7 S.D. 599 | S.D. | 1895
A decision of this case was made at the last term of this court, and is reported in 62 N. W. 982; 7 S. D. 1. Respondents contend that the major .proposition upon which they rested their defense was that the funds levied for the expenses of the city for one year could not legally be applied to the payment of warrants drawn for the expenses of a previous year, at least unless such warrants of the previous years could be paid out of a surplus remaining after all the expenses of the current year had been fully paid; in other words, that the fiscal affairs of each year stand by themselves, and that general fund warrants of one year are not to be paid from the taxes of a succeeding year, except in case of a demonstrated surplus, as above indicated. Respondents suggest that our former decision was made to turn largely upon other questions, minor to this, which could not be controlling if the main proposition is correct. This question and others incidental to it, are so thoroughly discussed in the petition for rehearing and the answer of appellant thereto and the briefs accompanying the same that we could hardly expect to find authorities more closely bearing upon the questions discussed than those cited by one side or the other in the briefs upon this application for rehearing. In the absence of clearly controlling constitutional or statutory direction, it would seem to be primarily a question of the policy of the law, to be gathered from general provisions,
'There is.certainly nothing in the terms of either of these provisions that would suggest that the legislature intended to restrict the use of warrants in payment of taxes to such as were issued on account of expenses or debts incurred during the year for which such taxes were assessed. Both of these sections constantly speak of ‘‘warrants or orders” in general terms. County warrants may be used to pay county taxes, and city warrants to pay 'city taxes. We are informed from different sources, and by those in position to know, that for many years at least the general, if not the universal, practice in the different counties and cities of the state, as of the territory formerly, has been to i’eceive such warrants in payment of such taxes, without regard to their date, if not barred of course by the statute of limitations. While such practice could not be allowed to determine what is a proper legal interpretation of the lawr, it is important in two respects: It shows the construction which territorial, county and municipal officers charged with duties under it have uniformly given to it, which is always influential with the courts in construing a statute of doubtful meaning, and it shows, too, that the legislature, made up biennially of representatives from the different counties and localities of the territory and state, and presumably Knowing that such was the common understanding of the effect of this provision, was satisfied therewith, for it took no steps to change the law or the practice under it. If it had regarded such practice as dangerous or undesirable, it would naturally have so modified the law as to make it express a meaning clearly adverse to such common understanding and practice. Respondent contends that such a construction of the law would enable a warrant holder to accomplish indirectly what he could not do directly; that is, he might use his warrant as so much money
Upon this question, English v. Oliver, 28 Ark. 317, is an instructive case. There the state law provided that county taxes might be paid in county warrants, and all taxes in state scrip. A taxpayer offered in payment of the tax of 1873 scrip issued in 1871, which was refused. The court held that he had a right so to pay the tax with such scrip, except so much of such tax as was levied to pay interest on certain county bonds, which the legislature had especially provided should be collected in United States currency. In the course of its opinion that court made a remark that seems quite pertinent to the question discussed and decided in the former opinion of this court, to which reference is now made. The court said: ‘‘Whatever sums the county authorities are authorized to assess and collect of the
It is contended, further, that the appellant was not entitled to have the city warrant applied towards the payment of its city taxes, for the reason that the warrant itself was issued after the city had exceeded the maximum of its allowed indebtedness, and was, therefore, void for any purpose. The trial court only finds that when this order was issued — that is, at its date — the city had reached the constitutional limit of indebtedness; but it is nowhere shown what was the city’s indebtedness when the liability was incurred for which the warrant was issued. The warrant was issued to the city assessor on account of his official services in assessing the city. That, by the charter, was required, or at least allowed, to be done months prior to the date of the warrant; and that the city had reached the limit of its indebtedness the last of July, when the warrant was issued, does not show that it had so reached such limit in April or May preceding. Although our former opinion may have taken a wider range than was necessary to determine the rights of the parties upon the facts in this case, we think the case was rightly decided, and the petition for rehearing is denied.