Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661

286 F.3d 661 | 3rd Cir. | 2002

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This appeal arises out of a putative class action against(cid:13) Ford Motor Company relating to two allegedly defective(cid:13) components in the transmissions installed in Ford vehicles(cid:13) during the 1990-1995 model years. Asserting that Ford(cid:13) knew about the defective parts since at least 1991,(cid:13) appellants sued for breach of express warranty, breach of(cid:13) implied warranty, fraudulent concealment, and violations of(cid:13) Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer(cid:13) Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, SS 201-1(cid:13) et seq. (West 1993). The district court, after denying(cid:13) appellants’ motion to remand the case to the state court in(cid:13) which they had originated it, granted Ford’s motion for(cid:13) judgment on the pleadings as to all of appellants’ claims.(cid:13) For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the district(cid:13) court’s orders.(cid:13) I. BACKGROUND(cid:13) A. Factual History(cid:13) Eight plaintiffs who bought or leased Ford automobiles(cid:13) manufactured between 1991 and 1995, six of whom appeal,(cid:13) 3(cid:13) filed the complaint in this case alleging that the(cid:13) transmissions in their vehicles contained two defective(cid:13) parts: (1) aluminum (rather than steel) forward clutch(cid:13) pistons ("FCPs") that crack prematurely, and (2)(cid:13) inadequately lubricated planetary gears ("RPGs").(cid:13) Appellants assert that both defects can cause transmission(cid:13) failures, including "sudden acceleration, delayed forward or(cid:13) reverse engagement, sudden shifts into reverse, and a total(cid:13) loss of acceleration or forward movement." Br. of Appellants(cid:13) at 5. According to the complaint, each of the appellants(cid:13) experienced transmission failure and incurred substantial(cid:13) repair costs before his or her automobile had reached(cid:13) 80,000 miles.1(cid:13) Appellants assert that Ford’s Technical Service Bulletins(cid:13) demonstrate that the company has known about the FCP(cid:13) defects since at least 1991. They maintain that Ford(cid:13) redesigned the FCPs twice before finally deciding in 1994 to(cid:13) manufacture them with steel instead of aluminum.(cid:13) Appellants similarly allege that Ford has been aware of the(cid:13) RPGs’ lubrication defect since at least 1990. Even after(cid:13) redesigning the RPGs in 1990 and 1992, however, Ford has(cid:13) been unable to correct the lubrication problem. Despite its(cid:13) awareness of these malfunctioning components, Ford never(cid:13) warned the overwhelming majority of car owners about the(cid:13) transmission defects. According to appellants, Ford not only(cid:13) concealed this material information from consumers as it(cid:13) continued to market and sell automobiles with defective(cid:13) transmissions, but it addressed the problem by cutting its(cid:13) 6-year/60,000 mile power train warranty for its 1991(cid:13) models to a 3-year/36,000 mile warranty for its 1992(cid:13) models.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. Jean Cook’s 1991 Mercury Sable experienced transmission failure at(cid:13) 44,500 miles; Donna and Joseph Coffey’s 1995 Ford Winstar experienced(cid:13) transmission problems at 50,000 miles; Joan McIlhenny’s 1990 Ford(cid:13) Taurus had to have its transmission overhauled at 73,159 miles; Daria(cid:13) Zaharchuk’s 1993 Ford Taurus experienced transmission failure at(cid:13) 48,779 miles; and James Dunlap’s 1995 Ford Winstar had to have its(cid:13) transmission overhauled at 65,000 miles. See Pls.’ Compl. PP 33-37(cid:13) (App. 43a-45a).(cid:13) 4(cid:13) B. Procedural History(cid:13) On January 20, 2000, appellants filed their putative class(cid:13) action in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.(cid:13) Ford promptly removed the case to the district court on the(cid:13) basis of diversity of citizenship following which appellants(cid:13) moved to remand the case, arguing that the amount-in-(cid:13) controversy jurisdictional threshold exceeding $75,000 had(cid:13) not been satisfied. On April 11, 2000, the district court(cid:13) denied appellants’ motion for remand and thus retained(cid:13) jurisdiction over the case. In its order, the district court(cid:13) first indicated that Pennsylvania courts "have found that(cid:13) the amount in controversy in a suit under the UTPCPL is(cid:13) the purchase price of the car." Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co.,(cid:13) No. Civ. A. 00-943, 2000 WL 375260, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr.