6 Ga. App. 105 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1909
Will West was convicted of arson, and his motion for a new trial was overruled. There is no controversy over any question of law, the only issue in the case being as to the sufficiency of the evidence. It is insisted by the plaintiff in error that there is no proof of the corpus delicti. In cases of arson, as in every other crime, it is absolutely necessary that the evidence, whether
It is insisted that generally it is impossible to prove by direct evidence the corpus delicti in arson cases. This may be true, but it furnishes no reason for any relaxation of the imperative rule, founded in the humanity of the law and supported by principles of abstract justice, that in every case of alleged crime the proof must show the fact of the crime to a moral and reasonable certainty, to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. The crime of arson is not within any exception to the rule; indeed there is no exception to this salutary rule -of evidence. In this case it is claimed that the defendant confessed the crime; but this confession is of no probative value whatever until, and unless, by some evidence outside of the confession, the crime is shown to have been committed by some one. The statute law of this State declares that a confession alone, uncorroborated by other evidence, will not justify a conviction. Penal Code, §1005. And while it has been declared that proof aliunde that a crime was committed would in law be sufficient corroboration of a confession, yet it is equally well settled that mere confession is not sufficient to establish the corpus delicti (Murray v. State, 43 Ga. 256); in other words, that before a confession will authorize a conviction, it must be corroborated by evidence which, independently of the confession, tends to establish the corpus delicti. Bines v. State, supra; Wimberly v. State, 105 Ga. 188 (31 S. E. 162); Davis v. State, 105 Ga. 809 (32 S. E. 158); Schaefer v. State, 93 Ga. 177 (18 S. E. 552). Cases can be imagined in which a confession might disclose independent facts or circumstances which would furnish sufficient proof of the corpus delicti. But in this ease no such independent facts or circumstances are disclosed by the confession. The confession consists of the simple statement that the defendant, m company with another negro, set fire to the house in question. There is no evidence of the existence or whereabouts of this alleged accomplice. No threat is shown to have been made by the
In some jurisdictions it has been held that a confession is sufficient to warrant a conviction where there is additional proof that the crime charged has been committed; in other words, that the confession may be taken and considered in connection with other evidence, if there be any, either positive or circumstantial, tending to prove the commission of the crime charged. Even if this rule of evidence is applicable under the law of this State, it would not fit the facts and circumstances of the present case; for here the confession, as before stated, furnishes no independent fact or circumstance tending to show the commission of the crime, or which when taken in connection with any other fact or circumstance in the case tends to show that any crime was committed; and the rule as declared in this State is that the corpus delicti must be fully proved independently of the confession.
We are reluctant at all times to interfere with the verdict of a jury, but after giving the facts and circumstances in this case a most careful consideration, we are perfectly clear that nothing appears in the evidence, outside of the confession, that even remotely tends to show the essential predicate upon which all criminal prosecutions must 'be based, to wit, the existence of the crime charged; and for this reason we are compelled to reverse the judgment refusing to grant another trial. Judgment reversed.