47 Ala. 492 | Ala. | 1872
We shall dispose of this case on the first defense made in the court below, without saying anything as to the merits of the second. In the first place, the judgment recovered by Mrs. Allsover was rendered by a coimt of the rebel State of Alabama, and, as we have held, it had only the force and effect of a foreign judgment, and constituted a cause of action merely, and no execution could be legally issued upon it after the rebellion was suppressed. Foreign judgments can only be enforced by the law of comity, and in actions brought for that purpose the merits and justice of such judgments may be examined into. — Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418. The question, then, arises, does the evidence, if true, make out a good defense to the action, either as a payment sim
The rule undoubtedly is, that “ the payment of a part of a debt is, in general, no legal satisfaction of the remainder, although the creditor receive the smaller sum in full discharge of tho whole demand, and give a receipt accordingly.”- — Chitty on Contracts, 747, and cases cited. This rule, however, to say the least of it, is a hard rule, and defeats the clearly expressed intentions of the parties, and, therefore, should not be extended to embrace cases not within the very letter of it. In the case of Brooks et al. v. White (2 Metcalf, 283), speaking of this rule, it is said: “ This rule, which obviously may be urged in violation of good faith, is not to be extended beyond its precise import; and whenever the technical reason for its application does not exist, the rule itself is not to be applied.” And in the case of Johnson v. Brannan, 5 I. R., the court speaks of it as “ that rigid and rather unreasonable rule of the old law.” Being a rigid rule, and the reasons for itnot altogether satisfactory, it might be expected that cases
A composition by a debtor in failing circumstances, by which the creditors agree to accept a certain percentage of their debts, whether past due or running- to maturity, in discharge of the whole, is a well settled exception to this rule. — Milligan v. Brown, 1 Rawle, 397. So, if a debtor give his note, indorsed by a third person as further security, for a part of the debt, which is accepted by the creditor in full satisfaction, it is a valid discharge of the whole of the original debt, and may be pleaded as an accord and satisfaction. — Boyd v. Hitchcock, 20 I. R., 76. So, again, the acceptance of a collateral thing, if of any legal value, in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt, is a good defense as an accord and satisfaction.— Williams v. Stanton, 1 Root, 426; Blenn v. Chester, 5 Day, 360; Anderson v. Highland Turnpike Co., 10 I. R., 86. And, once, more, the payment and acceptance of the principal of a debt, without the interest due thereon, if received by the creditor in full satisfaction, is a good accord and satisfaction. — 5 I. R., supra.
In the present case, the payment, as the evidence shows, exceeded the sum for which the judgment was rendered by more than a hundred dollars, and it was received in full satisfaction of the same; therefore, it operated as a legal discharge of the whole judgment. Interest is, really, no part of the debt, but is a mere incident to the debt, given by statute, and is only recoverable as damages for its detention. If a party accepts the principal of his debt, he -can not, afterwards, sue for the interest. This is especially so where the principalis received in satisfaction. — Tillotson v. Preston, 3 I. R. 229.
In addition to what is already said, we hold that the circumstances of this case presented good reasons to make the payment of the $880 a good defense to the action, as the compromise of a doubtful debt. The defendant was only surety for the original debt. The principal and the defendant’s co-surety had become insolvent, and the defendant himself, by the disasters of -the civil war, had been