Priоr to October 8, 1917, the appellant company sold to one Jones, in Memphis, Tennessee, an automobile fоr jitney and taxi service, retaining the title to the car until the purchase price had been paid. But the payment hаd not been made on the date aforesaid. After purchasing the car, Jones, without the knowledge or consent of appellant, fitted the car with copper tanks having an aggregate capacity of seventy to eighty gallons of liquid, and, with the car thus camouflaged, proceeded to transport intoxicating liquor from Oaruthersville, Missouri, into аnd through Mississippi County, Arkansas, in violation of the laws- of this State. ■ -The sheriff of that county arrested the occupants of the car, who were fined for their violation of the law, and an order of the court was made confiscating the car.
Appellant brought replevin against the sheriff to recover the car, and the cause was heard upon an agreed statement of facts, containing, in addition to the above recitals, the statement that appellant was not a party to any of the procedure above outlined and had no knowledge of the tanks or of the use to which they were put, but, on the contrary, had no reason to believe the car was being used for any purpose оther than that for which it was sold to Jones, .to-wit, for taxi and jitney service.
Appellant has prosecuted this appеal to reverse the judgment of the court refusing to award it the possession of the car.
The car was confiscаted under the provisions.of section 6 of Áct No. 13 of the Acts of 1917, Vol. 1, p. 41-, prohibiting the shipment of intoxicating liquors into this Statе, and otherwise restricting the sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors. The relevant portions of the section referred to are as follows:
“That no property rights of any kind shall exist in the liquors mentioned in section 1 of this act, * * * or in аny vessel, fixture, furniture, implements, or vehicles, when the said liquors or other property mentioned are kept, stored or used for the purpose of violating any law of this State, nor in any such liquors, bitters and drinks when received, possessed, keрt or stpred at any forbidden place; and in all such cases the liquors, bitters and drinks aforesaid, and said property herein named are forfeited to the State of Arkansas and may be seized, or searched for and seized, under the lаws of this State and ordered to be destroyed in the manner and under the rules prescribed by law respecting contraband liquors or by order of the judge or court after a conviction * *
Appellant cites and relies upon the ease of Moody v. McKinney, (S. C.)
In that case, however, the violator of the liquor laws had possession of the horse and buggy without the knоwledge or consent of the owner thereof, and the Supreme Court of that State held that the statute quoted did not apply under the facts stated.
Without expressing an opinion as to what our holding would be under similar facts, it suffices to say that we have here a different case. The purchaser of the car had the possession thereof with the knowledge and consent of the appellant company. Indeed, the sale itself gave this right of possession and the violation of the law was committed under the possession thus conferred.
There are a number of cases in the Fedеral Courts upholding the right of seizure and confiscation of property used for an unlawful purpose under statutes forfеiting property rights in property so used.
In the case of United States v. One Black Horse,
And in the case of United States v. Two Bay Mules,
The case of Dobbins Distillery v. United States,
A statute similar in principle to the one here under consideration wаs construed in the case of United States v. Distillery at Spring Valley, Federal Case No. 963, in which the court said that it is expeсted that the owner of property will see to the use made of it, at his peril.
The case of Dobbins Distillery v. United States, sivрra, is annotated in 10th Roses’ Notes to United States Supreme Court Reports .(Revised Edition), p. 193, and numerous cases arе there cited which support judgments similar to the one here ¡assailed. See also Daniels v. Homer, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 997.
There apрears to be no question about the constitutionality of statutes similar to our own. Indeed, under the common law, proрerty thus illegally used would be forfeitable ipso facto.
We conclude, therefore, that, as the appellant company had voluntarily parted with the possession of the car, it can not complain against the judgment of confiscation rendered against it because of the unlawful use made of it by persons who were in possession of it with the appellant’s knowledge and consent.
Judgment affirmed.