100 Ky. 358 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1897
delivered the opinion oe the court:
August 14, 1872, White & Cochran obtained a judgment against L. and M. A. Moore for $584.55, upon which, September 28, 1872, an execution was issued, and in due time returned with the official endorsement, “no property found.”
On and not until February 16, 1890, another was issued, which was returned with this official endorsement: “Received of M. A. Moore $200 on the within execution, and I return the within execution by consent of plaintiff April 20, 1891.”
And now this is an action in equity by M. A. Moore, one of the original defendants, in which he asks judgment quashing the third execution, issued February 2, 1894, vacating the levy made under it, and prohibiting plaintiffs in the original action from proceeding further by execution.
As more than fifteen years had elapsed after return of the first before the second execution was issued the statute of limitation operated as a bar to the latter, as also to the one issued in 1894, unless by one of the modes suggested for appellant, running of the statute was suspended, so that the time antecedent to the date of the second execution is not to be counted in computing the bar.
It has been repeatedly held by this court, and may be considered settled doctrine, that a partial payment
But more than fifteen years had elapsed, and consequently there was a complete statutory bar to any proceeding on the judgment of 1872, when the payment of $200 was made on the execution of 1892. Consequently no act of the defendants short of an express or clearly implied promise to satisfy the residue of the judgment, founded on moral obligation to do so, could have operated to revive it or entitle plaintiffs to an execution on it.
It appears that in 1876 an action in equity was instituted to subject certain propety of M. A. Moore to the satisfaction of the judgment of 1872, which.was pending until 1878. But that action was merely a Cumulative mode of securing satisfaction of the judgment, and did not have the effect to suspend plaintiffs’ right to successive executions, nor to stop tjie running of the limitation of the time within which they were required by statute to cause execution issued in order to prevent the bar to all proceedings on that judgment.