23 A.2d 660 | Md. | 1942
Western Maryland Dairy, Inc., a distributor of milk and other products in Baltimore, filed a bill of complaint against Lawrence Chenowith and also Charles J. Chenowith, trading as the Meadowbrook Dairy, his agents, servants and employees, to enjoin them from soliciting orders for dairy products from, or selling, serving or delivering, either directly or indirectly, dairy products to any of its customers contrary to a collective labor agreement between the complainant and Local Union No. 937, Milk and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy Employees. The union, consisting of about 700 employees of the corporation, had agreed that no employee, on leaving its employ, would "solicit, serve or sell, directly or indirectly," milk or dairy products during the period of six months thereafter to any customers whom he had served during any part of one year next preceding the termination of his employment. The chancellor granted a temporary injunction, but after the hearing dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill.
In the early days of the trade unions and brotherhoods in America, some courts were unwilling to enforce their agreements; but in recent years the courts have manifested a growing appreciation of their value in securing harmonious relations between employer and employee. It is now held in Maryland and by the great weight of authority that employees have the right to organize a union and to select their agents to bargain collectively with their employer with the object of promoting the welfare of the members; and if their collective agreement has been acquiesced in by a particular employee and it is not contrary to public policy, it is valid and enforceable at law or in equity. International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove,
The question remains for our consideration whether the complainant was entitled to injunctive relief under the facts and circumstances of the case. It appears from the evidence that in 1939 Charles J. Chenowith, after working for the complainant for many years, started in business for himself, and Harry F. Meyer, who also had been an employee of the complainant, went to work for him. It further appears that on December 3, 1940, Lawrence Chenowith, who had been a salesman in the Harford Road section for many years, and was serving 254 customers on this route, left the employ of the complainant. Prior to that day he told a number of his customers that he intended to leave its employ. Although he denied at first that he had told any of them that he was going to work for his brother, he finally admitted: "I don't know how many I told that I was leaving. * * * I don't know how I determined to whom to tell, to which customers to tell that to. I just picked some customers at random. * * * I did tell some few people that were very familiar with me, yes, that I was going with my brother at Meadowbrook." Within two days 23 of his customers had stopped their orders. Within two weeks 73 customers had discontinued. By the time of the hearing the total had reached 94. According to the records of the company, the loss of customers on a milk route when a driver leaves is generally less than 1 per cent, and never more than 10 per cent, whereas the loss on this route had already exceeded 35 per cent. It was contended by the complainant that while Lawrence knew that the union agreement forbade him to solicit his old customers, he and his brother had concocted a scheme to evade the covenant. It appears that Lawrence decided to take Meyer's route in the York Road *241 section in the hope of avoiding the appearance of breach of covenant, while Meyer took Lawrence's old route.
A number of instances of breach of covenant were produced by the complainant. One of the customers on Ailsa Avenue admitted on the witness stand that Lawrence Chenowith had asked her to buy milk from him. She testified: "Well, I think he mentioned something of the fact, yes, he said he was going with his brother, and asked me if I would go and try the milk, * * * and I did try it." It was then shown that Lawrence was seen in a Meadowbrook milk truck on Ailsa Avenue about 4 o'clock in the morning of December 8. It was claimed by Charles J. Chenowith that the order of the new customer had been "turned in" by Meyer, and that the only reason why Lawrence was riding in the milk truck was to point out to Meyer where to deliver the milk. However, this is a clear instance of violation of the agreement that within the time specified no employee would "solicit, serve or sell, directly or indirectly." Among the other witnesses were Hugh M. Ward and Raymond Little, route foremen, who took Chenowith's successor over the route and introduced him to the customers on December 3. After they came out of the house of a customer on Southern Avenue, Lawrence Chenowith entered the house and conferred with the customer for some minutes. He gave the following version of the incident: "Well, she was my customer. I had a right to. I was employed by the dairy. She might want to buy something. * * * It was my duty. I had not been relieved yet." But according to Ward, Lawrence said: "I didn't think they could be that rotten." To his statement Ward replied: "I don't think they are rotten. * * * They are out to protect their trade as well as you are."
Little testified that Lawrence said: "Well, that's one less they will have to serve, one less customer the Western Maryland will have to serve after this." It was *242
contended by the defendants that it was Meyer, and not Lawrence Chenowith, who had solicited the customers, and that Meyer did not mention Lawrence Chenowith's name to the customers. However, when an Elsrode Avenue customer was asked on cross-examination: "When did Mr. Meyer tell you that Lawrence Chenowith was with the Meadowbrook Dairy?" she replied: "When he solicited me. It is true that the defendants produced a number of customers who testified that they had not been solicited directly by Lawrence Chenowith. But the complainant did not contend that he had personally solicited every one of the 254 customers. Moreover, even though the dairy company may have been deprived of only a single customer by his direct solicitation, his conduct would amount to an injury, small though it may be, forbidden by the covenant. Capital Laundry Co. v. Vannozzi,
The court also finds that the complainant was entitled to injunctive relief against Charles J. Chenowith, his agents, servants and employees. As long as a collective labor agreement continues in force, it should be the duty of the court in a proper case to enjoin any conspiracy on the part of either side to breach it. It is a well-established rule that a collective labor agreement is not to be construed narrowly and technically, but broadly and in such a way as to accomplish its evident aim of promoting industrial harmony, and hence such an agreement ought to be kept faithfully and without subterfuge by both employers and employees, for in no other way could confidence between capital and labor be maintained. Yazoo Mississippi Valley R.R.Co. v. Webb, 5 Cir.,
It is well settled that the right to an injunction is not absolute, but lies largely within the sound discretion of the chancellor. For example, the chancellor may properly refuse the writ where it will do the complainant little good and cause the defendant great harm. It has been said that the application for an injunction is addressed to the sound conscience of the chancellor, acting upon all the facts and circumstances of each particular case; and since the chancellor has the right to require a full and candid disclosure of all the facts, he may refuse to exercise the extraordinary power of injunction if a full disclosure has apparently not been made. American-StewartDistillery v. Stewart Distilling Co.,
It is now too late to grant an injunction in this case but there are substantive rights to be determined. Before the temporary injunction was issued, the complainant was required to give a bond in the penalty of $1,000 to indemnify the defendants for any costs and damages occasioned by the issuance of the injunction in the event the injunction was rescinded. If we do not determine the primary right of the complainant to a writ of injunction, then the complainant will not have prosecuted the cause with effect, and the liability under the bond would become fixed for costs of suit as well as possible damages; whereas our determination now that the complainant was entitled to an injunction would discharge the bond. Tolman Laundry v. Walker,
Decree reversed, and cause remanded, with costs.