196 Pa. 249 | Pa. | 1900
Opinion by
On December 10, 1890, George Westinghouse, the plaintiff, delivered to Sproul & Lawrence, bankers and brokers, doing business in Pittsburg, certificates for 500 shares of the capital stock of the Fuel Gas Company of the par value of $100 each; the stock was delivered to the brokers as collateral, for the protection of Westinghouse’s account with the brokers, who largely purchased, carried and sold different stocks for him. On each certificate was the usual absolute transfer and written sale of the stock, with an irrevocable power of attorney authorizing the brokers to have the shares transferred to themselves on the books of the corporation and to have issued to themselves new certificates in their name; in about a month thereafter, they were transferred to the brokers, the old certificates being surrendered and new ones issued to them; then they pledged the new securities with the German National Bank as collateral for the payment of their demand note of $15,000. Before this loan, .the brokers had borrowed from the same bank $10,000 on two other notes, making their indebtedness $25,000 altogether; for these last loans, they had pledged other securities as collateral.
Westinghouse sometime in August, 1894, and several times afterwards, offered to pay to the brokers any balance due from him to them, on a redelivery of the Fuel Gas Company stock
The case was fully heard by the court below,' and decree made, that the title to the stock was in Westinghouse, and that Craig should surrender it to him. From this decree we have this appeal.
In the case of Westinghouse v. Bank, 188 Pa. 680, a case like this in some of its facts, and argued the same week, a similar decree was affirmed. There was some difference of opinion at that time among the members of the court, as to whether the principles announced in that case were applicable in this one, and therefore, on account of the large business interest likely to be affected, we ordered this reargument. After careful consideration we all now concur in the opinion that there should be a reversal.
The decree of the court below here is based solely on the ground that appellant is not a bona fide holder for value, because neither he nor the bank made inquiry as to whether Lawrence had a right to pledge the stocks. It will be noticed that the brokers as authorized by the power of attorney on the back of the certificates, very soon after they came into their possession, surrendered them to the company, and took new certificates in their own names. When they offered them to the bank as collateral, there was not on their face, anything to suggest that Sproul & Lawrence were not the absolute owners; the bank accepted them as collateral, handing their money over to the brokers on the faith of them ; then they turned them over to Craig when he paid his money in accordance with his obligation. There is not a word of evidence dehors the certificate, indicating to the bank or Craig, knowledge of claim by another. No penalty for neglect of inquiry can be imposed, unless under the facts inquiry was a duty. But of whom would the bank or Craig inquire ? The company, on the face of the certificates, had in effect said “ Sproul & Lawrence have paid for and are the owners of 500 shares of our stock, and we so certify; ” when they pledged them to the bank, they in effect declared, “ these certificates are ours; we have paid for them to the fuel company, and want to borrow
We hold that when on the face of the certificate absolute' ownership appears in him-who is in possession of it, and there is no evidence outside,'showing actual or constructive notice, that the ownership is in another, the party taking such certificate for value takes title thereto. Where loss results, the owner who puts it-in-the-power of another-to deal with the instrument as his own,- must bear the loss.
The decree of the court below is reversed -at costs -of appellee-. ■