WHISTLE STOP INN, INC. and Louise Liford d/b/a Thirsty Turtle, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Mayor Greg Ballard, Indianapolis City-County Council, and Hoosier Park, LLC, Appellees-Defendants Appellee-Intervening Defendant.
No. 49S02-1604-MI-175.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 11, 2016.
46 N.E.3d 1195
Conclusion
We hold that the autopsy report in this case was not prepared for the primary purpose of aiding in a future criminal investigation or prosecution. Because the autopsy report was not intended to substitute as trial testimony, we conclude that the autopsy report was non-testimonial for confrontation purposes. The admission of the autopsy report did not violate Ackerman‘s constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, the testimony provided by the pathologist, who did not perform the autopsy, also did not rise to a confrontation violation. This holding does not mean that every autopsy report will be found non-testimonial. Such a bright-line rule would seemingly go against the fact-sensitive analysis that is demanded by the primary purpose test. Rather, the particular circumstances of this case have not persuaded this Court that the autopsy report should be found to be testimonial in nature.
We also hold that Ackerman‘s due process rights were not violated based upon delayed prosecution. We affirm the trial court‘s denial of Ackerman‘s motion to dismiss. Finally, we conclude that, while it would be inappropriate for the current sentencing scheme to have influenced the trial court‘s decision on what sentence to impose under the 1976 sentencing statute that was controlling in this case, any error was harmless. As such, Ackerman‘s conviction for second degree murder and sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole are now affirmed.
RUSH, C.J., DICKSON, RUCKER, and MASSA, JJ., concur.
J. Lee McNeely, Cynthia A. Bedrick, Scott A. Milkey, McNeely Stephenson, Shelbyville, IN, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Indiana Association of Cities and Towns and Indiana Municipal Lawyers Association.
George A. Gasper, Eric J. McKeown, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae City of Gary.
Andrew P. Seiwert, Adriana Katzen, Amanda J. Dinges, Pamela G. Schneeman, Office of Corporation Counsel, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee City of Indianapolis, Mayor Greg Ballard, Indianapolis City-County Council.
A. Scott Chinn, Anne K. Ricchiuto, Brian J. Paul, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Mark Crandley, Peter J. Rusthoven, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Hoosier Park, LLC.
DICKSON, Justice.
We uphold Indianapolis’ non-smoking ordinance (“Ordinance“), finding that it does not violate the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. While the Ordinance provides an exemption to satellite gambling facilities but not to bars and restaurants, Article 1, Section 23 does not prohibit this disparate treatment. We affirm the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city.
Indianapolis first passed the Ordinance in 2005, banning smoking in public businesses but providing some exemptions, including for bars and taverns that had liquor licenses and neither served nor
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying the plaintiffs’ motions for emergency relief and judgment on the pleadings, by granting Hoosier Park‘s Motion to Intervene, and by granting summary judgment for the defendants on the Equal Privileges and Immunities claim. The defendants responded to these arguments and the City also asserted that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by res judicata, that Hoosier Park was properly permitted to intervene, that judgment on the pleadings would have been inappropriate, and that the Ordinance‘s exemption for satellite facilities violated the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause as compared to bars and restaurants. Whistle Stop Inn, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 36 N.E.3d 1118, 1130 (Ind.Ct.App.2015). The Court of Appeals severed the satellite facility exemption, finding that the rest of the Ordinance could still be given its intended effect. Id. The plaintiffs and Hoosier Park each petitioned for transfer,3 and we now address the constitutionality of the Ordinance‘s exemptions under the Indiana Constitution‘s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, and, except for severability,4 summarily affirm the Court of Appeals on the other issues.
First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.
As established in Collins, we “must accord considerable deference to the manner in which the legislature has balanced the competing interests involved.” 644 N.E.2d at 80 (citation omitted). We “[p]resum[e] the statute to be constitutional,” placing “the burden upon the challenger to negat[e] every conceivable basis which might have supported the classification.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). This deference, however, does “not eviscerate the two-prong constitutional test established,” but “merely emphasize[s] the importance of appropriate legislative deference, especially with regard to legislative classifications.” Paul Stieler, 2 N.E.3d at 1277. “[I]t is within the province of this Court to determine whether the exercise of legislative discretion violates express provisions of the Indiana and Federal constitutions.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The plaintiffs argue that applying the
I. The First Collins Prong
Under the first prong of the Collins test, “the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes.” 644 N.E.2d at 80. In this case, the disparately treated classes are satellite gambling facilities, which are exempted from the Ordinance, and bars and restaurants, where the Ordinance bans smoking. “In analyzing a Section 23 challenge, it is the disparate classification alleged by the challenger, not other classifications, that warrants review.” Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., Inc., 53 N.E.3d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2016). But those classifications must “have a sufficient basis in the challenged legislation.” Id. Here, the plaintiffs argued in their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings that the Ordinance violates
a. Inherent Characteristics
The plaintiffs and defendants apply different definitions of “inherent” when identifying potentially inherent characteristics. The plaintiffs cite several dictionaries, arguing that “inherent” characteristics are “permanent,” “essential,” “intrinsic,” and “inalienable.” Appellants’ Br. at 31. Hoosier Park responds that under Indiana case law, “different regulatory treatment between legislatively created classes” may be “inherent for purposes of equal privileges and immunities analysis.” Appellee Hoosier Park‘s Pet. to Tr. Reply Br. at 1. Under Indiana‘s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, “inherent” does not refer only to immutable or intrinsic attributes, but to any characteristic sufficiently related to the subject matter of the relevant Collins classes.
