Whalen v. IvesWhalen v. Ives
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Spear
The defendant appeals from a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $261,122.96. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) conducted a hearing in damages after he filed an answer that required the clerk “automatically” to set aside an earlier default for failure to plead, (2) granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s notice of intention to contradict the plaintiff’s allegations at the hearing in damages, and (3) denied the defendant’s motion to file a late notice of defenses as to the hearing in damages. We disagree with all of the
The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant received certain valuable coins, a firearm and other articles that were stolen in a burglary of the plaintiff’s home. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for default for failure to plead on January 17, 1992, and the clerk sent notice of the default to all parties on January 22, 1992.
On February 6, 1992, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the default pursuant to
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to strike, stating in its memorandum of decision that “[ajccordingly, the defendant was defaulted not because he failed to plead but because he failed to comply with
The defendant then filed a motion for permission to file a late “notice of defenses as to hearing in damages.” That motion was denied by the trial court, and a hearing in damages was held on July 7,1993. The trial court awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages of $78,245, which were trebled pursuant to
I
The defendant first contends that he is entitled to use
“The rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to Practice Book rules.” Grievance Committee v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 22, 470 A.2d 228 (1984); Brown v. Smarrelli, 29 Conn. App. 660, 663, 617 A.2d 905 (1992) , cert. denied, 225 Conn. 901, 621 A.2d 284 (1993) . Two principles of statutory construction militate against the interpretation urged upon us by the defendant. The first principle is: “[W]hen two statutes relate to the same subject matter every effort should be made to find a reasonable field for the operation of both statutes . . . [and] where there is a reasonable field of operation for each statute which does not impinge on the domain of the other, it is the court’s duty to give them concurrent effect.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Windham First Taxing District v. Windham, 208 Conn. 543, 553, 546 A.2d 226 (1988); see also McCarthy v. Commissioner of Correction, 217 Conn. 568, 578, 587 A.2d 116 (1991).
Upon being defaulted for failure to plead, the defendant must make a choice of which section to invoke. To decide otherwise would run counter to a second well settled rule of statutory construction. Neither statutes nor court rules should be interpreted in a way that leads to bizarre results. “When two constructions are possible, courts will adopt the one which makes the [statute] effective and workable, and not one which leads to difficult and possibly bizarre results.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gabrielle v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378, 386, 635 A.2d 1232, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928, 640 A.2d 115 (1994). “[I]n construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts will assume that [the legislature intended to accomplish] a reasonable and rationale result . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 212 Conn. 727, 737, 563 A.2d 1347 (1989).
A rational result may be obtained by interpreting the rules to require that the defendant elect his remedy. A defaulted defendant could take the guaranteed set aside of § 363A by filing an answer or invoke the court’s discretion pursuant to § 376. This would effect the judicial economy inherent in streamlining the short calendar pursuant to § 363A without impinging on the exercise of the court’s authority to deny a motion to set aside such a default or to attach conditions thereto pursuant to § 376.
We conclude that once the defendant invoked the court’s discretion pursuant to § 376, he was bound by the court’s order thereon and was not entitled to the benefit of § 363A with respect to the same default.
The defendant next claims that the court’s order striking his “notice as to hearing in damages” was improper for two reasons. First, he asserts that a motion to strike is not the proper vehicle to address such a notice and, second, he contends that the ten day period pursuant to
A
The defendant correctly asserts that a motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). He argues that because the attack on the notice addressed its timeliness rather than its legal sufficiency, the motion to strike was improper. In support of this argument, the defendant cites Mac’s Car City, Inc. v. DeNigris, 18 Conn. App. 525, 528, 559 A.2d 712, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 807, 563 A.2d 1356 (1989), for the proposition that the proper way to raise a claim that a cause of action is time barred is by way of a special defense, not a motion to strike.
We do not need to address the issue of whether a motion to strike or a special defense is the proper way to raise a timeliness claim pursuant to § 368 because
Even though the plaintiff’s motion here is labeled “motion to strike” and invokes
There is nothing in the plaintiff’s motion to strike that addresses the legal sufficiency of the defendant’s notice of defenses. The sole claim made by the plaintiff is that the notice was untimely. This “motion” is, therefore, more properly viewed as an objection to the filing of the notice rather than a pleading that attacks the contents of the notice. Although the trial court ruled that the “motion is appropriate to address the legal sufficiency of what is in effect an answer,” we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on an alternative ground supported by the record. See Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 592, 606 A.2d 693 (1992); Latimer v. Administrator, 216 Conn. 237, 252, 579 A.2d 497 (1990); In re Jennifer G., 29 Conn. App. 689, 693, 617 A.2d 921 (1992).
It is necessary to treat the plaintiff’s motion as an objection in order to achieve a rationale result in read
B
The defendant further asserts that there was no notice of a default that triggered the ten day provisions of § 368. He also claims in the alternative that § 368 provides that a notice of defenses can be filed, in the case of a denial of a motion to strike, within ten days from the expiration of the time limited for pleading over. The defendant’s notice here was filed within ten days of the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike the case from the hearing in damages list.
We address the defendant’s alternative claim first because it is easily refuted. The part of § 368 that he cites refers only to a situation where a party has a right to plead over.16 After the court denied the defendant’s motion to strike this case from the hearing in damages list, the defendant could not have pleaded over because he had already been defaulted for failure to plead. Therefore, the defendant’s reliance on this part of § 368 is misplaced.
The trial court’s order of February 25,1992, granting the defendant’s motion to set aside the default for failure to plead on certain conditions constituted what is commonly referred to as a nisi order. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines nisi as: “Unless, if not: except.” Such orders are conditional and empower the affected party either to avoid an adverse order of the court or to cause an existing adverse order to be set aside or vacated by complying with the specified conditions.17 The present case is an example of the latter type of nisi order. The defendant was empowered by the trial court to effect a set aside of the default for failure to plead by complying with the two conditions set by the court. If the defendant had timely complied with those conditions, the default would have been set aside effective as of the date of compliance without the need for further action by the court. By failing to comply with
The notice that triggered the ten day provisions of § 368 was, therefore, the January 22, 1992 notice of default for failure to plead. Because that default was never set aside, the trial court’s statements that the defendant was defaulted for failure to comply with the conditions set on February 25,1992, and that the order of February 25 was the notice of default, were of no consequence. Although the trial court referred to
The plaintiff’s assertion that the February 25,1992 order of the trial court could not be notice because the ten days would have run prior to the expiration of the time period within which the defendant could have complied with the court’s conditions is also without merit.19 We agree that the February 25 order was not notice of a default for the reasons discussed previously. The ten day period after February 25, 1992, is irrelevant because the ten day period for filing a notice of defenses began to run from the January 22, 1992 notice and had expired before the defendant filed his motion to set aside the default on February 6,1992. The trial court’s
Normally a default conclusively determines liability. Ratner v. Willametz, 9 Conn. App. 565, 579, 520 A.2d 621 (1987). Pursuant to § 367, a defaulted defendant who files a timely notice of defenses can contradict the allegations of the complaint and prove matters of defense in addition to contesting the amount of damages. This approximates what the defendant would have been able to do if he had filed an answer and special defenses. In order to obtain this extraordinary relief, the defendant must act within ten days of the notice of a default “[i]n all actions where there may be a hearing in damages . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Ill
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court improperly denied his motion to file a late notice of defenses as to a hearing in damages. The defendant’s motion to file a late notice of defenses was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We reverse discretionary rulings of the trial court only where such discretion has been abused and has caused prejudice or injustice. See State v. Denby, 35 Conn. App. 609, 620, 646 A.2d 909 (1994); State v. Harrison, 34 Conn.
In view of all of the circumstances here, including the fact that the notice of defenses was filed more than three and one-half months late, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to file a late notice of defenses.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“If a party who has been defaulted under this section files an answer before a judgment after default has been rendered by the court, the clerk shall set aside the default.”
We note that
See footnote 2.
Our discussion is focused on
See footnote 5.
See footnote 5.
An example of the former is an order by this court that an appellant’s appeal will be dismissed if the appellant’s brief is not filed by a certain date. If the appellant fails to file the brief on or before the designated date, the dismissal enters as of that date without further order of the court.
See footnote 3.
The defendant’s claim that he was entitled to notice of his own failure to comply with the nisi order defies logic and common sense. In addition, such a requirement would place an unnecessary and onerous burden on the clerk’s office because the clerk would have to set up a system to monitor such orders and to notify noncomplying parties of that which they already know.