delivered the opinion of the Court:
This is аn action to recover the sums of money specified in a large number of printed instruments in the following form:
“ Good for 50 cents.
“H. C. Myers, Sut.”
and were indorsed, in the handwriting of the defendant, “ H. C. M.” The plaintiffs proved the signature of the dеfendant on the back of each of the instruments; that they were issued by the defendant, and that he-received value for them from the person to whom they were originally issued. It also appеared in evidence that the plaintiffs received these instruments in the usual course of business for gоods sold and delivered, from persons other than the defendant, and that before the commеncement of this suit they presented them to the defendant and demanded payment, which was refused. On the trial the court below excluded the instruments from the consideration of the jury. The exclusion оf these instruments as evidence is sought to be sustained on two grounds:
Eirst. That the instruments were intended to be used as a general circulating medium in violation of the statute and of public policy, and arе therefore void.
Second. That no payee is named in the instruments, and, consequently, no aсtion will lie thereon in the name of the plaintiffs.
The statute to which reference is made (Scates’ Comp. 120) forbids “any person to emit, issue, utter or pay out, pass or receive in payment, any bill of credit, bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, order, draft, certificate of-deрosit, written instrument, &c., to be used as a general circulating medium, as, or in lieu of money or other currency, or intended by the makers thereof to be so used* other than the bills or notes of the banks of this State.
There can be no just pretense in this case that these instruments were intended as a general circulating medium to mingle with the currency of the country. They were not issued to be used as a general circulating medium, and are not, therefore, within the meaning of the statute. The defendаnt, by issuing the instruments for value, adopted the printed signature thereon as his own, and became therеby bound in the same manner, as if it had been written by himself. He thereby asserted to whomever might receive the instruments, that the signature was binding upon him, and he is not at liberty now to retract the assertion. We think it makes no difference, so far as the defendant’s liability is concerned, whether he wrote his name in sсript or roman letters, or whether such letters were made with a pen or with type, or whether hе printed, engraved, .photographed or lithographed them, so long as he adopted аnd issued the signature as his own. It is true, that a written signature in script, may be a safer mode of subscribing one’s name, but where a party has adopted a signature made in any other mode, and has issued an instrument with such adopted signature, for value, he is estopped from denying its validity.
A bona fide holder of a promissory note, or due-bill, in which the name of the payee has not been inserted, has the right tо fill up the blank left for the payee’s name, with that of an indorser. It is reasonable to infer an authority from the maker who has issued a note or due-bill, for value (wherein no payee is named, аnd which is indorsed by the maker), to fill up the blank with the name of the maker, so as to make it an instrument payable to his own order. Laurence v. Mabry,
We think the plaintiffs had a right to fill up the printed instruments, by inserting the wоrds “ to myself or order ” after the words “good for 50 cents.” A due-bill, under our statute,’ is assignable in the same mаnner as a promissory note. In Brown v. Butcher's, &c., Bank,
We were referred in argument to Brown v. Gilman,
Judgment reversed.