250 Ind. 378 | Ind. | 1968
The appellant was charged by affidavit with falsely and fraudulently forging and uttering a certain rental agreement purporting to have been executed by one Walton Evans, agreeing to pay rental in the amount of $11.00 per day to Red Cab, Incorporated, a corporation doing business as Avis Rent A Car. A copy of the instrument executed was set out in the charge. The defendant was found guilty by the
Error is assigned in the overruling of the motion for a new trial, the main contention being that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding of guilty in the following particulars, as urged by the appellant in his brief:
1. That there was no evidence to establish that the defendant falsely and fraudulently forged the instrument.
2. That there was no evidence to establish that the defendant entered into or made any rental agreement of any kind agreeing to pay any amount to Red Cab, Incorporated.
3. That there was no evidence that the defendant did anything with intent to secure possession of anything from Red Cab, Incorporated.
4. That there is no evidence which established the defendant intended to defraud Red Cab, Incorporated.
5. That there is no evidence which established that the actions of the defendant, as stated in the affidavit, occurred in Marion County.
With reference to the contention that Red Cab, Incorporated, was not defrauded and the car was not obtained from that corporation or any contract made with it, we point out that the appellant has failed to set out in his brief the affidavit and charge made against the appellant, and we are not compelled to search the record to find exactly what the allegations were with reference to ownership. Suffice it to say, however, that the evidence showed that “Avis Rent A Car is a franchise operation and Red Cab, Incorporated owns the franchise for Indianapolis” and that Red Cab, Incorporated, was the owner of the car involved. An exhibit in the case shows a contract was entered into by the appellant under the name of Walton Evans with Avis Rent A Car through a franchise of Red Cab, Incorporated.
The main contention of the appellant is that he merely used an alias in good faith and with no intent to defraud or deceive any one in obtaining this car. The evidence, however, shows that he identified himself at the time as Walton Evans and produced a driver’s license with Walton Evans’ name thereon, which the appellant on cross-examination admitted was an “alias.”
The evidence further shows that Walton Evans lived at 846 Woodruff Place, and in the latter part of June of the same year the appellant, Charles Wayne West, also lived there. Evans
Testimony further shows the car was to be delivered at the Avis office in Jacksonville, Florida. However, it was not delivered at that office, but was found in Jacksonville three or four weeks after the due date, with the license plates on the car changed from those which were on the car when it was delivered to the appellant in Indianapolis. On cross-examination the defendant admitted that he had been convicted previously of forgery a number of times, and was at present an escapee from the Kentucky authorities.
We think the evidence was sufficient from which the finder of the facts was warranted in believing that the appellant used a driver’s license that was not his and a name other than his usual name for the purpose of misleading1 and obtaining the possession of an automobile owned by Red Cab, Incorporated, and in this transaction he forged the name of another person, namely, Walton Evans, and executed a contract with that forged name therein and delivered the same for that purpose.
“The use of fictitious names is not to be encouraged by the courts. It lends itself too readily to fraud by reason of concealment involved and thus is too likely to be used against a public interest or a private interest, particularly those of creditors or other interested parties. It is well settled the law does not countenance or permit the use of a fictitious or assumed name in the execution of a fraudulent scheme.” Peak v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 334, 344, 163 N. E. 2d 584, 590.
The defendant on cross-examination admitted he used an “alias” to obtain possession of this car, and it is quite apparent
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 235 N. E. 2d 53.