(cid:13) 11, 2000). Finding that a jury reasonably could conclude(cid:13) that appellants were entitled to recover the purchase price(cid:13) of their automobiles to make them whole, the court started(cid:13) with a base of $15,000 in damages. See id. After trebling(cid:13) the compensatory damages to $45,000 pursuant to the(cid:13) UTPCPL, the court next determined that reasonable(cid:13) attorney’s fees could range between $5,000 and $10,000,(cid:13) thus pushing the amount to over $50,000. See id. Finally,(cid:13) recognizing that the UTPCPL provides courts with(cid:13) discretionary authority to impose punitive damages, the(cid:13) district court concluded that "[b]ased on Plaintiffs’(cid:13) allegations, a reasonable jury could award punitive(cid:13) damages that would easily place the amount in controversy(cid:13) above $75,000." Id. at *4.2 (cid:13) On May 24, 2000, Ford filed a motion for judgment on(cid:13) the pleadings. After the motion was briefed fully, the(cid:13) district court entered an order granting the motion with(cid:13) respect to the claims of all parties except the Werwinskis’(cid:13) claim for breach of express warranty. Of concern on this(cid:13) appeal, the district court dismissed the fraudulent(cid:13) concealment and UTPCPL claims under the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine because "recovery in tort is barred in product(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. Having concluded that the compensatory and punitive damages could(cid:13) exceed the amount-in-controversy threshold, the court deemed it(cid:13) unnecessary to consider the value of the injunctive relief sought by(cid:13) appellants. See id.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) liability actions between commercial enterprises where the(cid:13) only damage alleged is to the product itself, even if the(cid:13) defect posed a potential risk of injury." Werwinski v. Ford(cid:13) Motor Co., No. Civ. A. 00-943, 2000 WL 1201576, at *4(cid:13) (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2000). In coming to this conclusion, the(cid:13) district court determined that the economic loss doctrine is(cid:13) not limited to transactions between commercial enterprises,(cid:13) but extends to transactions between manufacturers and(cid:13) individual consumers as well. See id. at *5. Furthermore,(cid:13) the district court predicted that the Supreme Court of(cid:13) Pennsylvania would conclude that the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine applies to claims for intentional fraud in addition(cid:13) to claims for negligence, strict liability, and negligent(cid:13) misrepresentation. See id. Finally, the district court(cid:13) observed that Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations(cid:13) for common law fraud actions barred the fraud claims of(cid:13) several appellants. See id. at *6 n.5.(cid:13) Eventually, the Werwinskis settled their case with Ford(cid:13) and dismissed all of their claims with prejudice. 3 On(cid:13) December 12, 2000, the district court entered final(cid:13) judgment for Ford. Three days later, appellants filed a(cid:13) timely notice of appeal challenging both the district court’s(cid:13) order denying remand and its order disposing of the case(cid:13) on the merits.(cid:13) II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW(cid:13) A. Jurisdiction(cid:13) The district court exercised removal jurisdiction over this(cid:13) putative class action based upon diversity of the parties.(cid:13) See 28 U.S.C. SS 1332(a)(1), 1441(b). The district court(cid:13) entered final judgment in the case on December 12, 2000,(cid:13) and appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and thus we(cid:13) have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291.(cid:13) B. Standard of Review(cid:13) We exercise plenary review over the district court’s order(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. Consequently, the Werwinskis are not parties to this appeal, even(cid:13) though their names remain in the caption as a procedural formality. See(cid:13) Br. of Appellants at 4 n.2.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) denying appellants’ motion for remand, see Lazorko v. Pa.(cid:13) Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___(cid:13) U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2552 (2001), and its order granting(cid:13) Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, see Churchill(cid:13) v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 1999).(cid:13) III. DISCUSSION(cid:13) Appellants raise several issues on appeal. First, they(cid:13) contend that the district court erred in denying their(cid:13) motion to remand because the amount-in-controversy(cid:13) requirement for diversity jurisdiction had not been met for(cid:13) any of their claims. Second, they argue that the district(cid:13) court erroneously applied the economic loss doctrine to(cid:13) their fraudulent concealment and UTPCPL claims. Finally,(cid:13) appellants submit that the district court erred in ruling(cid:13) that the Pennsylvania statute of limitations barred certain(cid:13) of their fraudulent concealment claims. See infra note 9.