After working for more than thirty years as a special education teacher at Bourne High School, the plaintiff sought, pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 3(4), to purchase additional retirement credit for additional service, from December, 1972, to August, 1974, as a teacher in a “Daytime Development Center” (DDC) providing education for children with special needs in
Background. We summarize the facts, as found by the DALA administrative magistrate.
Between 1972 and 1974, the position of the directоr of the DDC was redefined from a nurse to a certified teacher of special
The DDC consisted of nine classrooms, each with between five and ten students. It operated on the same calendar as the public schools of Fairfax County, on school days that began at 8:00 a.m. and continued until 3:00 p.m. It had a “PTA.” The DDC was open to the public and served children from throughout Fair-fax County. Children arrived at the DDC on county buses.
In December, 1972, Weston had a degree in psychology. He responded to an аdvertisement seeking a teacher of severely handicapped students and was interviewed for the position by the DDC principal and her assistant, who was an educational consultant. During his employment by the DDC, Weston had a class оf nine students between the ages of nine and sixteen, four of whom were nonambulatory. He was assisted by a teacher’s aide. Weston developed lesson plans and taught social skills, reading, language arts, math, art, and physical eduсation. He held regular parent-teacher conferences. Though he took professional development courses in 1973, he was not certified in special education. However, such certification was not required at the time.
Discussion. Under G. L. c. 32, § 3(4),
“ ‘[a]ny member in service[5 ] . . . who is employed in a teaching position . . . in a school or college . . . who had rendered service in any other state for any previous period as a teacher ... in the public day schools or other day school under exclusive public control and supervision . . . may, before the date any retirement allowance becomes effective for him, pay into the annuity savings fund of the system ... an amount equal to that which would have been withheld as regular deductions from his regular compensation for such previous period . . . had such service been rendered in a public school of the commonwealth and had he been a member of the teachers’ retirement system during the period such service was rendered.”
Upon making such payment, the teacher receives the same credit toward retirement benefits for the period of out-of-State employment as he would have received had he been employed as a public school teacher for that period within the Commonwealth. Ibid.
In concluding that Weston’s Virginia service was ineligible for purchased retirement credit under § 3(4), the administrative magistrate relied principally on the fact that, though “Weston was clearly serving as a teacher while at DDC, he was employed by the Department of Health, not a school committee or board of trustees.” Consequently, she reasoned, he did not meet the definition of a “teacher” set forth in G. L. c. 32, § l.
We previously have looked to the definition of “teacher” set forth in G. L. c. 32, § 1, to determine eligibility of out-of-State service to support a teacher’s request to purсhase retirement benefits. See Mackay v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.,
The present case, by contrast, presents a question of the proper construction of the statutory definition. “We typically defer to GRAB’S expеrtise and accord ‘ “great weight” to [its] interpretation and application of the statutory provisions it is charged with administering.’ Lisbon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.,
There are several problems with the construction adopted by the administrative magistrate. First, its narrow and literal application of the statutory definition creates tension with the essential purpose of § 3(4) to address periods of out-of-State service. That is because G. L. c. 32, § 1, defines the term “teacher” by reference to employment in “any public school.” See note 6, supra. But the same section defines a “public school” as “any day school conducted in the commonwealth under the superintendence of a duly elected school committee and also any day school conducted under the provisions of sections one to thirty-sеven inclusive of chapter seventy-four”
We conclude that the term “teacher” as it appears in G. L. c. 32, § 3(4), encompasses employment in one of the listed occupations appearing in the definition of teacher in G. L. c. 32, § 1, by any day school in another Stаte that is under exclusive public control and supervision, regardless of whether such employment (or such control or supervision) is by a school committee or a board of trustees. Since the findings of fact entered by the administrativе magistrate establish that Weston was employed full-time as a teacher by a day school in Virginia that was under exclusive public control and supervision, he is entitled to purchase retirement credit for the period during which he was sо employed. The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and a new judgment shall enter remanding the matter to CRAB for the entry of a decision in favor of the plaintiff.
So ordered.
Notes
General Laws c. 32, § 3(4), as amended by St. 1951, c. 505, § 1, inter alia, authorizes eligible teachers to purchase retirement credit for service rendered in any other State as a teacher “in the public day schools or any other day school under exclusive public control or supervision.”
The parties do nоt challenge the findings of fact made by the administrative magistrate, and the record contains substantial evidence to support them.
According to Weston’s testimony, he was likewise not certified when he was hired to teach special education at Bourne High School, though his hiring for that position without certification apparently required a waiver.
A “member in service” is an employee who has not yet retired and who is included, inter alia, in the teachers’ retirement system. See G. L. c. 32, § 3(l)(i).
Under that section, a “teacher” is “any person who is employed by one or more school committees or boards of trustees or by any combination of such committees and boards on a basis of not less than half-time service as a teacher, school psychologist, school psychiatrist, school adjustment counselor or school social worker . . . , director of occupational guidance and placеment . . . , principal, supervisor or superintendent in any public school as defined in this section . . . .” G. L. c. 32, § 1, as amended through St. 1990, c. 110, § 1.
As we have observed, CRAB summarily affirmed the decision of the administrative magistrate. In her memorandum of decision on thе parties’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Superior Court judge essentially adopted the reasoning of the administrative magistrate.
General Laws c. 74, §§ 1-74, address vocational-technical schools.
Moreover, woodenly literal reliance on the statutory definition of teacher without reference to any other source would fail by reason of its own internal circularity; the definition defines a “teacher” by reference to employment аs a “teacher, school psychologist, school psychiatrist” and other listed occupations. But the first occupation contained in that list is that of a teacher — the very occupation the provision seeks to define.