67 Mo. App. 628 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1896
Plaintiff and other Indians left their reservation at Rose Bud Agency, South Dakota, under a contract, secured by bond, made by one Taylor with the secretary of the interior providing for their good'treatment during their absence and safe return to
On the trial there the validity of the assignments to plaintiff, the reasonableness of the charges, and the performance of the services by all of the Indians was admitted by defendant, who, however, denied that he made any contract directly with the plaintiff or his assignor. This denial raises the only issue of fact. Defendant also presented the question of the capacity of plaintiff — being a tribal Indian — to sue in the
The theory underlying that instruction is that plaintiff and his assignors being tribal Indians placed. on a reservation under a government treaty were disabled to sue in the state courts for the enforcement of contract rights entered into while they were off their reservation. The weight of authority is against this proposition. While under the protection of the government and living upon their reservation certain limitations, for the protection of the, Indians, are affixed to the exercise of contract rights by them. Jack Gho v. Charley Juless, 1 Wash. Ter. 325; R. S. U. S., secs. 2103, 2104. But when they are off their reservation, they are not debarred from appealing to the courts for the enforcement of personal rights, as well as those springing from contracts made by them while sojourning in the states. 1 Harvard Law Reporter, p. 149; 15 Am. Law Rep., p. 32; Swartzell v. Rogers, 3 Kan. 374; Wiley v. Keokuk, 6 Kan. 94; Labdellv. Hall, 3 Nev. 507-516; Yic Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Mo. Pac. R’y v. Cullers, 13 Law Rep. An. 542. The doctrine of these authorities is reasonable and consonant with the spirit of our institutions. It is part of the American creed — expressed in the chart of our liberties — that all men are created equal before the law. In the administration of justice, neither race, rank, nor riches confers any advantage on its possessor over any other person. These accidents are not permitted to mar the wisdom and purity of laws made for the equal protection of every human being. Upon this principle we have builded, on this continent, the fairest fabric of freedom which has met
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION.
The defendant who voluntarily took an appeal to this court, and who did not claim in his brief, or suggest in his argument, any doubt as to the jurisdiction of this court, now claims- in his motion for rehearing that the case is one “wherein the validity of a United States statute, or authority exercised under the United States, is drawn in question, and that hence the supreme court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction therein.”
The clause of the constitution of Missouri, on which this claim is based, has never been judicially construed by the supreme court. It evidently does not mean the construction of a statute of the United States, because while in, all other clauses the word construction is used, in this clause it is omitted, nor can such omission be justly claimed as accidental. This case does in no sense involve the validity of a statute of the United States, nor any authority exercised under it, because the validity of the statutes is conceded by both parties. It is for these reasons that we concluded upon examination of the cause that we had jurisdiction thereof. In order, however, to give the supreme court an oppor
Ordered that the cause be transferred to the supreme court, with copies of the opinions filed therein.