79 Md. 153 | Md. | 1894
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, as
The Court below construed the will, and from the decree George Y. Wethered, Jr., who is one of several tenants for life in the residue of the estate, and two infant children of Mrs. Owings, who are interested in the same as remainder-men, have appealed.
One question involved in the decision below was whether Mary Wethered was the owner of certain furniture mentioned in the proceedings, which she claimed was given to her by the testator in his lifetime. The Court decided adversely to her claim, but as she has not appealed, that controversy is not before us.
The appeal of the Owings children presents an interesting question, which it is necessary for us to pass upon, viz., Are the life tenants entitled to the whole net income from! the residue of the estate from the death of the testator, or is said income, or any part thereof, liable for the debts of the testator and costs of administration?
The general principles governing the rights of the several kinds of legatees are quite well established; but, as is the case with most litigation arising from the construction of wills, there is an apparent conflict between some ■of the authorities on the question now before us, which, however, can in a great measure be reconciled by a careful examination of the facts.
A specific legacy ordinarily entitles the legatee to income, profits or proceeds of the article from the death of the testator, because such legacies “ are considered as separated from the general estate and appropriated at the time of the death of the testator.”
General legacies bear interest from the time the principal is payable, and, when the testator fixes no time for pay
Annuities given by wills ordinarily commence from the testator’s death, and according to. most authorities, a bequest of the residue of the personal estate for life, with the remainder over, generally entitles the life tenant to the income, commencing with the death of the testator; certainly as between the life tenant and remainder-man.
Of course, the income from all the personal estate is as liable for the debts of the decedent as the principal, and must be so applied, if necessary; but when the estate is ample to pay all debts, expenses of administration and legacies, and there still remains a considerable residue, the income of which is, by the terms of the will, to be paid to life tenants, and then the corpus or principal to go to remainder-men, the above principles wilt apply, unless the testator has provided otherwise, or there be some peculiar circumstances which would change the general rule. If the intention of the testator can be gathered from the will, his wishes should be gratified in these matters as well as others, unless in conflict with some well established rules of law. In ascertaining the intention of a testator, Courts must consider all the circumstances properly before them, and must not place such construction upon the provisions of the will as will do injustice to any of the parties, or would be contrary to what a reasonable man ■would likely intend, unless the terms of the will be so clear as to admit of no doubt as to what the testator did intend.
In the case before us the record shows that the testator’s estate consisted of personal property appraised at $31,-
He then gave all the rest and residue of his estate of every kind, wherever situated, to the appellee in trust for the following uses, purposes and trusts: “First. To divide all the net income of my whole estate into five (5) equal parts, and semi-annually to pay one of said portions to each of the following persons, during the lifetime of said persons, viz., One-fifth part to Elizabeth Wethered, widow of my brother Samuel Wethered, and one-fifth part to each of her four children,” naming them. He then directed what- should be doné in the event of the death of the life tenants.
There is nothing in the record to show what debts, if any, the testator owed when he died. Nor is there anything to show the amount of the expenses connected with the administration. The administration accounts are not in the record, although apparently filed with the bill. The reference to them in the record simply gives the date they were filed, and the fact that the balance was transferred to the appellee without stating what that balance was.
There were, of course, funeral expenses and costs of administration, in addition to the hundred dollars to be paid to the authorities of Greenmount Cemetery, and the
There are not only no difficulties disclosed by the record in the way of a speedy and easy settlement of the estate, but, on the contrary, it was an unusually simple one to settle. Under such circumstances we do not think it would be equitable to call upon the life tenants, or the income that would otherwise go to them, to pay the expenses of administration or other charges to be paid. It only remains
In Evans et al.vs.Iglehart et al., 6 Gill & J., 192, the Court after deciding “ that the increase and income resulting from personal property specifically bequeathed, where the assets are abundant to pay debts and legacies, enure to the benefit of the specific legatees, and form no part of the general residue,” said: “We can discover no solid ground of distinction between the rights of a legatee for life to the increase and profits of a specific legacy, from the testator’s death, and the rights of a similar legatee of a general residue to like interests from the same period.”
