21 S.E.2d 258 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1942
1. The court did not err in directing a verdict against the defendant's plea in bar.
2. The overruling of the motion for new trial was not error.
The State admitted as true all the allegations of fact contained in paragraphs 1 to 7, inclusive, of the plea, but denied the conclusions of defendant as set out in paragraph 8 of the plea. Paragraphs 1 to 7, inclusive, of the plea were admitted in evidence as an agreed statement of facts, and after argument of counsel the jury, on the direction of the court, returned a verdict against the plea. To the direction of the verdict the defendant excepted pendente lite, and assigned error thereon in his bill of exceptions. The question for determination on that assignment of error is, in effect, whether, under the revenue tax act to legalize and control alcoholic beverages and liquors (Ga. Laws 1937-1938, Ex. Sess., pp. 103-124), where the qualified voters of a "dry" county have voted intoxicating liquors back into the county, such voters of the county can, after the expiration of two years from the date of the declaration by the ordinary of the result of the previous election, legally *549 vote such liquors out of the county. And this question must be determined by the proper construction of said act, and especially of section 4 thereof.
It is true that the act made no specific provision for the call of a second election after one election had been held resulting in favor of taxing, controlling, and legalizing the manufacturing, possession, distribution, and sale of intoxicating liquors and beverages. However, in section 4 of the act, it is stated that "no ordinary shall call, nor shall any election provided for herein, be held within two years after the date of the declaration of the result by the ordinary of the previous election for such purpose under this act." It is well settled that in the construction of a statute the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view, at all times, the old law, the evil, and the remedy. Code, § 102-102, par. 9. As regards the statute under consideration, the old law was the strict prohibition law applying to all counties in Georgia. The evil was that many counties were inflicted with "bootleggers" and "blind tigers," and that in those counties the public officials who had the duty of enforcing the law were often lax in the performance of that duty, and that laxness resulted in a wide and growing disrespect for all other laws. The General Assembly, recognizing the evil, sought to eradicate it by enacting the statute under consideration, thereby leaving to the voters of any county the right to determine whether that county should be "wet" or "dry."
The contention of the defendant, as set forth in his special plea, is, in effect, that it was the intention of the legislature in passing the act to provide that after a "dry" county had once been voted into the "wet" brigade, it could never again be voted back into the "dry" column, but must remain "wet" forever. In our opinion that construction of the statute is unreasonable and unthinkable. "Where the intention of the legislature is so inadequately or vaguely expressed that the court must resort to construction, it is proper to consider the results and consequences of any proposed construction, and the court will, if possible, place upon the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, oppression, hardship, or inconvenience, unreasonableness, prejudice to public interest, or absurd consequences, or conclusions not contemplated by the legislature." 59 C. J. 969-972, § 574. In Gazan v. Heery,
In our opinion it was the intention of the legislature in passing the act in question to provide that the voters of any "dry" county should have the right to determine whether the county should remain dry or become wet; and that, regardless of how that election went, the voters should have an opportunity, after the expiration of two years, to again determine whether the county should be wet or dry. We think that the legislature in passing the act inadvertently omitted giving the voters that right. The fact that the legislature in 1941 (Ga. L. 1941, pp. 199-200) amended the above-referred to act of 1937-1938 by specifically authorizing such a second election does not show that the legislature in passing the act of 1937-1938 did not intend to provide for such a second election. As before stated, we think that the General Assembly in the act of 1937-1938 intended to include such a provision in that act but inadvertently left it out; and that when that omission was discovered, the General Assembly, in the act of 1941, "to make assurance doubly sure," provided specifically for such a second election. The cases cited in the brief of counsel for the accused are distinguished by their facts from this case. The court did not err in directing a verdict against the plea in bar.
The verdict was authorized by the evidence; and none of the special grounds of the motion for new trial shows cause for a reversal of the judgment.
Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre and Gardner, JJ., concur.