(cid:13) A. Amount in Controversy(cid:13) A district court has subject matter jurisdiction over state(cid:13) law claims if there is complete diversity of citizenship(cid:13) between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds(cid:13) $75,000 for each plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C.S 1332. Appellants(cid:13) argue that the district court should not have exercised(cid:13) removal jurisdiction because the $75,000 threshold has not(cid:13) been satisfied. In particular, they contend that the court(cid:13) erred when calculating the amounts in controversy by(cid:13) taking into account the purchase price of their vehicles,(cid:13) rather than just the repair costs for their transmissions.(cid:13) A district court’s determination as to the amount in(cid:13) controversy must be based on the "plaintiff ’s complaint at(cid:13) the time the petition for removal was filed." Steel Valley(cid:13) Auth. v. Union Switch Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1987). The court must measure the amount "not . .. by the(cid:13) low end of an open-ended claim, but rather by a reasonable(cid:13) reading of the value of the rights being litigated." Angus v.(cid:13) Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). However,(cid:13) "claims of several plaintiffs, if they are separate and(cid:13) distinct, cannot be aggregated for purposes of determining(cid:13) the amount in controversy." Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul(cid:13) Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal(cid:13) 7(cid:13) quotation marks omitted). See also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co.,(cid:13) 414 U.S. 291, 301, 94 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1973). Only claims,(cid:13) whether related or unrelated, of a single plaintiff against a(cid:13) single defendant may be aggregated. See Snyder v. Harris,(cid:13) 394 U.S. 332, 335, 89 S. Ct. 1053, 1056 (1960). 4(cid:13) Appellants first argue that the amount in controversy for(cid:13) each plaintiff does not even approach $75,000 because(cid:13) their complaint requests compensatory damages for only(cid:13) the costs of repairing or replacing the defective(cid:13) transmissions, which range from $848 to $2,434. See Br. of(cid:13) Appellants at 12. Appellants’ erroneous assertion that their(cid:13) complaint does not claim damages based on the purchase(cid:13) price of the automobiles is belied, however, by their(cid:13) complaint’s "Prayer for Relief," which plainly seeks recovery(cid:13) for, inter alia, "compensatory damages" and "all or part of(cid:13) the sums [appellants] paid to purchase or lease [their](cid:13) automobiles." Pls.’ Compl. at 19-20 (App. 54a-55a). The(cid:13) "Prayer for Relief " also demands "that defendant disgorge,(cid:13) for the benefit of the class, its ill-gotten profits received(cid:13) from the sale or lease of the subject vehicles and/or make(cid:13) full restitution to the Named Plaintiffs and the other(cid:13) members of the Class." Id. at 20 (App. 55a). Although(cid:13) appellants indicated in their motion to remand that they(cid:13) were seeking only repair costs and that "individual claims(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. Appellants allege in their complaint that their claims exceed $50,000(cid:13) in value, see Pls.’ Compl. P 42 (App. 46a), but they insist that they(cid:13) included this allegation to avoid the case being referred to Pennsylvania’s(cid:13) mandatory arbitration program. See Br. of Appellants at 12. The district(cid:13) court considered this allegation to be a concession by appellants that the(cid:13) amount in controversy was at least $50,000 and that they were seeking(cid:13) more than merely $2,000-$3,000 in repair costs for each plaintiff. See(cid:13) Werwinski, 2000 WL 375260, at *3. Appellants explain that they reached(cid:13) the $50,000 figure by aggregating their damages, which they assert is(cid:13) allowed to pass the state mandatory arbitration threshold but is not(cid:13) permitted to pass the federal amount in controversy threshold. See Br.(cid:13) of Appellants at 12. The district court rejected appellants’ explanation,(cid:13) concluding for itself that the local rules governing the mandatory(cid:13) arbitration program do not permit aggregation. See Werwinski, 2000 WL(cid:13) 375260, at *3. We need not resolve this issue, however, for even if the(cid:13) district court was correct, appellants’ alleged admission that the amount(cid:13) in controversy exceeded $50,000 would not in itself satisfy the $75,000(cid:13) threshold.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) for compensatory damages[ ] will rarely exceed $2,000, and(cid:13) will not exceed $3,000," Pls.’ Mot. for RemandP 3 (App.