159 Ga. 283 | Ga. | 1924
Lynch sued White & Hamilton Lumber Company for breach of a contract, which in substance is as follows: (1) That the party of the first part, the plaintiff, agrees to sell to the second party all pine lumber which he saws from timber on certain described tracts of land in McDuffie County, for and during the next 18 months, at and for the sum of $20 per thousand feet, on sticks at the mill, same to be located on one of said tracts .of land. First party agrees to begin cutting said timber into lumber within the next sixty days, and to continue the operation of his mill'with all reasonable speed, cutting not less than seventy-five thousand feet of lumber per month during the life of this contract, provided normal working conditions shall obtain for and during said period. The lumber is to be cut into one-inch boards, running four, six, eight, ten, and twelve inches in widths, and ten, twelve, and sixteen feet in lengths; is to be sawed so as to be delivered in good merchantable condition, and is to hold up full width and thickness
When the case came on for trial the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; and the defendant made a motion for new trial, which was overruled. Movant thereupon excepted, and by writ of error the case was taken to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court below, with direction that it stand affirmed upon certain conditions stated. The plaintiff in error in the Court of Appeals thereupon brought the- case to the Supreme Court for review by writ of certiorari.
What is the measure of damages which the seller can recover when the buyer of goods to be manufactured, after a portion of the goods have been made, repudiates the contract, and declines to pay for the goods already manufactured, and to accept and pay for those which have not been manufactured? The general rule is that the measure of damages, when the buyer repudiates the contract and refuses to receive and accept the goods, is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the goods at the time and place of delivery. Groover v. Warfield, 50 Ga. 644 (4); Camp v. Hamlin, 55 Ga. 259; Georgia Refining Co. v. Augusta Oil Co., 74 Ga. 497 (2); Huggins v. Southeastern Lime &c. Co., 121 Ga. 311 (5) (48 S. E. 933); Sizer v. Melton, 129 Ga. 143 (58 S. E. 1055); Phosphate Mining Co. v. Atlanta Oil &c. Co., 20 Ga. App. 660 (93 S. E. 532); Southern Upholstering Co. v.
We do not think that the measure of damages in such a case is the same, both as to the manufactured' and unmanufactured goods: It is well settled that a party to an executory contract may always stop performance by the other party by an explicit direction to that effect, though he thereby subjects himself to the payment of such damages as will compensate the other party for the loss he has sustained by reason of having his performance stopped at that stage in its progress. In such a case the contract is not rescinded, but broken; and while the party not at fault has the right to deem it in force for the purpose of the recovery of his damages, he is under no obligation, for that purpose, to tender complete perform
Damages are given as compensation for the injury sustained. Civil Code (1910), § 4390. What is the injury sustained by the seller under such circumstances? His injury would not be the same as that which he would sustain if he had completed the manufacture of the goods before the breach of the contract by the other party. The injuries being different, it necessarily follows that the compensation should not be the same. In a case where the goods have been manufactured at the time of the breach and have a market value, the difference between the contract price and the market value is the proper measure of damages; but if the goods have not been manufactured, the proper measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the cost of manufacturing them. This measure of damages is sustainable both on principle and by the weight of authority. To adopt a contrary rule and to allow the vendor to recover upon the theory that the goods had been manufactured would be giving to him more than his actual damages. Moline Scale Co. v. Beed, 52 Iowa, 307 (3 N. W. 96, 35 Am. R. 272). It would be compensating him for an injury which he did not sustain. It would be permitting him to recover expenses which he had not incurred. Under such a measure of damages the seller would receive more compensation than sufficient to meet the injury which he had sustained. This view is sustained by the great weight of authority. 35 Cye. 596; River Spinning Co. v. Atlantic Mills, 155 Fed. 466; Tufts v. Weinfeld, 88 Wis. 647 (60 N. W. 992); Lincoln v. Levi Cotton Mills Co., 128 Fed. 865 (63 C. C. A. 333); Kingman v. Hanna Wagon Co., 176 Ill. 545 (52 N. E. 328); Ludlow v. Peck-Williamson &c. Co., 116 Ky. 608 (76 S. W. 377); Dryfoos v. Uhl, 69 App. Div. 118 (74 N. Y. Supp. 532); Kimball v. Deere, 108 Iowa, 676 (77 N. W. 1041);
We could multiply authorities and citations sustaining the rule of damages stated above; but we deem it unnecéssary. While this court so far has never passed upon this precise question, it has in effect decided the principle involved. In Wallace v. Tumlin, 42 Ga. 462, which involved a breach of contract between the Western & Atlantic Eailroad and Tumlin & Stegall, in which the latter wore to furnish to the former water for a specific period, this court held: “That the actual damages which .the .plaintiff was entitled to recover embraces the difference between the cost of doing the work and the price to be paid for it.” So we are of the opinion that, under the facts of this case, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, as to the lumber manufactured and tendered to the defendants, the difference between the contract price and the market value of the lumber at the time and place of delivery; and, as to the unmanufactured lumber, the difference between the contract price and the cost of manufacturing the product. The rulings of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with these views, we think that its judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.