34 S.W. 438 | Tex. | 1896
The following statement and question have been certified to this court by the Court of Civil Appeals of the First Supreme Judicial District:
"In this case plaintiff sues to recover damages for grief suffered by her in consequence of the negligent failure of defendant to deliver in proper time a telegram from her sick brother, notifying her of his serious sickness and requesting her to go to him, on account of which default on defendant's part, plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity of getting to her brother before his death.
"The dispatch was sent several days before the brother's death and should have been delivered on the day when it was sent, but was not in fact delivered until after his death.
"In order to show the extent of her grief resulting from these facts, plaintiff alleged and proved that after sufficient time had elapsed for the delivery of the telegram and for her to have reached him, her brother expressed strong desire to see her, and disappointment at her failure to come, and also spoke bitterly of her, remarking that she considered herself above him and was too rich and proud to care for him, and that he died with that belief. All of this was communicated to plaintiff on her arrival between his death and burial, and aggravated and intensified the grief which she suffered.
Were these facts admissible and could plaintiff, if otherwise entitled to recover, hold defendant liable for the increased grief occasioned by them?"
The testimony set out in the statement above copied was not admissible, because it did not tend to prove the state of the plaintiff's feelings towards her brother, nor did it tend to prove any result of the failure to deliver the message for which the Telegraph Company was liable. The Telegraph Company could not be expected to anticipate that upon the failure of the plaintiff to respond to the message sent by her brother summoning her to his bed-side, the brother, in the presence of death, would become embittered against her and attribute it to her pride and want of affection for him.
The evidence in question, taken as a whole, tends more to prove (so far as the deceased was concerned) that there had existed on his part some unkind feeling towards his sister, than it does to prove any affectionate regard for her, and therefore it did not in any way tend to establish, what was no doubt true, that the sister was affectionate towards her brother.
The recital of the statements of the dying man, made by others to the plaintiff after her arrival, naturally aggravated the grief which would have occurred to a kind and loving sister under ordinary circumstances; the admission of such testimony would awaken in the jury a sympathy for the distressed sister, and, although it might be unconsciously done, *315
would induce them to increase the amount of damages. If the evidence is not to influence the verdict, why should it be admitted at all? A juror has the right and it is his duty to consider all evidence admitted by the court. But the Telegraph Company cannot be held liable for all damages which may arise from a failure to comply with its contract, no matter how great or real such damage may be; it can only be held for such as it should have anticipated, from the knowledge that it had and that which the law imputes to it, as the probable result of a failure to deliver the message. (Tel. Co. v. Carter,
The case of Tel. Co. v. Lydon,
We answer that the testimony should not have been admitted and that the Telegraph Company cannot be held liable for the increased grief occasioned by the relation to her of the statements made by her dying brother. *316