165 Ind. 165 | Ind. | 1905
Action by appellee for the recovery of a penalty imposed by the statute of April 8, 1885, for default of statutory duty with respect to a message intrusted to appellant. The plaintiff filed the message with the defendant’s agent at Indianapolis at 3 o’clock p. m. on June 18, 1903, addressed to E.' C. Braxtan, Paoli, Indiana. It was received by the defendant’s agent at Paoli at 4:05 o’clock p. m. of same day, but because of the negligence of defendant’s agent at Paoli, was not delivered to the addressee till J :30 o’clock a. m. the next day. The case went to trial by the court on the general denial. Special finding and judgment 'in favor of appellee for $100.
The single question for decision, and which arises upon the conclusions of law, is thus stated by the appellant:
It is in effect conceded that the dispatch in controversy was not delivered in the order of time in which it was received at Paoli, and that the defendant was guilty of negligence in its delivery.
' So much of the act referred to as is pertinent to this inquiry follows: “An act prescribing certain duties of telegraph and telephone companies, prohibiting discrimination between patrons, providing penalties therefor, and declaring an emergency. Section 1. That every telegraph company with a line of wires wholly or partly within this State, and engaged in doing a general telegraphic business, shall during the usual office hours receive dispatches, whether from other telegraph lines or other companies, or individuals, and shall, upon the usual terms, transmit the same with impartiality and in good faith, and in the order of time in which they are received,' and shall in no manner discriminate in rates charged or words or figures charged for or manner or conditions of service between any of its patrons, but shall serve individuals, corporations and other telegraphic companies with impartiality.” Section two relates to telephone companies. “Section 3. Any person or company violating any of the provisions of this act shall be liable to any party aggrieved in a penalty of $100 for each offense, to be recovered in a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Acts 1885, p. 151, §§5511, 5512 Burns 1901.
With respect to penalty, it is apparent that the legislature did not intend to make a distinction between intentional and negligent defaults, for its language (section three) is this: “Any person or company violating any of the provisions of this act shall be liable to any party aggrieved in a penalty of $100.”
After further consideration of the act of 1885 and the
We find no error. Judgment affirmed.