55 Iowa 335 | Iowa | 1880
I. The petition alleges that plaintiff is “ an un- _ married female of previous chaste character,” and that defendant did “ seduce, debauch and carnally know her,” whereby she “ became sick and pregnant,” therefrom “ suffering great bodily pain and mental anxiety, shame and disgrace; that such seduction was brought about by reason of false promises and pretension of love and affection, kisses, caresses and devo
IV. A witness testified to a conversation had with plaintiff, wherein she related that a certain man had taken improper liberties with her person and had improper conversation with her. This evidence was afterwards stricken out. We think it was competent and relevant.
We may remark that, as the plaintiff’s character for purity was in issue, evidence tending to show impure conversation, and improper and familiar association with men, was competent as tending to establish her want of virtue. The char
This instruction is clearly erroneous. The presumption of the law establishes grima facie the chaste character of plaintiff. This presumption is overcome by evidence sufficient to satisfy the jury that the plaintiff is unchaste. In other words the law imposes upon defendant the burden of establishing plaintiff’s want of virtue. The character of the evidence demanded to overcome the presumption is such as will satisfy the mind of the jury that plaintiff is unchaste. No higher order of evidence, or fuller measure of proof, is required than to establish any other fact. The mind may be satisfied of the existence of any fact by less than what may be called clear proof. The proof, indeed, may be wanting in clearness and completeness, yet when considered in the light of experience and observation may satisfy fhe mind. And this is the simple test of -the evidence applicable to the question of the plaintiff’s chastity, as it is in most other cases. The proof need not be clear; it must be satisfactory to the mind of the jury. The instruction is, therefore, erroneous.
~We find ourselves unable to agree upon one or two other questions. As the judgment of the District Court must be reversed for the errors above pointed out, these questions and others discussed by counsel need not be determined in this opinion.
Reversed.