WESTSIDE COMMUNITY FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. MARIO G. OBLEDO, as Secretary, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
L.A. No. 31561
Supreme Court of California
Feb. 7, 1983.
33 Cal. 3d 348
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Thomas E. Warriner, Assistant Attorney General, Floyd D. Shimomura and William F. Soo Hoo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Fleishman for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Fred Okrand, Terry Smerling, Paul L. Hoffman, Dale L. Gronemeier and Abouaf, Epstein, Myers & Gronemeier as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
OPINION
BIRD, C. J.—Did the trial court in this case abuse its discretion in granting attorney fees to plaintiffs pursuant to
I.
On November 8, 1979, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, asking the court to order defendant to issue final regulations implementing
Defendant filed an answer on December 12, 1979, in which he acknowledged that he had not as yet issued final regulations, but asserted that he was in the process of formulating regulations. He denied that he had failed to comply with
The declaration of William Wilder, special assistant to defendant Obledo, was attached to the answer. Wilder said he was in charge of drafting regulations to comply with
Defendant‘s answer also asserted that the court had no authority to order issuance of final regulations, because (1) the former Administrative Procedure Act (former §§ 11371-11445; see current § 11340 et seq.) required notice to the public and public hearings before the proposal was adopted; (2)
Wilder‘s declaration stated that the procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act were already underway.
On December 14, 1979, at a superior court hearing on the petition for writ of mandate, defendant told the court that the draft regulations would be released to the public in January. The trial court continued the hearing until January 30, 1980.
Prior to the January court hearing, defendant released the proposed regulations to the public and filed a copy with the trial court. Defendant also informed the trial court that he planned to complete hearings on the regulations by the end of May of 1980 and issue the regulations in early June. Another court hearing was scheduled for June 2, 1980.
One week later, on February 7, plaintiffs filed a notice of motion for attorney fees under
Prior to the June 2, 1980, hearing, defendant informed the court that the regulations would be issued by the end of June. The court issued an alternative writ of mandate which ordered him to issue regulations by June 30, 1980, or show cause why he had failed to do so. Final regulations were issued on June 24, 1980.
In July of 1980, plaintiffs requested supplemental attorney fees. The trial court awarded additional fees of $1,538 in September of 1980. Defendant appealed from this award, and the two appeals were consolidated.
II.
Defendant argues that there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court‘s conclusion that plaintiffs were a “successful party” in this action, or that the lawsuit “resulted in” the enforcement of a right. He points first to the fact that the lawsuit never reached a final judgment. However, past cases from both this court and the federal courts demonstrate that an attorney fee award may be justified even where a plaintiff‘s legal action does not lead to a favorable final judgment.5
For example, in Northington v. Davis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 955 [154 Cal.Rptr. 524, 593 P.2d 221], the defendant city claimed that it altered its plans “voluntarily” shortly after the plaintiff‘s lawsuit was filed. The city argued that this alteration should not be considered a “benefit” achieved by the lawsuit. (Id., at p. 960, fn. 2.) This court disagreed, holding that an attorney fee award may be based on such a “voluntary” change, where it is a result of plaintiff‘s legal action. “[P]rior authorities make it clear that ‘voluntary’ corrective action, induced by litigation, may properly be considered a ‘benefit’ of the litigation in determining the propriety of an attorney fee award. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
In Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 313, 325 [72 Cal.Rptr. 146], cited with approval in Northington, the Court of Appeal upheld an attorney fee award in an action that was resolved through a settlement. The court held that “[i]t was not significant that the ‘benefits’ found were achieved by settlement of plaintiffs’ action rather than by final judgment.” (Ibid.)
Numerous federal decisions have reached the same conclusion, holding that attorney fees may be proper whenever an action results in relief for the plaintiff, whether the relief is obtained through a “voluntary” change in the defendant‘s conduct, through a settlement, or otherwise. (See, e.g., Sullivan v. Com. of Pa. Dept. of Labor, etc. (3d Cir. 1981) 663 F.2d 443, 447-450; Robinson v.Kimbrough (5th Cir. 1981) 652 F.2d 458, 465-466; American Constitutional Party v. Munro (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 184, 187-188.)
