Zachary WHEAT
v.
Brаndon NIEVAR, Allstate Insurance Co., U.S. Agencies Casualty Insurance Company, Incorporated, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*774 William Cooper, III, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Zachary Wheat.
Brad Brumfield, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Defendants, Brandon Nievar & Allstate Insurance.
Van Heard, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Defendant, La. Dept. of Public Safety.
Jonathon Duncan, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Defendant, U.S. Agencies Casualty.
Eric Pittman, Denham Springs, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee, Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office.
Before GAIDRY, McDONALD, and McCLENDON, JJ.
McCLENDON, J.
Plaintiff, Zachary Wheat, appeals the district court's sustaining of the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription filed by one of the defendants, Willie Graves, in his official capacity as Sheriff for the Parish of Livingston (Sheriffs Officе). We reverse and remand.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from a two vehicle rear-end traffic accident on Interstate 12 in the Parish of Livingston, on October 30, 2003. The original timely filed petition set forth not only the place and time of the traffic accident, but also specifically asserted that plaintiffs vehicle "crested the overpass on Interstate 12 over Range Avenue [and] encountered stopped traffic cоnditions." Although plaintiff safely stopped his vehicle, one of the named defendants, Brandon Nievar, whose vehicle had been traveling directly behind plaintiffs vehicle, was not able to stop and hit plaintiffs truck. The original petition also alleged that the traffic was being directed by defendant, the Louisiana State Police. Plaintiff further alleged that the police should have placed a vehicle on the upslope of the crest to warn approaching cars before they crested the rise in the interstate roadway. Plaintiff asserted that the decision to place a patrol car "beyond the crest of the overpass . . . caused and/or contributed to the significant losses suffered by plaintiff Zachary Wheat."
A tort action is subject to a liberative prescriptive period of one year. LSA-C.C. art. 3492. The Sheriffs Office was added as a defendant by amended petition filed more than a year after the accident. In pertinent part, Mr. Wheat's amended petition noted that the original petition was copied "in extеnso," and asserted the following additional allegations:
At the time of the accident, and in the time immediately prior to same, upon information and belief, employees of the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office assisted thе United States Border Patrol who was conducting a manhunt in an attempt to capture two men who had previously escaped their custody. This *775 manhunt and the attempt to set up a perimeter within which to searсh for these two escapees caused the traffic to slow in front of plaintiff and defendant [Brandon Nievar].
3.
Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that a contributing cause of the accident, which caused his damages and other losses, was the negligence of the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office in failing to more appropriately cordon off traffic and/or warn other motorist[s] of the traffic congestion.
4.
Plaintiff Zаchary Wheat shows that [defendant] the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office is responsible for the injuries and damages suffered by plaintiff, because of the non-exclusive list of negligent acts committed by the defendant as set forth herein below:
. . .
5 Failure to properly position authorized units in an appropriate place for warning oncoming motorists of impending danger ahead;
6 Violating state law and/or regulations with regard to providing proper emergency response to traffic congestion. . . .
On appeal, Mr. Wheat argues that the named defendants in the original petition and the Sheriff's Office are joint tortfeasors. Thus, pursuant to LSA-C.C. аrt. 2324, suit against one suspended prescription against any other joint obligor or tortfeasor. Additionally, Mr. Wheat, citing Ray v. Alexandria Mall,
Citing Lajaunie v. Colony Insurance Co.,
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRECEPTS
If a petition has prescribed on its face, the burden shifts to thе plaintiff to show that the action has not prescribed. Spott v. Otis Elevator Company,
The Louisiana Civil Code provision instituting comparative fault, article 2323, applies to the acts of "all pеrsons causing or contributing to" a plaintiffs damages. LSA-C.C. art. 2323 A. Article 2324 C of our Civil Code provides that "[i]nterruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor *776 is effective against all joint tortfeasors. See Marchand v. State Farm, 2003-2598, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/04),
APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRECEPTS TO THE FACTS
It is undisputed that prescription had run at the time of the amended petition's filing. Thus, Mr. Wheat bore the burden to show that prescription had been interrupted by the initial filing against a joint tortfeasor. See Rizer, 95-1200 at pp. 2-3,
Although Mr. Wheat does not use the specific phrase "joint tortfeasor" or employ the word "jointly" in his amending petition, Louisiana is a fact pleading state that values substance over form and does not require the use of magic titles or terminology as a threshold requirement for validly pleading an action. When legally permissible, a petition should be maintained against a peremptory exception to afford a party his day in court. "Pleading is the `handmaid rather than the mistress' of justice." Teachers' Retirеment System of Louisiana v. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System,
In Lajaunie, the case cited by the Sheriffs Office, plaintiffs: Howard, Angela, Rachal, and Melinda Lajaunie, sued Arthur Taylor, the defendant driver, and his insurer. By an amending petition, filed after prescription had run, the Lajaunie plaintiffs named their insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) as a defendant, and, for the first time, alternatively alleged that if Mr. Taylor was not solely at fault, one of the plaintiffs, Angela Lajaunie, was concurrently or solely at fault. However, Angela was never named as a defendant. In response to the amending petition, Allstate filed a peremptory еxception raising the objection of prescription. Subsequently, all the plaintiffs settled their claims against Mr. Taylor and his insurer, and those defendants were dismissed. The trial court then granted Allstate's exception and dismissed Allstate from the suit, with prejudice. The dismissal of Allstate was challenged on appeal by the Lajaunie plaintiffs, with the exception of Angela. The appellants argued that the filing of the original suit against a joint tortfeasor interrupted prescription. Lajaunie, 99-1771 at pp. 2-3,
In the Lajaunie appeal, this court noted that no evidence was presented at the hearing on the exception of prescription, and the opinion itself рrovided no specific allegations of fact from the petitions. Based on Angela's status as a plaintiff at the time of the filing of both the original petition and untimely amending petition, the assertion of fault in the аlternative, and on the absence of "allegations of the joint tortfeasor status between Taylor and Allstate," we affirmed Allstate's dismissal. Lajaunie, 99-1771 at pp. 5-6,
To interpret Lajaunie's reference to the lack of "allegations of the joint tortfeаsor status" as mandating the use of specific terms, such as "jointly" or "joint *777 tortfeasor," is an invalidly narrow and speculative interpretation. See Doyle v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 99-0459 & 0460, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/31/00),
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment dismissing the suit against the Sheriffs Office and remand the case to the district cоurt for further proceedings. The costs of the appeal are assessed against appellee-defendant, Willie Graves, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Livingston Parish.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GAIDRY, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
McDONALD, J., concurs.
GAIDRY, J., agreeing and assigning additional reasons.
While I agree with the majority's analysis and the result, I provide these additional reasons simply to clarify the well-settled point that there is no such legal entity as a "sheriff's office"; there is only the sheriff. See Valentine v. Bonneville Ins. Co., 96-1382, pp. 4-5 (La.3/17/97),