60 A.D.2d 943 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1978
Proceedings initiated in this court pursuant to section 298 of the Executive Law to review orders of the State Human Rights Appeal Board, dated May 12, 1977 and July 18, 1977, which affirmed orders of the State Division of Human Rights finding that petitioner had discriminated against each of the complainants because of her sex by disallowing disability benefits during a period she was disabled by pregnancy and childbirth. The petitioner raises no question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the necessary facts of discrimination. Further, it concedes that pursuant to the recent case of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd. (41 NY2d 84, rearg den 42 NY2d 824) it is established that the discrimination herein is a violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, art 15). The petitioner nevertheless urges this court to find that the mandate of the Human Rights Law (referred to by it as HRL) as settled in the Brooklyn case is unenforceable as a matter of law in the following "Points” of its brief: "Point Two—To the extent that the HRL’S prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex is interpreted to prohibit an employer’s failure to provide in its employee disability benefits plan coverage of disabilities due to pregnancy, the HRL conflicts with the provisions of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is pre-empted by section 1104 of that Federal statute * * * Point Three—To the extent that the HRL’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex is interpreted to compel an employer to provide in its employee benefits plan coverage of disabilities due to pregnancy, the HRL is preempted by ERISA * * * [The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974—Pub L 93-406] Point Four—To the extent that the HRL’s prohibition against sex discrimination is interpreted to compel an employer to modify a collective bargaining agreement, the HRL is preempted by the Federal labor policy. [National Labor Relations Act—US Code, tit 29, § 151 et seq.]” We find no reasonable basis to conclude that these statutory provisions of the Federal Government were so excluded from the thinking of the Court of Appeals in its consideration of the Human Rights Law in the case of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd. (supra) as to justify a reversal of the Brooklyn case by this court upon