Thus, an award of attorney fees may be appropriate where “plaintiffs’ lawsuit was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought. . . .” (Robinson, supra, 652 F.2d at p. 465, italics added.) A plaintiff will be considered a “successful party” where an important right is vindicated “by activating defendants to modify their behavior.” (Ibid.)
However, in order to justify a fee award, there must be a causal connection between the lawsuit and the relief obtained. Thus, in Northington, this court found that the defendant‘s “voluntary” action was “induced by” the plaintiff‘s legal action. (Northington v. Davis, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 960, fn. 2.) And in Fletcher, the settlement was clearly a result of the plaintiff‘s lawsuit. (Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, Inc., supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at p. 325.) The federal decisions have required that a plaintiff‘s action be a “material” factor or have “contributed in a significant way” to the result achieved. (Sullivan, supra, 663 F.2d at pp. 447-450; Robinson, supra, 652 F.2d at pp. 465-466; American Constitutional Party, supra, 650 F.2d at pp. 187-188.)
Where there is no causal connection between the plaintiff‘s action and the relief obtained, an attorney fee award is not proper. “[N]o award is required if the court determines that plaintiff‘s suit was completely superfluous in achieving the improvements undertaken by defendants on plaintiff‘s behalf.” (Nadeau v. Helgemoe (1st Cir. 1978) 581 F.2d 275, 281.) In American Constitutional Party, supra, 650 F.2d at page 188, the court rejected a claim for attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs had introduced no evidence demonstrating that their lawsuit had played a “causal role” in achieving the result they sought.
Defendant here argues that plaintiffs’ lawsuit was “completely superfluous,” with no causal connection to defendant‘s action, the issuance of final regulations implementing
Were there any evidence in the record to support the trial court‘s order, this court would be reluctant to reverse that order on appeal. However, when faced with no basis in the record for the trial court‘s holding, how can this court properly give deference? In general, it is the task of the trial court to “realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical perspective,
Nevertheless, trial court discretion is not unlimited. “The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is shown. [Citation.]” (6 Witkin (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 244, p. 4235; Martin v. Cook (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 799, 807 [137 Cal.Rptr. 434]; Frank E. Beckett Co. v. Bobbitt (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d Supp. 921, 927-928 [4 Cal.Rptr. 833].)
Here, there is no reasonable basis for the trial court‘s award of attorney fees to plaintiffs.7 Therefore, the orders awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs are reversed.
Richardson, J., Kaus, J., and Brown (Gerald), J.,* concurred.
BROUSSARD, J.—I respectfully dissent. The facts clearly indicate that this lawsuit acted as a catalyst by speeding up the process of issuance of the final regulations.
Sections 11135 and 11139.5 of the Government Code were enacted in September of 1977; yet, two years later, when this lawsuit was instituted, only proposed regulations had been drafted. No dates had been set for public hearings; no date had been set for issuance of final regulations; indeed, the proposed regulations themselves had not yet been issued. There were plans to send questionnaires to various agencies in January for the purpose of further prolonged study of the fiscal cost of the regulations that would have taken a minimum of 12 weeks to complete, after which at least 30 days would have been necessary to notice public hearings; in addition, respondent planned to seek the concurrence of the State Building Standards Commission—a complex process which would have taken a long, if not inordinate, period of time.
