This appeal comes to us from the district court’s nunc pro tunc еntry of judgment against the appellant, Karla Westfall, Personal Representative of the estate of Chris Westfall. We are asked to decide whether, in the circumstances of this case, a nunc pro tunc еntry of judgment against an alleged debtor’s personal representative is proper when the personal representative has not been substituted as a defendant in the action which had been brought to collect the debt. For the reasons set forth below, we hold the district court’s order to be improper, and therefore', reverse and remand.
Chris Westfall was purchasing two pieces of logging equipment from Westmont and defaulted on payments. Pursuant to the security agreement the collateral was repossessed and sold, but the sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt. Westmont then initiated a proceeding in district court in Bonneville County to obtain a deficiency judgment. Judgment was entered by default against Chris Westfall for failure to answer. Subsequently, Westfall, arguing excusable neglect, moved the court to set *713 aside the judgment so that he could file an answer. The court granted the motion. Thereafter, Westmont and Chris Westfall executed and filed a Stipulation and Consent to Judgment which callеd for Westfall to pay part of the deficiency in monthly installments or suffer an entry of judgment if he should fail to do so. The instrument provided that the action would remain pending and would not be subject to dismissal until all sums duе had been paid, but also that judgment might be entered by the court upon Westmont’s affidavit indicating default by Westfall.
Such was the state of affairs when two years later, Chris Westfall was killed in a logging accident. Probate of his estate was commenced in magistrate court in Lemhi County, and Karla Westfall, his surviving spouse, was appointed personal representative. However, the suit by Westmont against Chris Westfall was still pending. Thereafter, Westmont filed an affidavit in district court pursuant to the stipulation agreement stating that Westfall was in default since January and asking for entry of judgment. The judgment was so entered against Westfall оn October 17, 1984, one month after Westfall’s death and several weeks after commencement of the probate proceedings of his estate. Neither the personal representativе nor the estate had been made parties to the action in Bonneville County. On October 22, 1984, Westmont filed an abstract of judgment in the Lemhi County real property records.
In December, 1984, Westmont, pursuаnt to the presentation requirements of the Uniform Probate Code, filed a claim in the Lemhi County probate proceedings requesting priority status relying on its recorded abstract of judgment. Subsequently, follоwing expiration of the statutory period for presenting claims, the personal representative gave notice of disallowance to the claimed priority status of Westmont’s claim. The disаllowance did not dispute the debt or the amount, only the secured status.
Westmont, then took several routes to obtain secured status. First, relying on I.R.C.P. 25(a)(1) 1 , it returned to district court in Bonneville County, requesting that the personal representative and estate be substituted as parties and the judgment of October 17,1984, be amended to reflect the substitution. The district court by Memorandum Decision denied the motion, opining that the filing of the abstract of the original judgment created a lien against the estate real property. Relying on this assumption, the district court determined that Westmont already had secured status and thе substitution was not needed. However, the district judge did not entirely close the door on the substitution motion. The Memorandum Decision concluded with: “If the Magistrate Court were to find that the judgment was not entitled to рriority as of the date abstracted, this Court would reconsider this opinion.”
Westmont then timely petitioned the magistrate court to have its claim given secured status. The magistrate court entered its decision on Westmont’s claim on October 15, 1985, denying secured status because the judgment lien was not filed against the estate. Westmont then returned to district court to seek the reconsideration which the district сourt seemingly had encouraged. Following a hearing on the reconsideration motion, the district court by order allowed substitution of the personal representative, nunc pro tunc, retroactive to the date of original entry of judgment of October 17, 1984, thereby giving secured status to Westmont’s claim. The estate of Chris Westfall, and the personal representative appeal that ruling.
Initially, we must address the timeliness of Westmont’s reconsideration mo
*714
tion, to which objection was made by the personal representative. A Petition for Reconsideration may be properly treated as a motion tо alter or amend the judgment.
Obray v. Mitchell,
Accordingly, we turn to the issue of the validity of the nunc pro tunc order. Nunc pro tunc literally means “now for then.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition 1981). In the present context, the phrase indicates that a judgment should be given retroactive effect to a designated date. In this case specifically, the district court’s order substituting the personal representative was retroactive to October 17, 1984, the date of the original judgment against Westfall. Westmont seeks the retroactive substitution to give its claim a priority status in the probate proceeding.
The personal representative does not dispute substitution, but challеnges the district court’s
nunc pro tunc
order, relying on our Court of Appeals’ recent case of
Ward v. Lupinacci,
The Court of Aрpeals set forth the general requirements for a valid nunc pro tunc entry of judgment:
“It is widely held that such judgments may be entered in furtherance of justice where failure to enter an earlier judgment was due to accident, excusable oversight or mistake. [Citations omitted.] However, it also has been stated that a judgment may not be given nunc pro tunc effect to correct a judicial error, as opposed to a clerical errоr; neither may it contain a rule and recite an event that did not actually occur.” [Citations omitted.] Ward, supra, at 42,720 P.2d at 225 .
The Court of Appeals then considered these requirements in apparent conflict, but cаpable of reconciliation. They examined two Idaho cases,
Donaldson v. Henry,
With these principles from Ward in mind, we turn to the present case to see if *715 the district court correctly entered the judgment nunc pro tunc. The district court held that no prejudice to the estate resulted from the nunc pro tunc order. In its order on reconsideration, the court stated:
“The reason there is no prejudice here is due to the particular circumstances. Default judgment hаs been taken against Mr. Westfall during his lifetime, and it was set aside by stipulation. That stipulation provided for regular payments by Mr. Westfall, and if not strictly made according to the agreement, then judgment could be tаken. The personal representative would have no defense to offer on what amounted to a confession of judgment.”
We disagree. A review of the affidavit in support of judgment filed by Westmont indicates that it intended its judgment be entered against Westfall individually and not against his estate. Only after its claim to a priority in the probate proceedings was denied, did it attempt to judicially proceеd against the personal representative and the estate. The court could not retroactively enter judgment against the estate and its personal representative where initially the court did not intend to secure judgment against the parties. Donaldson, supra; Fall River Irrigation, supra. The entry of the judgment against Westfall was not due to “accident, excusable oversight or mistake” on the part of the court, but was attributable to thе court’s doing what Westmont asked of it.
We emphasize that our ruling in no way implies that we agree or disagree with the magistrate’s holding that Westmont is not presently secured. We simply rule that the facts of this case do not warrant a nunc pro tunc entry.
Reversed and remanded.
Costs to appellants.
Notes
. I.R.C.P. 25(a)(1) reads as follows:
"Rule 25(a)(1). Substitution of parties— Death. — If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitutiоn may be made by the successors or representatives of the deceased party or by any party and together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in rulе 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in rule 4 for the service of a summons. If substitution is not made within a reasonable time, the action may be dismissed as to the deceased party.”