106 Md. 561 | Md. | 1907
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant owns several lots of ground in the city of Baltimore, which bound on the north side of the main branch of the Patapsco river, together with the riparian rights appurtenant thereto. It constructed what are spoken of in the record as a freight' pier and a coal pier. The former is about 840 feet long and 120 feet wide and consists of a wooden platform resting upon, piles, with a steel shed, one story high for freight purposes. The latter is 729 feet on one side and 700 on the other, and is a wooden structure which also rests upon piles. They were projected from the bulkhead line into the water to the pierhead' line, and the water flows under them. The Patapsco is a navigable river at the place in controversy, in which the tide ebbs and flows. The eastern and
It is well settled that the same rules of construction will be applied to the boundaries of a municipality, bordering on navigable or non-navigable water, as will be to a description in a grant to an individual for land so situated. Fort Smith & VanBuren Bridge Co. v. Hawkins, 54 Ark. 509; s. c. 12 L. R. A. 487; Perkins v. Oxford, 66 Me. 545; State, etc., v. Columbia, 27 S. C. 137, and a number of cases cited in the notes on page 1149 of 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law. In Giraud
The Legislature in 1862 passed an Act which is embraced in secs. 47, 48 and 49 of Art. 54 of the Code, by which it greatly enlarged and defined the rights of proprietors of lands bordering on any of the navigable waters of this State. Sec. 47 enacted that such a proprietor “shall be entitled to all accretions to said land by the recession of said water, whether heretofore or hereafter formed or made by natural causes or otherwise, in like manner and to like extent as such right may olean be claimed by the proprietor of land binding on water not navigable,” and sec. 48 provided that such proprietor “shall be entitled to the exclusive right of making improvements into the waters in front of his said land; such improvements and other accretions as above provided for shall pass to the successive owners of the land to which they are attached, as incident to their respective estates. But no such improvement shall be so made as to interfere with the navigation of the stream of water into which the said improvement is made.’ Sec. 49 provides that “No patent hereafter issued out of the land office shall impair or affect the rights of riparian proprietors, as explained and declared in the twm preceding sections; and no patent shall hereafter issue for land covered by navigable waters.” Judge Alvey said, in a concurring opinion in Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 603, in speaking of that Act, that “The right given to improve out from the shore into the water was designed, manifestly, to embrace only structural improve
That brings us to the consideration of the first prayer, which asked the Court to rule that such portions of the property of the appellant as are located beyond the bulkhead line, established by the city, are not subject to taxation by it, or to assessment by the Appeal Tax Court. There can be no doubt that the right of the appellant to construct the piers depended upon its ownership of the contiguous land, which we have said was within the city limits, and, under sec. 48 above quoted, “such improvements and other accretions as above provided for shall pass to the successive owners of the land to which they are attached, as incident to their respective estates." Because the appellant owned this land, which was in the city, it had the “exclusive right” to make these improvements, and there would seem therefore to be at least very strong equity-in favor of the contention of the city. If instead of making
In Horner v. Pleasants, 66 Md. 475, a wharf, built under the Act of 1796, ch. 45, was under consideration, and it was said that it was not necessary for the State to grant a technical fee in the land covered by the water, in order to give the improver the benefits intended by the statute, “But the State did
It would seem therefore to be perfectly clear that the Legislature never intended that such improvements as these should, for the purposes of taxation, be cut in two at the point of high water mark on the bank of the river when they were made, and part be taxed by the city and the rest by the county. Without the right to use the land, which is in Baltimore city, the improvements would be useless and, as they are incident to that land and dependent upon it for their existence, it would be an anomalous condition of affairs if they were to be thus divided. They are so situated as .to be dependent upon the city for police and fire protection and if the appellant’s theory be correct they would practically have neither, as this water is separated from Baltimore Countyand it would be impossible to furnish the appellant with proper fire or police protection on these piers, unless the county made special provision for them, which would practically be impossible without the assistance of the city. Of course we are aware that this is not conclusive of the question before us, and that if in point of fact the piers are beyond the limits of the city they cannot be taxed by it without special authority from the Legislature, if it be conceded that it could then be done which we need not discuss, but such considerations are very apposite in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature, and in determining how far the boundaries of a municipality on navigable water follow
We understand the learned counsel for Baltimore Count}’-, who also appeared in this case, to admit that a city’s boundaries may be extended by natural accretion and that they “should be construed to embrace what is actually made land, wharves, permanently filled in with earth, and the like,” to use the language of his brief, and we are of the opinion that such is the law, unless of course the provisions of a particular charter clearly prohibit such extension. That being so, why should a distinction be made between such piers as are herein involved, and made land or wharves permanently filled in with earth. The piles on which the piers rest are from 50 to 85 feet long and are about eight feet apart. The water was from twelve to twenty feet deep and the piles are driven into the ground "to resistance” and extend about eight feet above mean low water. The pile work cost about $120,000 and as the total costs of the piers, including the piles, was $400,000, it can be seen that they make what should certainly be regarded as permanent, structures. "A pier is defined as a projecting wharf or landing .place.” 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 812. In The Haxby, 94 Fed. Rep. 1016, it was said that "The Century Dictionary defines a pier to be ‘projecting quay, wharf, or other landing place;’ and, without some qualifying adjective this is the ordinary meaning of the word. It may be a solid stone structure, or an outer shell of stone or wood filled in with earth; or it may be a frame work formed by fastening a platform of planks upon piles driven into the soil at the bottom of the water. In either event, it is a projection of the land, and for purposes ofjurisdiction it should be so treated." The opinion then goes on to distinguish between a floating pier and an immovable one.
The mere fact that these piers are built upon piles instead of on solid ground ought not to make any difference. They are permanent structures and as effectually monopolize the use of the land under them as if they were built in one of the either ways mentioned “The Haxby.” They were probably
The only remaining question we will discuss is the effect of the case of Raab v. State, 7 Md. 483, which the appellant relied on as conclusive of this case. There are expressions in the opinion which may-give some foundation for the reliance on it, but when it is carefully considered it will be seen that there is nothing in it which is contrary to the conclusion we have reached. The question there involved was whether Anne Arundel County was “an adjoining county” to the city of Baltimore, within the meaning of the constitutional provision then in force, relating to the removal of cases, and it was held that it was not, because Baltimore County still had jurisdiction over the river at .the place involved, which is near where these piers are. The lines of Baltimore County originally embraced what is now a part of Anne Arundel and was by the Act of 1726 limited to the south side of the river. Our predecessors held that after the Act of 1726 the river remained, as it had been for many years, within the limits of Baltimore County, except so far as affected by the Act of 1704, ch. 92, which provided that every county lying on any navigable river in the province should extend its jurisdiction from the shore to the channel of such river, and be divided from the other county by the channel. Our predecessors did not pass on the Act of 1704, but held that the river was still in Baltimore County at least as far as the channel, and was subject to the jurisdiction of its Courts. In Acton v. State, 80 Md. 547, we held that the jurisdiction of Anne Arundel. County did extend to the channel of the Patapsco river — the question which had been left open in
Order affirmed, the appellant to pay the costs.