(cid:13) 112a), the amount in controversy must be calculated based(cid:13) on a "reasonable reading" of the complaint, and a plaintiff ’s(cid:13) stipulation subsequent to removal as to the amount in(cid:13) controversy or the types of relief sought is of"no legal(cid:13) significance" to the court’s determination. See Angus, 989(cid:13) F.2d at 145. Consequently, the district court properly found(cid:13) that the complaint did not restrict appellants’ recovery to(cid:13) only the cost of repairing the defective transmissions, and(cid:13) therefore, a jury reasonably could conclude that appellants(cid:13) should be awarded the purchase price of their cars to make(cid:13) them whole.(cid:13) Appellants assert that the district court based its holding(cid:13) on a "jaundiced reading" of their complaint because the(cid:13) only injuries pled or specific sums listed in the complaint(cid:13) relate to the repair and replacement costs of the defective(cid:13) transmission parts. See Reply Br. of Appellants at 6. They(cid:13) note that the complaint makes no reference to the value of(cid:13) their automobiles or how much they paid for them. See id.(cid:13) at 7. Appellants insist that the district court’s reading of(cid:13) the complaint essentially requires them to state explicitly(cid:13) that they were seeking only repair costs and were not(cid:13) seeking refunds for the purchase price of the automobiles.(cid:13) See id. at 8. They submit that requiring them to plead with(cid:13) "such redundancy" violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Id.(cid:13) If the "Prayer for Relief " in their complaint did not(cid:13) request an order declaring Ford "financially responsible . . .(cid:13) for all or part of the sums [appellants] paid to purchase or(cid:13) lease [their] automobiles" or demand that Ford disgorge "its(cid:13) ill-gotten profits received from the sale or lease of the(cid:13) subject vehicles," then we might say that appellants’(cid:13) argument has some merit. Nevertheless, because of these(cid:13) provisions, the complaint clearly leaves the door open for(cid:13) them later to demand reimbursement for the purchase(cid:13) price of the cars. And because the district court must base(cid:13) its amount-in-controversy determination on what a jury(cid:13) reasonably could award appellants, it cannot be said that(cid:13) the court erred in concluding on the basis of the complaint(cid:13) 9(cid:13) that a jury could decide that appellants are entitled to(cid:13) refunds for the purchase price of their cars.5(cid:13) Appellants next contend that the district court’s amount-(cid:13) in-controversy calculation was flawed inasmuch as litigants(cid:13) are not permitted to recover the purchase price of their(cid:13) vehicles under the UTPCPL. Appellants argue that the four(cid:13) cases6 cited by the district court to support its conclusion(cid:13) that the purchase price of a vehicle is recoverable under the(cid:13) UTPCPL are inapposite because the courts in those cases(cid:13) calculated the amount in controversy under Pennsylvania’s(cid:13) "Lemon Law," Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, SS 1951-63 (West(cid:13) 1993), not the UTPCPL. The Lemon Law provides, in(cid:13) relevant part, that:(cid:13) If the manufacturer fails to repair or correct a(cid:13) nonconformity after a reasonable number of attempts,(cid:13) the manufacturer shall, at the option of the purchaser,(cid:13) replace the motor vehicle with a comparable motor(cid:13) vehicle of equal value or accept return of the vehicle(cid:13) from the purchaser and refund to the purchaser the(cid:13) full purchase price, including all collateral charges, less(cid:13) a reasonable allowance for the purchaser’s use of the(cid:13) vehicle . . . .(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. Appellants assert that the district court used the purchase price of the(cid:13) vehicles instead of the repair costs even after acknowledging that the(cid:13) parties agreed the complaint sought reimbursement for the cost of(cid:13) transmission repair. See Br. of Appellants at 13. Appellants misrepresent(cid:13) the district court’s statement, however, for the court simply observed(cid:13) that "[t]he parties seem to agree that the Complaint could be read as(cid:13) asking for the cost of repairing the damage[d] transmissions." Werwinski,(cid:13) 2000 WL 375260, at *2 (emphasis added). The district court went on to(cid:13) explain that Ford nevertheless argued that additional costs pushed the(cid:13) amount above $75,000. See id. Despite the impression appellants are(cid:13) trying to leave with this court through their characterization of the(cid:13) district court’s ruling, the parties never agreed that the repair costs (not(cid:13) the purchase price) were the appropriate starting point for assessing the(cid:13) amount in controversy.