88 N.J. Eq. 571 | N.J. | 1918
The opinion of the court was delivered by.
In 1859 William W. Niles, being the owner of a tract of land in the township of Union, in the county of Hudson, made and
The facts not disputed are that lots were sold on the portion of the street to which this controversy is limited, and to quiet the title to which the bill was filed, by reference to the map as filed, and that such lots are now all owned by the complainant; that previous to 1890 James H. Symes became the owner of all the lands lying east of Park avenue, formerly Bulks Ferry road, and in that year filed his bill in equity to quiet the title to the land in which the township of Union, the municipality which the defendant succeeded, was made a party. This bill of complaint rested upon the ground that various maps had been made of the tract, some, if not all, subsequent to the original map of 1859; that these maps had protracted on them streets not consistent with the original map, and particularly inconsistent with Niles avenue, because of which, it was averred in the bill, the township claimed some interest in the land. The answer admitted the complainant’s possession and claim of ownership but disavowed any information concerning the other averments set out in the bill.
The final decree in that case adjudged, among other things, that the township of Union had no estate or interest in or encumbrance upon the lands except the right to unpaid taxes and assessments levied against them. The lands in which it was adjudged and decreed that the township of Union had no estate or interest in, or encumbrance on, embraced that part of Niles avenue lying east of Park avenue.
Notwithstanding this adjudication the town of West New York, the present defendant, which succeeded to the government and the rights of the township of Union, did, by resolution, on April 2d, 1914, twenty-four years after the adjudication by the court of chancery that it had no estate, interest in or encumbrance upon the lands, and while that decree was in full force and effect, accept Niles avenue by virtue of which it claims an interest in so much of Niles avenue as lies east of Park avenue. The present bill was filed to quiet the title against this claim. In disposing of this bill the vice-chancellor disregarded the former decree, saying that, in his opinion the court was not authorized in 1890 in making that decree because it was based, in part at least, upon the stipulation and agreement of counsel, who, in his opinion, could not make such a stipulation, and that the decree in the court of chancery made in 1890 should be opened.
While the decree of dismissal does not in terms open that decree; it had that effect because, manifestly, the present decree could not have been made if the former decree remained in full force and effect.
The vice-chancellor had no power to open the original decree in the present proceeding. That decree had adjudicated between these parties the very question which is raised in the present proceedings and the complainant was entitled to a decree as prayed for upon the ground of res judicata.
The notion of the vice-chancellor that counsel for the defendant in the original suit had no authority to stipulate the facts, or to consent to the entry of the decree is fallacious. Courts constantly accejot the stipulation of counsel as a basis for their judgments and decrees, and if such consent is made without authority, it is the duty of the party for whom it is made to promptly complain, and not wait for nearly a quarter of a century, after accepting so much of the decree as is favorable, to disavow the authority of counsel.
To get rid of a decree entered by consent of counsel in excess of his authority, the complaining party must act with reasonable promptness. 'The decree dismissing the bill will be reversed, and the record remitted to the court of chancery that it may be dealt with according to the views expressed by this court.