95 A. 146 | N.H. | 1915
Mrs. Brown's will is not the product of a professional scrivener whose use of terms might be influenced by judicial decision as to their meaning. Reading it as the product of ordinary acquaintance with the English language, little difficulty is found in arriving at her intention. She intended to give her husband something more than a life estate, or the alternative clause, "or to dispose of for his support or benefit," would not have been inserted. If she had intended an absolute fee, the words descriptive of a life estate and remainder would have been omitted. Her purpose plainly was that he should make such use of the estate as he might deem necessary, and that at his death all not disposed of by him should go to the society. This is not an impossible estate. Shapleigh v. Shapleigh,
The real estate in controversy does not pass to the residuary legatees under Mr. Brown's will. As he possessed, not a fee, but a life estate enlarged by a power of disposition, his will did not effect *579
a disposition of the estate by the residuary clause unless such was his intention, even if Mrs. Brown's will gave him such power. It is not probable Mr. Brown knew that it was held in Burleigh v. Clough,
Mrs. Brown intended that the remainder of her estate should go to the society and not to Mr. Brown's heirs. If he understood that he had a power of disposition by will, it is probable that to effect the defeat of Mrs. Brown's purpose, if intended, specific language would have been used. But the husband's power of disposition under his wife's will was limited to "his support or benefit, or for the interest of the estate." The natural import of this language requires the exercise of the power during the existence of the life estate. No ground is suggested upon which it can be assumed that Mrs. Brown understood the gift of the estate by his will to Mr. Brown's relatives would be for his support or benefit, or for the, benefit of the estate.
Almost immediately after his appointment as executor, Mr. Brown surrendered the fifteen shares of stock standing in his wife's name and took out certificates in his own name. He held the certificates at his death; and the question whether he thereby acquired title to the stock depends upon the extent of the power of disposition conferred upon him by the will of his wife. The general purport of the wife's will was to place all her property under the control of her husband to do with as he deemed necessary, without control or restriction. She requested that no inventory should be made and that he should not be required to give sureties as executor. His power of disposition was not limited to his support, but was capable of exercise whenever he deemed it necessary for his benefit.
Technically, "benefit" is a much broader word than "support." Stowell v. Hastings,
The plaintiff is advised that the rents of the real estate and all the personal property of Mrs. Brown for which, upon the settlement of the husband's account as executor of his wife's will, he is chargeable belongs to the society. The executor of Mr. Brown has no further concern with the real estate, because the society takes title thereto under Mrs. Brown's will.
Case discharged.
All concurred. *581