This is an asbestosis case. Plaintiff Albert Wheeler brought suit against the customary panoply of defendants, alleging that he contracted asbestosis as а result of being exposed to asbestos dust while working with and around defendants’ products at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. The trial court granted summary judgmеnt to defendants *476 appellees on the ground that the statute of limitations had run. Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, Wheeler contends that the court erred in finding there was no genuine issue of material fact on the controlling question of when he acquired sufficient knowledge of his injury to start the running of the two-year statute of limitations. He further argues that the three-part test first stated in Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 4 Phila. County Reporter 290 (1980), is not the correct test for determining whеn the statute begins to run, that the court improperly considered unsworn exhibits as part of the record on summary judgment, and that the court erred in failing to find thаt appellant was the victim of a continuing tort. For the reasons stated below we reverse and remand for trial.
We shall address first the question of thе test to be applied in determining when the limitations period begins to run. At the time the instant appeal was taken, the controlling statement on the issuе was found in Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 4 Phila. County Reporter 290 (1980). The Philadelphia court of common pleas therein held that the statute begins to run when the plaintiff knows or reasоnably should know: (1) the injury, (2) the operative cause of the injury, and (3) the causative relationship between the injury and the operative conduct.
Aрpellant argues that a better formulation of the test was stated in
Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos,
Volpe
was affirmed by this court en banc.
Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
The instant action was commenced on September 5, 1978. In granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the record established that appellant knew he had contracted asbestosis as a result of exposure at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard no later than August 8, 1974, more than two years prior to commencing suit. The court based its decision on certain medical records which were attached as exhibits to the motion for summary judgment, a workers’ compensation claim form, likewise attached as an еxhibit, and appellant’s deposition testimony.
Appellant attacks the trial court’s reliance on unsworn exhibits, arguing they are not properly рart of the record on summary judgment. We agree. Under Pa.R.C.P. 1035, the record on summary judgment includes “the pleadings and any depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and supporting affidavits.” In
Irrera v. SEPTA,
Appellees argue that the documents should be admitted although unsworn because they nevertheless mеet three “criteria” supposedly stated in Irrera (See Appellees’ Brief at 6). This argument is based on a misreading of Irrera. The “criteria” cited by appеllees are part of a quotation in Irrera of Pa.R.C.P. 1035(d), which does not create an exception to the rule that unsworn documents may not be considered. Rule 1035(d) simply specifies requirements which an affidavit must meet to be considered on summary judgment. The rule still clearly requires that the documents in fact be аffidavits. The medical records and other documents at issue here are not affidavits. Therefore, the court erred in considering these documеnts in ruling on appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
However, our inquiry may not stop here, because the court also based its decision on apрellant’s deposition testimony. In his deposition, appellant was questioned extensively about statements he admitted making in his own handwriting on a workers’ compensation claim form. He admitted he had written August 8, 1974 in two places on the form, as (1) the date he first became aware of his illness (asbestosis) and (2) the date he first realized the illness was caused or aggravated by his employment. Appellant attempted to explain that he did not actually know he had asbestosis on August 8, 1974 and wrote that date on the claim form only because his doctor told him to. In the course of this discussion, the following colloquy ensued:
Q. Okay. What were you told by the doctor?
A. On August the 8th?
Q. On October 27th, ’76.
A. That I had asbestosis.
*479 Q. And as to this date, August 8th, 1974, is that the same conversation you had with Dr. Duca?
A. Yes.
Deposition of Albert Wheeler at 104-05.
The trial court interpreted this as an admission by appellant that he knew he had asbestosis on August 8, 1974. We disagree. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is to examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts and ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party.
Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co.,
Furthermore, the above statements of aрpellant must also be read in conjunction with the remainder of his deposition testimony. Elsewhere in the deposition, appellant maintained unequivocally that he was not told he had asbestosis until October 1976, which is less than two years before the action was commenced. See Deposition of Albert Wheeler at 44-45, 47-48.
Whether this testimony is credible is not the issue. On a summary judgment motion, the court’s function is not to try disputed issues of fact but simply to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist.
Taylor
*480
v. Tukanowicz,
Order reversed and case remanded for trial. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Notes
. We further note that the question whether appellant should have known of his injuries at some earlier date through the exercise of reasonable diligence was not raised below by the parties and is not before us.