73 Ind. App. 133 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1920
On November 27,1914, appellee Dreher, being the owner in fee simple of two certain contiguous lots in the town of Pleasant Lake, mortgaged the same to appellee First State Bank to secure the payment of certain promissory notes. On August 1, 1915, said appellee Dreher entered into a contract with appellants, by the terms of which contract appellants agreed to furnish certain materials and to do certain work in and about the construction of two dwelling houses which .appellee Dreher was at the time erecting on the lots. In accordance with the contract, the materials were furnished and the work done by appellants, but the agreed consideration therefor was not fully paid; and appellants, to secure the payment of the balance due them, filed a written notice of their intention to hold a mechanic’s lien on both of the lots for the amount of $250. The notice was filed within sixty days after the labor was furnished and the work done, and was recorded as required by law. Later, and within the time fixed by the statute, this suit was commenced against appellee Dreher and others interested, including the First State Bank, whose mortgage on the lots remained unsatisfied.
Substantially the same question here presented was before the United States Supreme Court in an appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Phillips v. Gilbert (1879), 101 U. S. 721, 25 L. Ed. 833. The mechanic’s lien statute of the District of Columbia is not materially different from the Indiana statute. In that case, a contractor sought to foreclose a lien for labor performed and material furnished in the construction of a row of buildings built on contiguous lots. The
Appellee cites Hill v. Braden (1876), 54 Ind. 72, Witherson v. Rust (1877), 57 Ind. 172, and McGrew v. McCarty (1881), 78 Ind. 496, as holding a contrary doctrine. It will be observed that the Premier Steel Company case, supra, is a later expression of our Supreme Court. Besides, the facts in those cases are so different that they are not controlling.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to the trial court to restate its conclusions of law, and enter a decree for appellants, all in accordance with this opinion.