56 F. 419 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina | 1893
These two cases, covering precisely the same averments awl issues,- were heard together. The complainants are corporation;!, each organized trader the laws of New York. Each, of them has an office in the city of Charleston, and each is engaged in sending messages by wire to points in the United States, to [joints outside of ibis state, and in other countries on this continent, and is connected by cable with the old world. Each of them is thus an instrument of and engaged in interstate commerce. Besides this, each of them, having its lines over the post roads, highways, and railroads in the city of Charleston, a (Ate of South Carolina, and in others of the United States, has accepted the provisions of the act of congress approved 24th July, 186(5, to aid in the construction of telegraph lines. By (his action the company so accepting puts its line at the service of the United ►States for postal, military, and other purposes, and gives precedence to its messages over all other business. It thus becomes an agent of the government. The bills, having made statements to, this effect, proceed to say that the city council of Charleston, assuming to act under an act of the general assembly of ¡South Carolina, passed an ordinance to regulate licenses for the year 1892; that by
•*:>5 telegraph companies or agencies, each, for doing' business exclusively within the city of Charleston, and not including' any business done to or from points without the state, and not including any business done for the government of the United States, its officers or agents, $500.”
The first question which rises naturally is, is (his a license, a condition upon (lie performance of which (he right to do business depends, and to-which tin; right of doing business is referred, or is it it tax? This question is answered in Home Ins. Co. v. City Council, 93 U. S. 122. Tin; slate of Georgia required all foreign insurance companies, as a condition precedent fot* doing business in (hat state, to get a certificate front the comptroller general, to be issued upon a sworn statement of certain facts required in (he aet. The Home Insurance Company of .New York had such it certificate. The city of Augusta passed an ordinance requiring all insurance companies (o (alto out a license annually, and pay a certain sum of money therefor. The Home Insurance Company disputed the validity of this ordinance, and denied the necessity for the Intense. The counsel for the company, leaders of the New York bar, contended before* the supreme court that the term “license” means “permission” or “authority;” that it is a right given by some compel mil authority to do an act which without such authority would bo illegal; that, having the right to do the business of insurance from its charter, and the permission to do its business in the state of Georgia from the act of its legislature, ¡i license from the city of Augusta was unnecessary, and its requirement unlawful. The supreme court replied to this argument:, and overruled it. They held that the payment required was a. special lax, although called a “license*,” levied in (he mode prescribed; that the penalty was a mode of enforcing its payment; and that the license, when issued, was only a receipt for the tax. In Wiggins Ferry Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 376, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257, the same court, discussing the right of a city to require a license from a ferryman whose ferries crossed a navigable stream dividing two states, take the same* view, and sustained the tax against the contention that it interfered with interstate commerce*. “The* <*xaetie>n of a lie:e*nse¡ feu; is an ordinary exercise of the police powe;r by a municipal e*orporation.” “The power of the state to authorize any city within its limits te> cm-force a license tax on trades or callings generally, especially the>m which are ‘quasi publie;,’ cannot he disputed.” “Whether a license fee is exacted under the pe>wer to regulate or the* power to tax is a matter of indifferemee*, if the power to elo eithea* exists.” In Serath Carolina the same* pemit is decided, and the* license* tax sustained, in State v. Hayne, 4 S. C. 403; State v. Columbia, 6 S. C. 1.
This being a tax, are these agents of the govea-iiment and in
“The principle in regard to telegraph companies which have accepted the provisions of the act of congress 2-tth July, 1866, is that they shall not bo taxed by the authorities of any state for any messages or receipts from messages from points within the state to points without the state, or from points-without the state to points within the state, but that such taxes can be levied upon all messages carried and delivered exclusively within the state.”
Precisely the same principle exists with regard to another instrument of commerce, — express companies. Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 350, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250. The case of W. U. Tel. Co. v. Attorney General, 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961, is on a line with these decisions. The license tax in this case is not unreasonable, nor will its payment imperil or tax the existence of either of the companies, or its business in this city.
The temporary injunction heretofore granted is dissolved in each case, the motions for injunction refused, and each bill is dismissed, with costs.