8 Conn. Supp. 313 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1940
The question presented by this appeal is a reviewable one in the Superior Court. O'Hara vs. HewlittConstruction Co.,
It is now claimed that the mother of the deceased should share the award equally with the wife, independent of any contingency such as death or remarriage of the widow. Massachusetts has a statute almost identical with that of Connecticut, and while no case with an exact analogy of fact has been decided, questions have been raised giving rise to a construction of the statute in that state.
The pertinent part of our statute reads: "The following described persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: (a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his injury or from whom she receives support regularly; (b) a husband upon a wife with whom he lives at the time of her injury or from whom he receives support regularly; (c) any child under the age of eighteen years, or over said age but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon the parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly at the time of the injury of such parent, there being no surviving dependent parent. In case there shall be more than one child thus dependent, the death benefit shall be divided equally among them. In all other cases, questions of dependency shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the injury. In such other cases, if there shall be more than one person wholly dependent, the compensation in case of death shall be divided equally among them, and persons partially dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof."
McNicol's case,
In Coakley's case,
In still a third case, Holmberg's case,
The fact then is that in Massachusetts there have been at least the three cases, supra, submitted for decision in one of which, at any rate, the court sought a broad construction of the act and so construed it. Coakley's case, supra. One of these cases resulted in an amendment of the law. It may be that legislative action may be required as the only solution with respect to our statute. If public policy so requires this case should receive the consideration of our appellate court *316 first, in view of the decisions and attendant uncertainty evidenced in Massachusetts.
It is a novel case and the question involved is not free from reasonable doubt. It is a question that is liable to arise in other cases. The court is therefore of the opinion that the question is of such public interest that it should be reserved for determination by the Supreme Court of Errors in order that a definite rule be established applicable to future cases, as provided in section 5266 of the General Statutes, Revision of 1930, and it is so ordered.