33 Pa. Commw. 403 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1978
Opinion by
These cross appeals bring before us for review an order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) dated July 7, 1976, disallowing in its entirety the second step of a two-stage tariff supplement filed by West Penn Power Company (West Penn), the appellant at No. 1592 C.D. 1976. The appellant at No. 1665 C.D. 1976 is the Commonwealth as a customer protes
On October 1, 1974, West Penn filed with the PUC a two-stage tariff supplement, the first stage of which was designed to increase operating revenues by $9,-912,950. or 4.9% based upon the level of operations as of June 30, 1974, the end of the test year employed by West Penn in its projections. The second stage would increase operating revenues an additional $15,-005,900. (7.3%) or a total increase in revenues of $24,-918,850., an overall percentage increase of 12.2% above those of the test year.
The first stage increases were not suspended, they became effective November 30, 1974, and are presently being charged to customers. The second stage proposed tariffs were suspended by the PUC' for two successive periods from November 26, 1974 to August 30, 1975. Since then to the date of the PUC order from which these appeals were taken, these second stage tariffs were, by order of the PUC, designated as temporary rates.
This rate proceeding before the PUC was bitterly contested by a host of protestants, including individual customers of West Penn, industrial customers and state and local government customers. Twenty-one months have expired between the tariff filing and the issuance of the PUC order here contested. Most unfortunately for all concerned, this case must be remanded to'the PUC because of its failure to make adequate factual determinations in support of its conclusion that West Penn’s second stage tariff supplement should be denied in its entirety. Without supporting explanation or reason, the majority of the Commissioners simply concluded that West Penn’s fair value is $816,225,000. and that a reasonable rate of return thereon is 7.92%, which conclusion produced .the remarkable result of. disallowing to the dollar West
The dominant difference found in the PUC order and that of the dissenting Commissioners directs itself to the reserve capacity of West Penn as the result of it's completion of a new generating capacity at its Harrison; Unit No. 3 for use in December 1974. In the PUC order, as in the staff report, the generating ca
Without detailing all the pertinent parts of the order, similar statements and critical unsupported conclusions are found in this order. For example, with respect to the fair rate of return as influenced by cost of borrowed money and equity capital, excess reserve capacity is also mentioned. It is stated in that portion of the order dealing with fair rate of return that the finding of excess reserve capacity “shall be taken into consideration” and that the cost of money “probably would have been lower had not West Penn obtained funds to increase reserve capacity.” Having
It states:
It is incomprehensible how the majority can conclude, without the benefit of an analysis of the changes in all figures of the staff report, that respondent is entitled to no additional increase in rates merely because questions were raised about reserve capacity. The key question is what would be the allowable operating revenues if changes were made to all figures in the staff report to delete the effects of Harrison Unit No. 3. That question cannot be answered, as the majority did, by an arbitrary assumption that the temporary-rate level would be the level of the permanent rates. It is the duty of this Commission to base its orders upon facts, and without an analysis of the changes in all figures of the staff report, the action of the majority on July 7, 1976, was without support or justification. The staff was directed to prepare an order reaching the conclusion that the temporary-rate level would be the permanent level of rates, and this can be done only by ignoring the facts, departure from principles of regulatory law and reaching urisupportable conclusions.
In Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, supra note 1, we faced
At the outset, we note that the PUC’s failure to make any specific adjustments to PG&W’s cost figures affords us no insight into the precise weight given the various cost élements by the PUC in arriving at fair value. Although this does not frustrate our review in the circumstances of the present case, it does make our task most difficult and we once again admonish the PUC to disclose in some detail in its adjudications the figures upon which its conclusions are based and the methods employed in arriving at those conclusions.
33 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 143 at 149, 381 A.2d 996, 999 (1977).
In this case, however, we are frustrated in the performance of our judicial review of a PUC order which can only be remedied by remand. In an attempt to persuade us to pass upon the merits of these appeals, the PUC argues that we should- give full recognition to the “pragmatic adjustment” theory applied by Federal Courts in review of rate making body adjudications as expressed in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), and Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 315 U.S. 575 (1942). This theory has never been adopted in Pennsylvania for the reason that the applicable statutory law pertaining to the right of a public utility to a fair rate of return upon a fair value, the role of the PUC to pass upon aerate application and to support its action with an adjudication meeting the standards of an administrative adjudication, and the role of a court in reviewing the same does not permit pragmatism to play any role that it may play in Federal decisions under the Mope doctrine.
Order
Now, January 26, 1978, the order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission of July 7, 1976, the subject of these appeals, is hereby set aside and these proceedings are remanded to the Commission for the purpose of its review and revision of said order and, if necessary, modification thereof, consistent with this opinion to the end that its discussion, findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficiently comprehensive and adequate to enable this Court on review thereof to determine the merits of any appeal from such revised order.
All rights of appeal are preserved to those who heretofore appealed from the order of July 7, 1976, if timely taken from the revised order of the Commission hereby directed to be issued in these proceedings.
Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 33 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 143, 148 n. 4, 381 A.2d 996, 999 n. 4 (1977); Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, v. Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co., 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 214, 341 A.2d 239 (1975).