Case Information

*1 Whether Agents of the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General are “Investigative or Law Enforcement

Officers” Within the Meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) A g e n ts o f th e D e p a rtm e n t o f J u s tic e O ffic e o f In s p e c to r G e n e ra l a re “ in v e stig a tiv e o ff ic e rs ” w ith in the m e a n in g o f 18 U .S .C . § 2 5 1 0 (7 ) a n d as su ch m a y b e a u th o riz e d to a p p ly fo r a n d c o n d u c t c o u rt-a u th o riz e d e le c tro n ic s u rv e illa n c e re g a rd in g m a tte rs w ith in th a t O ffic e 's in v e s tig a tiv e ju risd ic tio n .

May 29, 1990 L e t t e r O p i n i o n f o r t h e A s s o c i a t e U n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r n e y

S o u t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f N e w Y o r k

This responds to your request for our opinion as to whether agents of the Department of Justice Inspector General (“DOJ/OIG”) can be considered “ [i]nvestigative or law enforcement officer[s]” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7).' We have concluded that the DOJ/OIG falls within that statutory definition.

Your request arises from an application to the Criminal Division for court- authorized electronic surveillance pursuant to title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“OCCSSA”), Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. Ill, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520). During the drafting of that application, you considered the question whether agents o f the DOJ/OIG were authorized to act as “[investigative or law enforce ment officer[s]” who are permitted by OCCSSA to listen to intercepted communications. Because the question is one of first impression and in volves the intersection of the OCCSSA and the Inspector General Act, the Office of Enforcement Operations of the Criminal Division recommended that you seek our advice.

Title III of OCCSSA was intended to “provide law enforcement officials with some of the tools thought necessary to combat crime without unneces sarily infringing upon the right of individual privacy.”2 In general, the statute prohibits surveillance of wire and oral communications without the consent F reeh , A ssociate U nited S tates A ttorney, S outhern D istrict o f N ew York (A pr. 23, 1990). 2 Scott v. United States, 4 3 6 U .S. 128, 1 3 0 (1 9 7 8 ). L etter for W illiam P. B arr, A ssistant A ttorney G eneral, O ffice o f L egal C ou nsel, from L ouis J.

o f at least one party to the communication, but creates certain specific ex ceptions for law enforcement purposes, subject to procedural and substantive requirem ents.3 M ost relevantly, section 2516 provides for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications for law enforcement purposes pur *2 suant to a court order based upon a showing and finding of probable cause. U nder subsection 2516(1), the Attorney General and certain other officers within the Department of Justice may authorize the making of an application to a federal judge for an order “authorizing . . . the interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made,” if the underlying offense falls within one of several categories of federal crimes enumerated in section 2516. Under section 2518, each such application for a court order must be made in writing and include such information as “the identity of the investigative or law enforce ment officer making the application.” If the application is approved, the identified officer may listen to the intercepted communication. § 2518(3)-(5).4

Subsection 2510(7), in turn, defines “[ijnvestigative or law enforcement officer” to mean

any officer of the United States or of a State or political sub division thereof, w ho is em pow ered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses.

Because the definition is phrased throughout in the disjunctive — investi gative o r law enforcement officer, empowered to conduct investigations o r to make arrests — it seems plain that Congress intended the term “investigative officers” to be broad enough to include officials who participate in investiga tions but do not have arrest authority. Moreover, the only discussion in the legislative history of the term “investigative officers” indicates that the term encompasses all officers who carry out any law enforcement duties relating to offenses enumerated in section 2516:

Paragraph (7) defines “investigative or law enforcement of ficer” to include any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer empowered to make investigations o f or to make ar u se in te rc e p te d co m m u n icatio n s re la tin g to offenses o th e r than those specified in the c o u rt o rd e r if the d u tie s, m a y in su ita b le circum stances g iv e testim ony concernin g those co ntents, and m ay d isclo se and th o se c o n te n ts to the e x te n t that such u se is ap p ro p riate to the p ro p e r perform ance o f th e ir official d is c lo se th e c o n te n ts o f the com m unications to o th e r investigativ e o r law en fo rcem en t o ffice rs, m ay use § 2518(7). c e p t w ire o r o ra l c om m unications on an em ergency basis, subject to la te r ju d ic ia l review . fo rm e r are o b ta in e d in the course o f a co u rt-au th o rized intercep tion . in v e stig a tiv e o r law enfo rcem ent office rs specially desig n ated by an ap p ro p riate p ro se cu to r m ay in te r § 2 51 7( 1 )-(3), (5). Further, 'M o re o v e r, in v e stig ativ e o r law en fo rcem en t o fficers, if a utho rized to intercept c o m m unications, may S. R ep. N o. 1097, 90 th Cong., 2 d Sess. 27-28 (1968).

rests for any of the offenses enumerated in the proposed legis lation. It would include law enforcement personnel carrying out law enforcement purposes.

S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1968) (emphasis added).