In contrast, only one month after the initiation of this lawsuit, the trial court ordered respondent to advise it by January 30, 1980, of a date when the final
At the January 30 trial court hearing, respondent advised the court that final regulations would be issued by June 2, 1980. The trial court decided to continue the matter until such time. When it became apparent that respondent was not going to meet the June 2 deadline, the trial judge issued an alternative writ of mandate to either issue the final regulations by June 30, or show cause why the regulations should not issue. Respondent issued the final regulations on June 24, 1980.²
As the majority recognizes, “‘voluntary’ corrective action, induced by litigation, may properly be considered a ‘benefit’ of the litigation in determining the
The majority errs, unfortunately, in its vain search for specific evidence in the record to identify the “causal” connection, such as an affidavit or statement by the respondent that the lawsuit induced him to speed up the process. Such an affidavit, however, is simply unnecessary here. The trial judge, after considering the totality of the circumstances, was quite able to make a determination that a causal connection in fact existed. This judge sat through the entire proceedings from their very beginning; he listened to both parties testify, and read the various pleadings. He had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the respondent at the hearings. He asked for a date of final issuance which had not been set, and the respondent responded by setting the date. Thereafter, at least two months earlier than respondent had planned, respondent noticed public hearings to be held in April. Thereafter, when further delay was evident, the trial judge ordered that the final regulations be issued by June 30, and the respondent responded by issuing them. It was thus quite reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that respondent had felt compelled to hasten the process of issuing final regulations.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to the contrary. Respondent has not shown that he would have set a June date for final issuance had there been no hearing in January, nor that he would have noticed public hearings as early as February, nor that he would have actually issued the final regulations in June had no alternative writ of mandate been issued. He showed no evidence of other forces as his motivation for acting so swiftly. He alone had control over information explaining his actions—he, rather than petitioners, should have borne the burden of going forward with evidence to prove that the lawsuit did not act as a catalytic factor. (Cf. Nadeau v. Helgemoe (1st Cir. 1978) 581 F.2d 275, 281 (the inference drawn from the chronological sequence of events is stronger when evidence of defendant‘s behavior is under defendant‘s control).) Therefore, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that the lawsuit, and
At issue today is the future of public interest litigation such as that at bar which has benefited handicapped people throughout the State of California. Our private attorney general statute was passed to ensure that attorneys would remain motivated to prosecute cases in the public interest. “[P]rivately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and . . . without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.” (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933 [154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200].) Our policy therefore should be to encourage, rather than discourage, public litigation suits. To do so, we must allow a trial judge to make reasonable inferences from his or her perception of the totality of the proceedings before him or her, and to independently assess the catalytic effect of the proceedings on defendants. Requiring some kind of documental or testimonial proof of a causal connection only serves to deeply and impermissibly penetrate into the realm of discretion of the trial judge. I would therefore give great deference to a trial judge‘s finding of a causal connection, and would find no abuse of discretion absent concrete evidence by respondent that other factors, rather than the lawsuit, prodded him into speeding up the process. I would therefore uphold the award of attorneys’ fees in this case.
Mosk, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.
*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Notes
What makes this so “clear” is neither apparent nor explained in the opinion. Nothing in the record even suggests the existence of a causal relationship between the lawsuit and the expedited financial study. Indeed, other explanations for the early completion of the evaluation are just as plausible. After establishing the original plan, defendant may have found that a lengthy and complex study was unnecessary because implementation of the regulations would have no direct fiscal consequences. The dissent‘s conclusion that plaintiffs’ lawsuit caused the fiscal study to be accelerated is based on sheer speculation.
Furthermore, awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs on the basis of the expedited fiscal study would have detrimental consequences for the public in future lawsuits involving similar causes of action against public agencies. Once an agency was sued, it would refrain from taking any steps that it would normally take to accelerate the promulgation process, for fear that its actions would be perceived by the court as having been induced by the litigation. To avoid the possibility of having to pay attorney fees, the agency would strictly adhere to the original timetable that it had set for completing its work. This would deprive the public of the benefit to be gained from a speedier promulgation of the regulations.
In footnote 2, the dissent lists several other facts which assertedly support its contention. (See dis. opn., at p. 356, fn. 2.) It points out that at the hearing of December 14, 1979, defendant was ordered to advise the court of the date on which the final regulations would be issued. However, there is no evidence that the June 2d date announced by defendant was any earlier than the date that otherwise would have been set had the lawsuit not been filed.
The footnote also notes that prior to June 2d, defendant informed the court that he would not be able to have the final regulations issued by that day. How this fact supports the “catalyst” argument advanced by the dissent is unclear.
Finally, the dissent emphasizes that defendant did not actually promulgate the final regulations until after the court issued an alternative writ ordering him to do so by June 30th. What the opinion overlooks is that prior to the issuance of the writ, defendant had already informed the court that he planned to release the regulations prior to the end of June. The dissent‘s argument necessarily assumes that if the writ had not been issued, defendant would have exceeded the deadline he had set for himself. Nothing in the record provides a basis for this assumption.
