48 Conn. 520 | Conn. | 1881
Lead Opinion
This is an action of trespass, for assault and battery and false imprisonment, and was tried to the jury upon the general issue and notice. There were four defendants. The jury returned the following verdict:—
The coui’t accepted the verdict and rendered judgment for the plaintiff to recover of the defendants Tatem and Cox the sum of one hundred and seventy-five dollars and his costs. The defendaixts moved in arx’est of judgment for the irregxxlax'ity of the vex'dict. The case is before us upon the motion in error filed by the defendants upoxx the ovei’ruling of their motion in arrest.
The oxxly question is, Was the verdict regular and legal? A majoxity of the court think it. was clearly irregular and illegal, and that the court ex-red in accepting it and rendering jxxdgment upon it. It is elementary law that verdicts must correspond with and be responsive to the issues joined in the cause. The issue in this case was whether the defendants or axxy of them were guilty of an act of ti’espass against the plaixxtiff, and, if so, how much damage he had sustaixxed;—xxot how much damage he had sustained by the act of Tatem and how much at the hand of Cox, nor how much as a matter of equity between themselves each one ought to pay. There is no contribution between joint trespassers and the jury had no power to determine how much each one should pay. It is true the court disregarded that part of the verdict which apportions the damage and rexxdered judgment against both defendants for the whole sum. But this judgment does not correspond with the verdict of the jury. We think it very apparent that the jury considex’ed the apportionment an essential part of their verdict, and it is more than probable that no verdict would have beexx ren- ■ dered for the plaintiff had they supposed that their assess
Again, to sanction such a verdict would be to infringe upon the orderly and well-settled, practice of the courts and encourage a. species of jury-room arbitrament and assessment of damages among defendants whom they wished to favor, if there should happen to be any such. The court should have instructed the jury that the apportionment of damages was beyond their province and requested them to strike it out of the verdict, and upon their refusal so to do should have arrested the judgment.’
There is error in the judgment complained of.
In this opinion Carpenter and Pardee, Js., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I tliinlc the plaintiff has a clear legal right to retain his verdict and judgment for one hundred and seventy-five dollars damages against both defendants jointly.
In Gould’s Pleading, chap. 10, sec. 57, p. 522, it is said that “ a verdict finding the whole issue or the substance of it, is not vitiated by finding more; for the.finding of what was not in issue is but surplusage, and utile per inutile non vitiatur.” This proposition is well supported by the authorities. Bacon’s Abr., Verdict, N.; Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass., 303; Halsey v. Woodruff, 9 Pick., 555 ; Currier v. Swan, 63 Maine, 323 ; Windham v. Williams, 27 Miss., 313; O’Shea v. Kirher, 4 Bosw., (N. Y.) 120.
I know of no conflicting authorities, and the principle is applicable to the case at the bar, for the verdict contains every element of a valid verdict, not only in substance but in form. The issue is directly found for the plaintiff and against both defendants jointly. The damages which the plaintiff sustained are found to have been one hundred and seventy-five dollars, and the jury find for the plaintiff to recover that entire sum of both defendants with his costs.
So far the verdict was absolutely complete and perfect and the jury had no further jurisdiction. They did however append to this formal and complete verdict, in a detached paragraph, these words : “ The damages assessed by the jury to be divided as follows: against James B. Tatem seventy-five dollars ; against Haskell E. Cox one hundred dollars.” In so doing they transcended the limits of their duty and their jurisdiction and found “ more than was involved in the issue,” but under the rule above cited this part may be rejected as surplusage, and a perfect verdict will remain.
To construe the verdict as a several one against each of the defendants for the respective sums mentioned, seems to reverse the established rule by rejecting the legal part as surplusage instead of that which is illegal. All the analogies of the law forbid such a course. If, for instance, a judgment be erroneous only in part and that part be divisible, it will be reversed only as to that part. Reynolds v. Reynolds,
The rule as to verdicts ought to be and is less technical than that applicable to judgments, and requires that they be supported, if it may be done, by any reasonably liberal interpretation. Huntington v. Ripley, 1 Root, 321; Simmons v. Rarden, 9 Geo., 543; Elkins v. Parkhurst, 17 Verm., 105.
In this case manifest justice, as it appears from the entire record, requires that the verdict be sustained. Every element of the plaintiff’s case, including the damages, is directly found by the jury, and this finding is in no wise impaired by the additional words, giving them the strictest construction against the plaintiff; but giving them a liberal construction with a view to support the verdict and they amount to no more than a recommendation on the part the jury for an equitable apportionment of the entire damages as between the defendants, who may not in a moral point of view have been responsible to the same extent, though the jury had just found them legally so by finding for the plaintiff to recover the entire sum of both.
In Currier v. Swan, supra, the jury rendered a verdict in regular form, in an action of tort against four persons, and appended to it an apportionment of the damages among the several defendants, and it was held that the attempted apportionment amounted only to a recommendation, and if it was intended as anything else it was mere surplusage, to be rejected as irregular and void.
I cannot believe the jury had any idea of having two separate judgments, because it is utterly inconsistent with the formal joint verdict they had deliberately agreed upon.
But in the case at bar, unlike the above, the surplusage was not of a nature to indicate that the jury must have reasoned incorrectly or from false premises, and hence it should not vitiate the part which is clearly valid. Gregory v. Frothingham, 1 Nev., 256.
I think there was no error in the judgment complained of.
In this opinion Park, C. J., concurred.