WFTV, INC., d/b/a Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., Sun-Sentinel Company, Inc. and Miami Herald Publishing Company, Appellant,
v.
Dorothy H. WILKEN, Clerk of the Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
*675 L. Martin Reeder, Jr., and Cristina M. Simon of Steel Hector & Davis, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
Charles F. Schoech and Bill Corley of Caldwell & Pacetti, Palm Beach, for appellee.
Lorence Jon Bielby of Greenberg Traurig Hoffman Lipoff Rоsen & Quentel, P.A., for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Court Clerks, Inc.
PARIENTE, Judge.
This lawsuit arose when the Clerk of the Palm Beach County Circuit Court commenced charging $1.00 per page for copies of court records, asserting that this charge was in accordance with subsection 28.24(8)(a), Florida Stаtutes (1995). Appellants challenge the legality of the $1.00 per page charge. We affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment because we find that the principles of Times Publishing Co. v. Ake,
*676 In Ake, our supreme court approved the decision of the second district that:
The clerk, when acting in the exercise of his duties derived from article V is acting as an аrm of the court and, as such, is immune from the supervisory authority of the legislature. Thus, chapter 119 does not apply to the clerk in such capacity and the access to judicial records under his control is governed exclusively by rule 2.051 [of the Rules of Judicial Administration].
Contrary to appellants' position, charging a fee for copying judicial records does not interfere with appellants' constitutionally protected right to access. In fact, in Roesch v. State,
Our supreme court emphasized in Ake that it had directly addressed its responsibility concerning access to court records by adopting In re Amendments to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051-Public Access to Judicial Records,
In fact, in Amendments to Rule 2.051, our supreme court rejected certain language urged by Times Publishing Company, stating: "We choose not to accept these suggestiоns because to do so could have fiscal ramifications...."[2]
As an alternative argument, appellants contend that if the legislature has the authority to mandate the fees charged for copying court records, then the $.15 per page charge set forth in subsection 119.07(1)(a) аpplies, rather than subsection 28.24(8). Section 28.24 establishes a comprehensive fee schedule for services provided by the clerk,[3] and specifically, section 28.24(8)(a) provides for a service charge by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of $1.00 per page for the making of copies by photographic process for "any instrument in the public records" consisting of pages not more than 14 inches by 8 1/2 inches. Appellants argue that subsection *677 28.24(8) does not apply to all court records because all court records are not included within the phrase "any instrument in the public records."
While section 28.24 sets forth the mandatory amounts to be charged by the clerk of court for a comprehensive list of specific services, subsection 119.07(1)(a) is a general statute applicable to all custodians of public records. Subsection 119.07(1)(а) requires the custodian of a public record to furnish a copy
upon payment of the fee prescribed by law or, if a fee is not prescribed by law, for duplicated copies of not more than 14 inches by 8 ½ inches, upon payment of not more than 15 cents per one-sided copy, and for all other copies, upon payment of the actual cost of duplication of the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
If cоurt records are not encompassed by subsection 28.24(8), there would be no fee prescribed by law, and subsection 119.07(1)(a) would apply. This is because there is no other subsection within chapter 28 dealing with the copying of court records and no other statute specifically pеrtaining to charges for court records.
The focus of our statutory analysis is the phrase "instrument in the public records." The term "public records" has been defined by statute, see § 28.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); the term "instrument" has not. As we stated in Arthur Young & Co. v. Mariner Corp.,
When courts are required to interpret statutory language, "a statute should be construed and applied so as to give effect to the evident legislative intent, regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute's literal meaning." Nevertheless, that intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute. "When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute itself must be given its plain and obvious meaning."
(Citations omitted). See also Green v. State,
"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutоry language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green,
The ordinary meaning of the term "instrument" can include those documents having independent legal significance such as contracts, deeds, wills, bonds, or leases as well as a more expansive definition of "[a]nything reduced to writing, a document of a formal or solemn сharacter, a writing given as a means of affording evidence." See Black's Law Dictionary 801 (6th ed.1990).[4] Whether or not an "instrument" includes all court records maintained by the clerk depends on whether a restrictive or expansive definition of "instrument" is employed.
*678 In a July 11, 1994 opinion, the Florida Attorney General opined that thе term "instrument" within section 28.24(8) included only those documents having independent legal significance, such as contracts, deeds, wills, bonds, or leases.[5]See 94-60 Op. Att'y Gen. (1994). The Florida Attorney General utilized only part of Black's dictionary definition and ascribed the narrowest construction to the term. Appеllants urge us to adopt this construction or to utilize an even narrower definition restricting "instruments" to only those documents that are recorded.
