76 Neb. 761 | Neb. | 1906
The facts presented by this appeal are substantially as follows: It appears that the board of equalization of Lancaster county completed its labors for the year 1904 within the time fixed by statute, and thereafter, on the 7th day of July, the county board levied taxes to the amount of 15 mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the property of said county. Ho objections were made to such levy, and no complaint in relation thereto was ever filed with or presented to said board by any one. On the 21st day of July,'1904, one Charles O. Whedon, a resident taxpayer of said county, gave notice of an appeal to the district court from the order constituting such levy of taxes, filed his bond, obtained a transcript of the proceeding in question, filed the same in the district court for said county,
The appellant contends that the statutes authorize an appeal from such levy, while the appellees insist that the law makes no such provision; and this is the principal question for our consideration. The right of appeal in this state is purely statutory, and, unless the statute provides
“An appeal cannot be prosecuted as of right, but only when authorized or granted by the statute. The provision * * * (of the statute) which provides for an appeal to test the correctness of the decision of the board on one, only, of the contentions committed to it to decide, is a denial, by implication, of the right to appeal from any other of the decisions of the board.”
The same rule, in substance, was announced in Dutton v. Board of Review, 188 Ill. 386, and In re Appeal of Wilmerton, 206 Ill. 15. The reason for our conclusion is made clear by what was said by Chief Justice Holcomb in Hacker v. Howe, 72 Neb. 385, where we find the following:
“An assessment means the determination of the value of a man’s property for the purpose of levying a tax; an official listing of persons and property with an estimate of the value of the property of each for purposes of taxation. 3 Cyc. 1111.”
This clearly distinguishes the act of assessment from the order constituting the tax levy. A proper and legal assessment must first be made, and the value of the taxable property of the county must be thus ascertained as a basis for the subsequent act of levying sufficient taxes to conduct the governmental affairs of the state, the county and its several municipalities. So, the statute providing for an appeal from the decision of the board of equalization in certain matters of assessment can have no application whatever to the subsequent action of the county board by which the tax is levied. This would seem to be the view entertained by the supreme court of Iowa in construing a statute very like our own. City Council of City of Marion v. National Loan & Investment Co., 122 Ia. 629. Speaking of a case where the jurisdiction of the court depended on the right to appeal, the supreme court of Iowa said:
“No presumption can be entertained to the effect that*765 jurisdiction as to the subject-matter appealed from exists. The record must show it. As in the case of an appeal to this court, we can proceed only when it appears as an affirmative fact, established by matter of record, that a judgment has been rendered from which an appeal may be taken. And consent of parties — much less, mere silence on the part of the appellee — cannot be accepted as sufficient to take the place of a record showing the essential fact of jurisdiction.” Green v. Ronen, 59 Ia. 83; Groves v. Richmond, 58 Ia. 54.
Again, it would seem clear that the legislature never intended to confer jurisdiction upon the courts by appeal to review or control the discretion of the county board in the matter of levying taxes.. To grant the district court such powers would, in effect, substitute its discretion for that of the county board, the tribunal to which the statute has specifically committed that duty. So, we are of opinion that the right of appeal to the district court from an order of the county board in making the necessary tax levy under the provisions of section 137, art. I, ch. 77, Comp. St. 1903, does not exist, and therefore that court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters set forth in the appellant's petition.
It follows that the judgment of the district court in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the appeal herein was right, and it is therefore
Affirmed.