35 P. 315 | Cal. | 1893
Almon Wheelock, executor of the last "will of Albert G. Wheelock, brought an action to set aside and declare null and void an assignment made by Albert G. Wheelock, deceased, to defendant Arabella Godfrey, upon the ground of the mental incapacity of said Wheelock to execute the same, and fraud on the part of said Godfrey in procuring the execution of such assignment, and also to recover from both the defendants the sum of money assigned. Albert G. Wheelock, plaintiff’s testator, according to the complaint, had on deposit
The bank defendant has taken an appeal from each of said judgments, and in each case the cause comes up on the judgment-roll ; this appeal being from the last or final judgment. As they are submitted together, it may be said here the first judgment or decree was, as between the defendants, an interlocutory judgment, which simply established the right to the deposit, but left the amount of the recovery thereon to be adjudicated and crystallized in the final judgment rendered October 30, 1891: Freeman on Judgments, sees. 29-33. We do not doubt that a satisfaction of the last judgment will extinguish the first, and all the rights of defendant Godfrey acquired thereunder. It must be admitted that there are serious defects in the record, some of which are inexplicable, growing out of the filing of an amended complaint pending the trial. These do not, however, affect this appellant, which occupies the position of a stakeholder as between the other parties. No judgment was rendered against^ it either on the original or amended complaint, but, on the contrary, it had judgment for costs against the plaintiff. The judgment rendered against it was in consonance with the prayer of its answer and cross-complaint. It stands indifferent, as between the other parties to the action; and the controversy having been settled as between them, and the deposit awarded to defendant Godfrey, it was in order for it to pay the demand), as it expressed a willingness to do. There were, however, good reasons apparent why appellant here should exercise due caution in the premises by not paying the demand until a final adjudication between plaintiff and its codefendant; and it may fairly be presumed this consideration was an important inducement to this appeal.
We concur: Belcher, C.; Haynes, C.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment appealed from is affirmed, each party to pay his own costs on appeal.