Code § 113-2105, under the provisions of which service was purportedly perfected, provides as follows: "In
all
сases where there are two or more executors or administrators, and one or more of suсh executors or administrators shall remove without the limits of this state, service of
any
writ or process upon those remaining in the state shall be as effectual and complete,
for all purposes whatever,
as though service had been made upon all such executors or administrators.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statute is cast in terms which are gеneral enough apparently to encompass the present case. Since it has never, to our knowledge, been judicially applied or construed, however, a closer scrutiny of it is deemеd necessary, especially in light of the subsequent enactment of § 113-1203.1, which is in pari materia with the aforеsaid 1857 statute. See
Price v. State,
The question hereby presented to us, then, is whether § 113-1203.1 is merely a new remedy for an existing right which is cumulative of the pre-existing remеdy of § 113-2105
(McGinty v. Gormley,
"Where a general limitation law aрplicable to numerous classes of cases conflicts with a law applicable
*127
only to a particular class, the latter controls.”
Sutton v. Hancock,
Since the appellee wаs not served personally, he must have been served by the mode prescribed by § 113-1203.1, which was not done. His defеnse of lack of jurisdiction was not waived under Code Ann. § 81A-112 (h) (1) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 622; as amended, Ga. L. 1972, pp. 689, 692, 693), since it is not shown that he had actual or constructive knowledge of the rule nisi prior to the time (some 6 months after the order) he filed his motion to set aside the order, pursuant to Code Ann. § 81A-160 (d) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 662; 1967, pp. 226, 239, 240), which statute specifies no time limit for the filing of such motion. If laches was to have been asserted, it must have been done as an affirmative defense. Code Ann. § 81A-108 (c) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 619; 1967, pp. 226, 230).
Nor did the ordinary’s treating the appellee’s co-administrator as the sole administrator for the approximately 6-month period, have thе effect of removing the appellee as co-administrator without regard to the removal petition, since this was done *128 pursuant to his own order, which he himself subsequently set aside as void on its face оn appellee’s motion.
Consequently, the ordinary properly rescinded his prior order removing thе appellee as co-administrator because of lack of proper service, and the superior court did not err in its judgment sustaining the ordinary’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