(cid:13) 6. These four cases are: Pavese v. General Motors Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-(cid:13) 3688, 1998 WL 57761 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 1998); Palan v. Ford Motor Co.,(cid:13) Civ. A. No. 95-1445, 1995 WL 476240 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1995); Voorhees(cid:13) v. General Motors Corp., Civ. A. No. 90-295, 1990 WL 29650 (E.D. Pa.(cid:13) Mar. 16, 1990); Adams v. General Motors Corp. , Civ. A. No. 89-7653,(cid:13) 1990 WL 19950 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1990).(cid:13) 10(cid:13) Id. at 1955 (emphasis added). Appellants submit that the(cid:13) UTPCPL, unlike the Lemon Law, does not specify that(cid:13) compensatory damages should be based on the purchase(cid:13) price of the vehicle and, therefore, the measure of damages(cid:13) in this case should be based on the cost of repairing or(cid:13) replacing the defective parts.(cid:13) Appellants’ argument fails for two reasons. First,(cid:13) although the UTPCPL does not specifically identify the(cid:13) vehicle’s purchase price as the appropriate measure for(cid:13) compensatory damages, it likewise does not indicate that(cid:13) repair costs should be the sole measure for damages. The(cid:13) UTPCPL provides instead that a plaintiff can recover"actual(cid:13) damages," which the court may treble at its discretion, as(cid:13) well as "such additional relief [the court] deems necessary(cid:13) or proper." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, S 201-9.2. Therefore,(cid:13) notwithstanding appellants’ position to the contrary, the(cid:13) UTPCPL does not preclude a jury from awarding them(cid:13) damages based on the purchase price of their vehicles.(cid:13) Second, appellants’ argument is based on flawed(cid:13) interpretations of the opinions that the district court cited(cid:13) in support of its conclusion that a vehicle’s purchase price(cid:13) is the correct measure of compensatory damages under the(cid:13) UTPCPL. Despite what appellants argue in their briefs, the(cid:13) plaintiffs in Palan v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. A. No. 95-1445,(cid:13) 1995 WL 476240 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1995), Adams v. General(cid:13) Motors Corp., Civ. A. No. 89-7653, 1990 WL 19950 (E.D. Pa.(cid:13) Feb. 26, 1990), and Pavese v. General Motors Corp., No.(cid:13) Civ. A. 97-3688, 1998 WL 57761 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 1998),(cid:13) specifically sought recovery under the UTPCPL, and the(cid:13) courts calculated the amount in controversy under the(cid:13) UTPCPL, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs also(cid:13) stated claims under the Lemon Law.(cid:13) For instance, the district court in Palan explicitly stated(cid:13) that "as to plaintiff ’s Consumer Protection Law claim, the(cid:13) actual amount in controversy is three times the purchase(cid:13) price." See Palan, 1995 WL 476240, at *2. Furthermore, the(cid:13) district court in Adams concluded that, even leaving aside(cid:13) the Lemon Law claim, the UTPCPL claim itself exceeded the(cid:13) amount-in-controversy threshold insofar as the statute(cid:13) permitted the court to treble plaintiff ’s base request of(cid:13) $22,027.84 in damages, which represented the purchase(cid:13) 11(cid:13) price of the automobile. See Adams, 1990 WL 18850, at *2.(cid:13) Finally, the district court in Pavese had no choice but to(cid:13) calculate the amount in controversy under the UTPCPL(cid:13) after it held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under(cid:13) the Lemon Law because she was leasing the vehicle and(cid:13) lessees are not permitted to sue under the Lemon Law. See(cid:13) Pavese, 1998 WL 577761, at *2-3. General Motors argued(cid:13) that the plaintiff ’s actual damages under the UTPCPL could(cid:13) not exceed the total lease payments she had made at the(cid:13) time she filed her complaint ($16,637.48), whereas the(cid:13) plaintiff asserted that she was entitled to recover the full(cid:13) purchase price of the car ($33,505). The district court(cid:13) sidestepped the issue, however, by concluding that the(cid:13) amount-in-controversy threshold could be met by trebling(cid:13) the amount of plaintiff ’s total lease payments ($16,637.48).7(cid:13) Palan, Adams, and Pavese are consistent with two other(cid:13) decisions from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania(cid:13) recognizing a vehicle’s purchase price as the appropriate(cid:13) measure of damages for automobile defect claims under the(cid:13) UTPCPL. In Levin v. American Honda Motor Co., Civ. A. No.(cid:13) 94-5380, 1994 WL 719856, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1994),(cid:13) the plaintiff sued under, inter alia, the Lemon Law and the(cid:13) UTPCPL, but the district court calculated the amount in(cid:13) controversy under the UTPCPL after dismissing the Lemon(cid:13) Law claim for failure to exhaust alternative remedies under(cid:13) the statute. In retaining jurisdiction over the case, the court(cid:13) concluded that "[t]he actual damages in this case would be(cid:13) the total purchase price less a reasonable allowance for the(cid:13) use of the vehicle." Id.