Moreover, case law also interprets the term “investigative officer[s]” broadly to include all law enforcement officials involved in the investigation of the enumerated offenses, even if they lack the authority to make arrests.5 Finally, this Office has previously opined that in light of the use of “the broad term ‘investigatory’ [sic],” FBI support personnel qualify as “investi gative officers” within the meaning of section 2510(7).6

We believe DOJ/OIG agents qualify as “investigative officer[s]” under section 2510(7) as construed above, because these agents may make investi *3 gations of offenses enumerated in section 2516. Each Inspector General has the duty and responsibility to “provide policy direction for and to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations” relating to the programs and operations “of [the] establishment” in which he functions. 5 U.S.C. app. 3, § 4(a)(1).7 An Inspector General must also “conduct, supervise, or coordinate other activities carried out or financed by such establishment for the purpose of . . . preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in, its programs and operations.” § 4(a)(3). Inspector Generals also have responsibility “with respect to ( A ) . . . the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in . . . programs and operations administered or financed by such establishment, [and] (B) the identification and prosecution o f participants in such fraud o r abuse.” § 4(a)(4) (emphasis added). These responsibilities require an Inspector General to “report expeditiously to the Attorney General whenever the In spector General has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law.” § 4(d).8 Thus, the Inspector General Act en trusts the DOJ/OIG with investigative, auditing and other responsibilities ’ See U nited State v. Feekes , 879 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (prison in v estigato r w ith in sectio n 251 0(7)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 841 F.2d 1048, 1054 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (H ouse o f R ep rese n ta tiv es C o m m ittee in im peachm ent proceeding against federal ju d g e is an “ in vestigative officer” w ith in sectio n 25 1 0 (7 )); United States v. Clark, 651 F. Supp. 76, 79 (M .D . Pa. 1986), a ff'd , 857 F.2d 1464 (3d C ir. 1988), cert, denied, 4 9 0 U .S. 1073 (1989) (“W hile prison em p lo y ees m ay not be ‘the F B I o r o th e rs norm ally recognized as law enforcem ent o fficers,’ . . . [they] fall w ithin the category o f in v e stig ativ e o fficers . . . ."); Crooker v. Department o f Justice, 497 F. Supp. 500, 503 (D . C onn. 1980) (p riso n officials, ev en though lacking arrest authority fo r any o f the offenses en u m erated in sec tio n 2516(a), w ere in vestigators u n d e r section 2510(7)). ‘ M em orandum for W illiam H. W ebster, D irector, Federal B ureau o f Investigation, from T h eo d o re B. O lson , A ssistant A ttorney G eneral, O ffice o f L egal C ounsel, Re- Use o f FBI Support Personnel to M onitor Title III Surveillance at 20 (O ct. 31, 1984). ’ A lth o u g h the In sp ecto r G eneral A ct originally did not provide for an In sp ecto r G eneral w ithin the D e p artm e n t o f Justice, a 1988 am endm ent to the Inspector G eneral A ct c re ated the D O J/O IG . P ub. L. N o 100-504, 102 Stat. 2515, 2520-21 (1988). 8 T h e pro v isio n s re la tin g specifically to the D O J/O IG state that the Insp ector G eneral “ sh all be u n d e r the a u thority, direction, and control o f the A ttorney G eneral w ith respect to a u d its or in v estig atio n s, o r the issu a n c e o f subpoenas, w hich require access o f sensitive inform ation" con cern ing sp ec ified areas o f law en fo rcem en t. 5 U S C. app. 3, § 8D (a )(l).

relevant to the detection and prosecution of fraud and abuse within Justice Departm ent programs or operations.9

In particular, we believe that the DOJ/OIG’s investigative jurisdiction car ries with it the power to investigate offenses enumerated in section 2516, should the DOJ/OIG discover evidence that Justice Department personnel, contractors or grantees are engaging in such offenses in connection with the Department’s programs or operations. Among these offenses may be, for ex ample, bribery of public officials and witnesses (18 U.S.C. § 201), influencing or injuring an officer, juror, o r witness (id. §§ 1503, 1512, 1513), obstruction of criminal investigations (id. § 1510), wire fraud (id. § 1343), mail fraud (id. § 1341), and dealing in illegal drugs. See id. §§ 2516(l)(c), (e).

Accordingly, we conclude that DOJ/OIG agents (including special agents, auditors and investigators) are investigative officers within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7), and as such may be authorized by the appropriate officials within this Department to apply for and to conduct court-authorized electronic surveillance with regard to matters within the DOJ/OIG’s investi gative jurisdiction.

JOHN O. McGINNIS Deputy Assistant Attorney General Office o f Legal Counsel *4 ’ In d e e d , th is O ffice has stated that it h a d “no doubt that the [L ab o r D epartm ent] In sp ecto r G e n eral has c rim in a l in v e stig a tiv e a u thority . . . within the scope o f h is statuto rily -g ranted in v estig ative au th o rity .” Inspector G eneral A uthority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 Op. O .L .C . 54, 58 n.7 (1989).