Wharff v. StateWharff v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Darden
OPINION
DARDEN, Judge.STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Michael Matthew Wharff appeals the denial to him of credit for his time on electronic home detention in the trial court’s order revoking his probation. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 19,1993, Wharff pleaded guilty to burglary as a class C felony. On June 21, 1993, Wharff was sentenced to five years, with the sentence suspended. Wharff was placed on probation for five years, and as a condition of probation, he was placed on electronically monitored home detention for the first 180 days thereof. After a third subsequent arrest in late 1996, the trial court revoked Wharffs probation. The court determined Wharff was not entitled to credit for the time he spent in electronic home monitoring as a condition of probation but only to jail time credit, and ordered Wharff to serve his five year sentence less only the jail time credit.
DECISION
Wharff contends that the trial court erred in denying him credit for time served during the period of his home detention against his sentence. He first argues that confinement on home detention constitutes imprisonment pursuant to
Capes v. State,
634 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind.1994). He concedes that the “Indiana legislature responded to the
Capes
decision with a 1994 amendment to
according to the controlling law of the state of Indiana and the Indiana Supreme Court, confinement on home detention still constitutes imprisonment and as such, offenders should still receive credit toward release for the actual time served confined.
Id. Our supreme court revisited Capes in Franklin v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Ind.1997), and held that “the amendment to the post-conviction home detention statute evinces legislative intent that credit time can no longer be awarded to pretrial home detainees.” Therefore, the holding of Capes that pre-trial home detention qualifies for credit for the time on home detention was overruled. Id.
Wharff next argues that a series of appellate decisions “have misconstrued
Finally, Wharff claims “the distinction between the statutory term ‘credit time’” and “the concept of ‘credit for time served’ ” has been blurred by Collins and Barton. Wharffs Brief at 12. He directs us to no statutory mandate for his “concept” of credit for time served. Moreover, we cannot agree that home detention as a condition of probation constitutes “time served.” The 1993 judgment of conviction ordered Wharffs five year sentence “suspended and that defendant be placed on probation for a period of 5 years on the terms and conditions as set forth by the court.” (R. 48). One of those conditions was that Wharff be on electronic home detention for 180 days. Therefore, his period of detention was a probation term and not time served.
We affirm.
SHARPNACK, C.J., and BARTEAU, J., concur.
Notes
. Ind.Code 35-38-2.6-6 allows credit time to be earned by persons sentenced to certain community corrections programs.
. Specifically, the statute provides that “a person who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under IC 35-50-6
unless
the person is placed in the person’s home.”