In Merryman,Ex’r vs. Long, 49 Md., 545, this Court decided that the income received by the executor during the first year after the death of the testator should be applied to the payment of debts and expenses of administration, but in that case the property consisted chiefly of improved leasehold estate, appraised at $>7335.
It was necessary either to apply the income or to sell the leasehold property. Under those circumstances the Court thought it would not be equitable to require a sale of the leasehold property to pay the debts and costs. The Court was of the opinion that no real injury was done the life tenant by thus relieving the corpus of the estate of the indebtedness and thereby save it from a sale. It can readily be seen how, under such circumstances, it might work a great hardship on remainder-men to sell the property. They would not only lose so much of the proceeds as would be necessary to pay the debts and costs, but a sale wuuld probably result in having a much less satisfactory investment of the surplus.
Whilst leasehold property is personalty, and as such devolves on the executor, and is held by him subject to the rights of creditors, yet so far as the safety of the investment is concerned, it resembles real property; and a remainder-man is generally better protected with an
A Court of equity might well hesitate to require the sale of the tvhole corpus of other kinds of personalty to pay debts and costs, when the nse of the income for a year would avoid the necessity of a sale which might jeopardize the surplus of the principal in a worse investment. But there was nothing in the will of Long to cause the Court to conclude that he intended the property to be sold, or did not intend the income to be applied, if necessary, to the debts, &c. The terms of the portion of the will quoted in the opinion of the 'Court would seem to indicate the contrary. He bequeathed the property in trust for the use of his wife, “ so that she be permitted and suffered to hold and enjoy the same property and estate, and the rents, issues, interest and income thereof, after payment of all groundrents,taxes, insurance, repairs and expenses upon said property * * * * and after her death in trust for the testator’s grandchildren.” The circumstances of that case differ very materially from the one we are now considering.
In Abell vs. Abell, 75 Md., 64, this Court concurred in the conclusion.of the Court below, “that the daughters, the devisees and legatees for life, are entitled to the net income, without any deduction from the payment of costs of administration, debts and legacies,” for the reasons stated in the opinion of the learned Judge of the Circuit Court. In that opinion the Judge said: “As to the circumstances of the estate, they present a striking contrast to those disclosed in Merryman, Ex’r vs. Long, 49 Md., 546, where a reasonable necessity existed for the application of the first year’s income to the payment of debts.”
.What was said in the Abell case applies equally well to this, and we think that the testator’s intention, as gathered from his will, and the nature and character of
Of course the income on so much of the principal as must be sold and used for the purposes herein stated, will not be payable to the life tenants as the residue of the estate is lessened to the amount of the principal so used.
The case of Lovering vs. Minot and others, 9 Cush., 156, is in accord with our conclusions. See also Green vs. Green, 30 N. J. Eq., 451 (affirmed in Green vs. Blackwell, 32 N. J. Eq., 768); Townsend’s Appeal, 106 Pa. St., 268 ; Baily, Petitioner, 13 R. I., 560 ; Pell vs. Mercer, 14 R. I., 432 ; Custis and wife vs. Adkins Adm’r, 1 Houston, 382; 2 Wins, on Executors, [1391], [1393] and notes, (3th Am’n Ed.).
Several of those cases show that the fact that the property is left to trustees instead of to the life tenants directly, makes no difference. The Abell case is also in point in that respect.
We are also asked to construe the will in reference to several other matters that may hereafter arise. This prayer is based on the provisions of the Code of Public General Laws embraced in sections 26 to 31 of Article 16, sub-title “ Declaratory Decrees.”
The case was very ably argued, and the Court would be greatly aided in reaching a proper construction of the will both by the oral arguments and the briefs filed presenting the views of the respective counsel. But we have not been convinced that this is a proper case to exercise the discretion vested in us by the statute above referred to, by pass
Being of the opinion that the Court ought not, under the circumstances of the case, to have passed upon the disposition of the corpus of the estate or of the income- in the event of Mary Wethered, George Y. Wethered, Jr., and Eliza Y. Owings, or any of them dying leaving issue, we must reverse so much of- the decree as undertakes to do so (without desiring to be understood as differing with the Court below on such construction, as we express no opinion
Decree reversed in part, and affirmed in part; costs to be paid by the appellee from the corpus of the estate.