A statutory term should not be read in isolation, but rather in context. See C.S. & J.S. v. S.H. & K.H.,
(1) "Official records" means each instrument that the clerk of the circuit court is required or authorized to record in the series of books called "Official Records" as provided for in s. 28.222.
(2) "Public records" has the same meaning as in s. 119.011[6] and includes each official record.
(Emphasis supplied). Because public records encompass both recorded and unrecorded documents, if the lеgislature had intended to restrict the $1.00 charge to recorded documents only, it would have utilized the phrase "instrument in the official records." See § 28.24(15)(c). Therefore, an "instrument in the public records" must include unrecorded, as well as recorded, instruments.
The next issue for our determination is whether the lеgislature intended to limit the term "instrument" to a narrow class of court records, consistent with the Attorney General's opinion. A phrase must be viewed in the context of the entire statutory section. See Jackson v. State,
Other examples of the expansive use of the term "instrument" within section 28.24 are as follows:
(5): For certifying copies of any instrument in the public records ... $1.00 per page
* * * * * *
(10): For copying any instrument in the public records by other than photographic process, per page ... $4.00.
If the term "instrument" were limited to recorded documents, there would be no charge established for certifying copies of all other court documents. In view of the fact that section 28.24 encompasses a comprehensive schedule of services and the corresponding charges, it is logical to conclude that the legislature intendеd to set charges for all court records and not only a very limited class of documents. See Arthur Young,
*679 A statutory phrase should also be viewed not only in its internal context within the section, but in harmony with interlocking statutes. See C.S.,
Finally, we note that section 25.241, Florida Statutes (1995), requires the clerk of the supreme court to collect a fee of at least $1.00 for the copying of "opinions, records, papers, or other instruments." (Emphasis supplied). The use of the term "other" in the phrase "or other instruments" indicates that opinions, records, and papers are included in the term "instruments" for purposes of that statute. Because the subjeсt matter of sections 25.241 and 28.24(8) is closely related, i.e., the copying of public records, it follows that the term "instrument" should be interpreted consistently in the two sections. See Florida State Racing Comm'n v. McLaughlin,
A reading of section 28.24 as a whole and in pari materia with similar statutеs governing court records leads us to the conclusion that there is no legal distinction in section 28.24 between the term "instrument" and the term "document," and court records are thus included within "any instrument in the public records" subject to subsection 28.24(8)(a) copying charges. Accordingly, the summary judgment is affirmеd.
KLEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
NOTES
Notes
[1] We do not address appellants' contention that the charge of $1.00 per page is unreasonable because this point was not raised in the trial court. The case was submitted to the trial court on a set of stipulated facts.
[2] Times Publishing Company suggested substitute language to address its concerns about copyright protection, confidentiality, and the statement that the closing of court proceedings requires prior notice while the closing of court records does not. In re Amendments to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051Public Access to Judicial Records,
[3] Examples of the services covered and fees charged by the clerk of court under section 28.24 include the following: court attendance by each clerk at $75.00 per day; court minutes at $5.00 per page; verifying any instrument presented for certification prepared by someоne other than the clerk at $2.00 per page; and recording, indexing, and filing any instrument not more than 14 inches by 8 1/2 inches at $5.00 for the first page and $4.00 per each additional page.
[4] Black's Law Dictionary 801 (6th ed.1990) contains the following definition of "instrument":
A formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or lease. A writing that satisfies the requisites of negotiability prescribed by U.C.C. Art. 3. A negotiable instrument (defined in U.C.C. § 3-104), or a security (defined in U.C.C. § 8-102) or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.
Anything reduced to writing, a document of a formal or solemn character, a writing given as a means of affording evidence. A document or writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, fоr the purpose of creating, securing, modifying, or terminating a right. A writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act or agreement. Anything which may be presented as evidence to the senses of the adjudicating tribunal.
Incomplete instrument. A paper whose contents show, at the time of signing, that it is intеnded to become an instrument but that is not an instrument because a necessary element is missing.
(Citations omitted).
[5] This narrow definition of the term "instrument" led the Florida Attorney General to conclude that chapter 28 does not require the clerk of the circuit court to charge $1.00 per page for all рublic records. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 94-60 (1994). We note that the opinion of the Attorney General is not binding on a court, although it is entitled to careful consideration and generally should be regarded as highly persuasive. See State v. Family Bank of Hallandale,
[6] According to section 119.011, Florida Statutes (1995):
(1) "Public records" means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapеs, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing software, or other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or means of transmission, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency.