Diana Smith WHIPPLE
v.
Keith M. WHIPPLE.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Alan Fishbein, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant Diana Smith Whipple.
Ernest A. Kelly, Houma, for defendant-appellee Keith M. Whipple.
Before PONDER, WATKINS and CARTER, JJ.
WATKINS, Judge.
Diana Smith Whipple brought this action against Keith M. Whipple seeking to make executory alleged arrearages in alimony pendente lite. From a judgment dismissing her demand, Mrs. Whipple appeals.
Mrs. Whipple filed suit in East Baton Rouge Parish on May 27, 1981, seeking a separation from bed and board. The trial court awarded Mrs. Whipple alimony pendente lite in the amount of $1,500.00 per month. Mrs. Whipple obtained a judgment of separation on December 15, 1981, which continued the alimony pendente lite award.
Mr. Whipple subsequently filed suit in Terrebonne Parish seeking a divorce. Mrs. Whipple answered the suit demanding permanent alimony in thе amount of $1,500.00 per month. On April 5, 1982, the court rendered judgment granting Mr. Whipple a divorce and awarding Mrs. Whipple permanent alimоny in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for a period of four months, subject to a credit for $3,000.00 worth of gold in Mrs. Whipple's possession.
*1307 Mrs. Whipple appealed the judgment of divorce. On February 22, 1983, this court rendered judgment affirming the judgment of divorce and the permanent alimony award. Whipple v. Smith,
While the appeal was pending, Mrs. Whipple filed the present suit in East Baton Rouge Parish seeking to make executоry the alimony pendente lite payments which she alleges were due subsequent to the divorce decree and while the аppeal was pending. The trial court dismissed the suit, and Mrs. Whipple filed this appeal.
Mrs. Whipple contends that the judgment of divorce was not final until affirmed by this court and her application for supervisory writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court was denied, аnd, therefore, alimony pendente lite continued to accrue pending the appeal.
Mr. Whipple contends thаt since there is no suspensive appeal from a judgment awarding or terminating alimony under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3943, the judgment of divorce was exeсutory when it was rendered by the trial court.
LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3943 provides:
"An appeal from a judgment awarding custody of a person or alimony can be tаken only within the delay provided in Article 3942. Such an appeal shall not suspend the execution of the judgment in so far as the judgment relates to custody or alimony."
As the Official Revision Comments to Article 3943 note, the purpose of this provision is to prevеnt a spouse from being deprived of necessary support pending an appeal.
In support of his contention, Mr. Whipple relies on Donica v. Donica,
On Appeal, this court concluded that the trial court erred in ordering the husband to continue paying alimony pendente lite pending the wife's appeal since under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3943 the judgment of divorce terminating alimony pendente lite became executory at the time it was rendered. In support of its conclusion, the court relied on Malone v. Malone,
In support of her argument, Mrs. Whipple relies on Morris v. Morris,
The court in Morris concluded that alimony pendente lite continued to accrue while the appeal was pending, relying on Viser v. Viser,
Further, the court in Morris sought to distinguish Donica on the basis that the court in Donica failed to note that it was dealing with "two types of alimony resting upon two separate and independent legal and theoretical bases." We do not find this distinction persuаsive. The purpose of alimony pendente lite is to temporarily, pending litigation, provide for the spouse who does not have sufficient income for his or her maintenance. It is well settled that an award of alimony pendente lite automatically terminates upon divorce. See: Lewis v. Lewis,
Here, in the divorce proceeding Mrs. Whipple prayed for and was awаrded permanent alimony. If we applied the analysis used by the court in Morris to the facts of this case, we would be forced tо conclude that Mrs. Whipple had two valid judgments, one awarding alimony pendente lite and one awarding permanent alimony, which she could execute upon. We note that the courts in Morris and Viser did not have to deal with this issue since the divorce judgment in both of those cases did not award permanent alimony but instead denied the wife permanent alimony.
We therefore conclude that the rule set forth in Donica is the proper interpretаtion of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3943. As we noted, the purpose of that provision is to protect spouses from being deprived of necessary suрport pending appeal, not to allow a spouse who has already been awarded permanent alimony to continue collecting alimony pendente lite while an appeal is pending.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs are assessed against appellant.
AFFIRMED.
