White Cloud Charter, Inc. v. DeKalb County Board of Tax AssessorsWhite Cloud Charter, Inc. v. DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors
Whitе Cloud Charter, Inc. (“White Cloud”) appeals the judgment of the Superior Court of DeKalb County affirming the decision of the DeKalb County Board of Equalization (“Board”) upholding an ad valorem tax assessment on an aircraft owned by White Cloud.
When White Cloud’s aircraft was appraised for tax year 1997 at a fair market value of $5,894,000, White Cloud appeаled to the Board. After the Board found in favor of DeKalb County (“County”), White Cloud appealed to the superior court. In its appeal, White Cloud challenged both the taxability of its aircraft and, in the alternative, the failure of the Board to apportion the taxes since the airplane was only in this State for 164.5 days of the year.
The suрerior court conducted a de novo review. At issue was the applicability of
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to these facts: (1) In 1996, 45 flights originated from Peachtree DeKalb Airport (“PDK”) and no other single airport location had more than or an equal number of originating flights; (2) In 1996, three flights originated from White Plains, New York; and (3) In 1996, this aircraft was physically located in White Plains, New York on 34 different dates and оn either 186 or 159.25 days at PDK airport.
Notwithstanding these stipulated facts, White Cloud argued that in determining the “primary home base,” the Board also had to consider the locatiоn of its company office, the New York residency of the flight crew members, and the location at which most maintenance activities were performed. White Cloud emphasized its status as a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in White Plains, New York. It offered evidence that in 1997 it had rented hangar spаce in White Plains. According to the chief pilot’s affidavit, “[w]e consider White Plains to be the home base of the aircraft and it receives all of its scheduled maintenance there.”
The trial court found that while White Cloud’s principal place of business may well have been New York, the aircraft at issue was principally hangared аt PDK airport and the aircraft’s flights normally originated from there. Determining that under
1. White Cloud contends that the trial cohrt erred in affirming the Board because revenue statutes, when ambiguous, must be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority. White Cloud claims that the definition of “primary home base” is ambiguous and must be construed against the taxing authority.
Under the guise of construing a statute, we are not at liberty to rewrite it.
Cooper v. Edwards,
As the party initiating the appeal, White Cloud bore the burden of proving that in 1996 this aircraft was not principally hangared at PDK airport and that its flights normally did not originate from that airport. See
Hirsch v. Joint City County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
2. White Cloud claims that the court erred in affirming the Board’s decision because the Board’s calculation method was arbitrary, capricious and had no basis in fact or law. It claims that the 1997 taxes should have been based on information from 1997, not 1996.
This argument overlooks the obvious problem that it would not be possible to determine the location of the principal hangaring and the normal origin of flights until after the year concluded. Otherwise, aircraft might be subject to assеssment in the wrong county. Moreover, a county’s appraiser would need to be omniscient to anticipate that an aircraft would be primarily located within the county’s boundaries and have most of its flights originating therefrom nearly a year before the flights occurred and the aircraft had been hangared.
Thomas Starnes, a 25-year vеteran appraiser for the County, explained that initially a fair market value determination is made using a standard blue book for aircraft to ensure uniformity in assessments. Starnes testified that after this particular aircraft had been appraised, White Cloud appealed. Starnes then requested and obtained the flight records for 1996 from White Cloud. By using that flight data, Starnes determined on which calendar dates this aircraft had physically been present at different airports and was able to ascertain the оrigin of its flights. Starnes testified that the taxability of an aircraft is mainly determined by the flight logs, which for this particular plane showed mainly DeKalb both as to location and flight origination for calendar year 1996.
Notwithstanding White Cloud’s suggestion that the County “could have borrowed” from commercial airliner statutes which analyze the ratio of plane hours in this State to total system plane hours in order to calculate the primary home base of an aircraft, White Cloud cites no authority, and we know of none, in support of this methodology. In light of the express terms of
3. White Cloud contends that the court erred in affirming the decision of the Board because this aircraft was not in Georgia on January 1 of either 1996 оr 1997 and, thus, was not subject to taxation under
While the applicable Code section says “principally hangared or tied down” and “out of which its flights normally originate,” it does nоt require that the aircraft itself be physically present in a county on the first day of the calendar year. Otherwise, resourceful owners could strategically situate thеir aircraft outside this State for one day and thereby avoid tax liability for an entire year.
4. White Cloud claims that the court erred in affirming the Board even if the statute at issue is not ambiguous and even if the County’s method of calculation was not improper under the statute, because the tax assessment did not apportion the tax.
Although the Board claims that White Cloud did not raise the issue of apportionment, the notice of appeal shows otherwise, as does
the transcript of the hearing. But, in these cirсumstances, apportionment was neither required nor authorized by law. See
5. White Cloud asserts that the court erred in affirming the Board’s decision because
This argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, by failing to obtain a ruling from the trial court on the Board’s purported error, White Cloud waived the issue. See
Wilkes v. Redding,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The statute provides in pertinent part: “[a]ny person who owns tаngible personal property in the form of an aircraft which has its primary home base in a county in this state other than the county in which such person maintains a permаnent legal residence shall return such property for taxation to the tax commissioner or tax receiver of the county in which such primary home base is located.”