Collins itself was not concerned with dictionary definitions of “inherent,” but with longstanding precedent that “[t]here must be inherent differences in situation related to the subject-matter of the legislation which require, necessitate, or make expedient different or exclusive legislation with respect to the members of the class.” 644 N.E.2d at 78 (quoting Heckler v. Conter, 206 Ind. 376, 381, 187 N.E. 878, 879 (1933)). Such difference must have “reference to the subject matter.” Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80. Differences unrelated to the subject matter cannot satisfy the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause‘s inherency requirement, which “incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be ‘just,’ ‘natural,’ ‘reasonable,’ ‘substantial,’ ‘not artificial,’ ‘not capricious,’ and ‘not arbitrary.‘” Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
This meaning of “inherent” is reflected in our
We have also found that some attributes are not inherent to certain class distinctions. Preserving rural land around urban areas and preventing cities from annexing each other‘s land are not inherent to a county with a population of 200,000-300,000. Mun. City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 694 (Ind.2003). Likewise, a high percentage of out-of-town customers and recent upgrades to ventilation systems are not inherent to riverboat gambling facilities. Paul Stieler, 2 N.E.3d at 1275. When, as in these cases, a difference is so unrelated to the relevant classes that it does not refer to the subject matter distinguishing the classes, it is not inherent and cannot serve as a basis for disparate treatment under
In this case, the satellite facility exemption in the Ordinance requires that
Here, the application requirement is inherent because Indiana‘s legislature has made it a prerequisite to being a licensed satellite gambling facility. Without specifying “the heating and air conditioning units, smoke removal equipment, and other climate control devices,” a facility cannot be licensed under
b. Reasonable Relation
Under Collins’ first prong, disparate treatment must also be reasonably related to an inherent characteristic differentiating the classes. Id. The plaintiffs correctly argue that “[t]here is no requirement in the Indianapolis ordinance that ‘tobacco management’ be part of a licensure process.” Appellants’ Br. at 27. But obtaining a license in accordance with the Ordinance does require a description of “the heating and air conditioning units, smoke removal equipment, and other climate control devices.”
Paul Stieler also holds that because certain factors were “not embodied” in its challenged ordinance “as prerequisites,” they were “clearly not inherent distinguishing characteristics” and were not reasonably related to the disparately treated classes. 2 N.E.3d at 1275. After the Court of Appeals in this case applied that language, amici curiae City of Gary, Indiana Association of Cities and Towns, and Indiana Municipal Lawyers Association filed briefs requesting clarification of this precedent. Specifically, amici are concerned that a municipality may be required “to specifically identify, on the face of all class-creating ordinances, all distinguishing characteristics of each class and the reasons for those distinctions.” Br. of Amici Curiae Ind. Ass‘n of Cities and Towns and Ind. Mun. Lawyers Ass‘n at 2. We clarify today that inherent distinguishing characteristics and how they are reasonably related to disparate treatment do not have to be specifically stated or explained in an ordinance. As Collins noted, it is enough that “[t]he legislative classification may have been based upon various features reasonably distinguishing Indiana agricultural employers from other employers....” 644 N.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added). Disparate treatment may be related to structural differences embodied in an ordinance or statute which create inherent distinguishing characteristics that are reasonably related to the disparate treatment.
2. The Second Collins Prong
The plaintiffs also argue that the Ordinance violates the second prong of the Collins test because it “creates a monopoly” and “creates a preference and establishes an inequality among a class of citizens all of whom are equally meritorious.” Appellants’ Br. at 35, 37. “[U]nder the second element of the Collins analysis, any ‘preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.‘” Myers, 53 N.E.3d at 1166 (quoting Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80). The preferential treatment here—exemption from the Ordinance—does not violate the second prong because the restaurants and bars are not similarly situated with satellite gambling facilities. The plaintiffs are correct that the “[l]egislature cannot take what might be termed a natural class of persons, split that class in two, and then arbitrarily designate ... the original unit as two classes, and thereupon enact different rules for the government of each.” Appellants’ Br. at 32. See Myers, 53 N.E.3d at 1166 (finding that Collins’ second prong was violated when the legislature treated two classes of similarly situated tort plaintiffs differently based only on the nature of the tortfeasor). But here, satellite gambling facilities are significantly different from bars and restaurants—they are distinct types of businesses with separate licensing requirements and provide different services. The applicable licensing requirements and regulations are not arbitrary, but are tailored to the type of business.
The Ordinance also does not violate
Furthermore, even if the Ordinance‘s stated purposes were pretextual and the City included the satellite gambling facility exemption in part to gain economic benefits, the Ordinance would not violate
The plaintiffs’ arguments do not “negate every conceivable basis which might have supported the classification.” Paul Stieler, 2 N.E.3d at 1277. The plaintiffs argue that under Paul Stieler, they “do not have to negate every possible basis for the ordinance.” Appellants’ Br. at 41. Of course, plaintiffs are not required to come up with dozens of possible legislative rationales and refute each one in a complaint or appellate brief. See Paul Stieler, 2 N.E.3d at 1277. The requirement to “negate every conceivable basis,” however, reflects the heavy burden on plaintiffs in establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute. Id. If the challenged statute itself or a defendant advances a rationale which
Conclusion
The challenged Ordinance does not violate the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Ordinance‘s exemption for satellite gambling facilities is reasonably related to the inherent differences distinguishing satellite gambling facilities from bars and restaurants. The Ordinance also does not create a monopoly or treat similarly situated classes disparately in violation of
RUSH, C.J., and RUCKER, DAVID, and MASSA, JJ., concur.