174 Pa. Super. 123 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1953
Opinion by
This is an appeal by West Penn Power Company from an order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission of February 16,1953. A petition for rehearing and stay of that order was denied by the Commission on April 6, 1953.
In this appeal the Company takes the position that the action of the Commission on October 26, 1951, constituted a final order with a finding that the rates under tariff No. 30 previously filed by the Company were just and reasonable, and that the Commission was without authority to summarily issue its subsequent order of February 16, 1953, in which it held the same rates to be in part excessive and ordered refunds. The Commission, on the other hand, asserts that its initial action on October 26, 1951, was no more than a decision not to further suspend the rates under tariff No. 30 and was interlocutory, and that consequently its order of February 16, 1953, was the first final order in the rate proceeding and entirely proper.
The Commission in its brief concedes that if its action on October 26, 1951, was a final order of the Com
On February 28, 1951, the Company filed with the Commission tariff No. 30 to be effective April 29, 1951, and to supersede tariff No. 25.. It was designed to produce an increase of $4,500,000 in annual operating revenues over those received under the previous tariff. By its order of April 24, 1951, the Commission suspended the operation of the proposed tariff (No. 30) for a period of six months until October 29, 1951. At the same time the Commission initiated an investigation on its own motion for the purpose of determining the fairness, justness, reasonableness, and lawfulness of the proposed tariff, the investigation to include consideration of the imposition of temporary rates. No complaints were filed with the Commission as to tariff No. 30 or the increase in rates provided therein. Hearings were held on twenty-one days, beginning May 23, 1951, at which evidence was introduced by the Company and the Commission.
On October 26, 1951, duly authorized personnel of the Commission informed officials of the Company that the Commission had decided the rates under tariff No. 30 were just and reasonable, and that it had
In ascertaining whether a particular action of the Commission constitutes an order of definitive character, we are guided by general principles of law applicable to administrative tribunals. The question of conclusiveness and finality of any administrative determination involves many factors, including the terms of the statute, the substance and effect of the order. 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, p. 507, §155. While the doctrine of res judicata does not apply, in any strict or technical sense, to decisions of administrative agencies, there must be a point at which an administrative ruling on the reasonableness of rates becomes fixed and definite though subject to change or modification in the future on proper proceedings. As an administrative body, the Commission is bound by the due process provisions of constitutional law and by fundamental principles of fairness. Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 391, 395, 90 A. 2d 850. The Commission cannot make a final determination on an ultimate question before it for adjudication and subsequently
We are all of the opinion that under the circumstances disclosed by the present record the action of the Commission on October 26, 1951, as communicated to the Company and announced to the public, was a final administrative determination, evidenced by an order that the rates under tariff No. 30 were justified and reasonable. Whether it was a final order in form under recognized standards of judicial and administrative action is not material, as it had the effect in law of an order of definitive character in these proceedings. An important consideration is whether the pronouncement of the Commission was a ruling in the present tense that the rates were reasonable as distinguished from a publicized vote of the members of the Commission against further suspension under circumstances showing a definitive ruling on the reasonableness of the rates to be a matter for future action. Judged by these standards, the action of the Commission on October 26, 1951, was a determination on the facts, which the Commission had before it after extensive hearings, that the rates under tariff No. 30 were reasonable. The language of the “release” from the Commission was in the present tense, and the release was an official pronouncement that “on basis of the exhaustive half-year inquiry, ... West Penn has clearly justified the increased rates.” The Commission further stated that voluminous evidence submitted by the Company showed “the utility could sustain [the rates] on any fair value finding the commission would be
Under section 308 (b) of the Public Utility Law of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1053, 66 PS §1148, the Commission is given full power to deal with the question of suspension of rates filed by a utility for an initial six-month period and a subsequent three-month period. The exercise of its statutory power of suspension of new tariffs is primarily an administrative function within the sound discretion of the Commission (Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 96, 103, 63 A. 2d 391); but its action may be set aside where in conflict with the general purposes of the Public Utility Law of 1937. Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, supra, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 391, 90 A. 2d 850; Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 87, 94, 95 A. 2d 555. The Commission in the present proceeding could have permitted the
Finally, the Commission, having approved the rates under tariff No. 30, could not summarily reverse its order of approval and apply such reversal retroactively by ordering refunds for the period between October 29, 1951, and April 14, 1953. The order of October 26, 1951, amounted in law to formal Commission approval of the new rates filed by the Company under tariff No. 30, and rendered the rates in effect commission-made rates. Consequently, after it had previously approved the rates, the Commission could not give retroactive effect to its order of February 16, 1953, and direct refunds to consumers for charges made beginning October 29, 1951. Cf. Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commis
The order of the Commission is reversed.