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. Appellants are correct that one of the four opinions cited by the(cid:13) district court does not squarely support its holding. In Voorhees v.(cid:13) General Motors Corp., Civ. A. No. 90 295, 1990 WL 29650, at *2 (E.D. Pa.(cid:13) Mar. 16, 1990), the district court first explained that the "actual(cid:13) damages for violation of the Lemon Law will be the total purchase price(cid:13) of the truck," and it then trebled the damages under the UTPCPL(cid:13) because a violation of the Lemon Law is also a violation of the UTPCPL.(cid:13) Thus, by intertwining the Lemon Law and the UTPCPL in its analysis of(cid:13) the amount in controversy, the court skirted the question of whether(cid:13) actual damages under the UTPCPL should be measured by the purchase(cid:13) price of the car.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) In McLaughlin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., No. Civ. A.(cid:13) 00-3295, 2000 WL 1793071, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2000),(cid:13) the plaintiff sued Volkswagen for fraud and fraudulent(cid:13) misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, breach of(cid:13) contract, and violations of the UTPCPL, alleging that her(cid:13) car contained a defective fuel level sensor. The district court(cid:13) determined that the baseline for damages under the(cid:13) UTPCPL was the car’s purchase price ($50,000), not its(cid:13) reduction in value. See id. at *2. The court explained:(cid:13) Where an alleged defect relates to a discreet [sic],(cid:13) modular, or incidental part of the vehicle (such as the(cid:13) tires, windshield wipers or stereo), it is unreasonable to(cid:13) use the purchase price as a baseline for measuring the(cid:13) amount in controversy. In such cases, the better(cid:13) measure of damages is the replacement cost of the part(cid:13) in question. However, where an alleged defect relates to(cid:13) an integrated system that is necessary to the safe(cid:13) operation of the vehicle (such as the engine or(cid:13) transmission), it is reasonable to assume that the(cid:13) baseline for damages is the purchase price of the car.(cid:13) Id. at *3.(cid:13) Unable to reconcile their position with these authorities,(cid:13) appellants urge us to follow Waggoner Equipment Co. v.(cid:13) Ford Motor Co., No. 00-CV-0168-MJR (S.D. Ill. Nov. 6,(cid:13) 2000), and Jorgenson v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV-99-355(cid:13) CAS (Ex), Minute Order (C.D. Ca. Mar. 30, 1999). Although(cid:13) these cases are factually similar in that the district courts(cid:13) remanded similar suits against Ford seeking recovery for(cid:13) the same faulty transmissions involved here, these two(cid:13) decisions from outside this circuit are unavailing for two(cid:13) reasons. First, the courts based their decisions on different(cid:13) state consumer protection statutes, so they provide little(cid:13) insight on whether a court should use the vehicle’s(cid:13) purchase price as the baseline for determining the amount(cid:13) in controversy in a suit involving a Pennsylvania UTPCPL(cid:13) claim. Second, the cases are readily distinguishable on(cid:13) critical facts. For example, the plaintiff ’s complaint in(cid:13) Waggoner expressly stated that the amount sought by each(cid:13) plaintiff did not exceed $75,000. Thus, instead of arguing(cid:13) that the amount in controversy should be based on(cid:13) compensatory damages, Ford urged the court to consider(cid:13) 13(cid:13) the cost of a provision in the complaint requiring the(cid:13) company to "create from scratch a massive owner(cid:13) identification, notification and transmission repair(cid:13) program," which Ford insisted would exceed $75,000.(cid:13) Similarly, in Jorgenson, Ford did not assert that(cid:13) compensatory and punitive damages for each plaintiff(cid:13) would exceed $75,000, but instead argued that the(cid:13) plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief met the amount-in-(cid:13) controversy requirement. In both cases, the district courts(cid:13) concluded that the equitable relief sought did not satisfy(cid:13) the jurisdictional threshold and, therefore, remanded the(cid:13) cases.(cid:13) Appellants do not provide a convincing argument to(cid:13) support their assertion that damages under the UTPCPL(cid:13) necessarily should be confined to the cost of repairing or(cid:13) replacing the defective transmissions and should not take(cid:13) into account the purchase price of the automobiles.(cid:13) Moreover, their complaint specifically seeks "all or part of(cid:13) the sums [appellants] paid to purchase or lease [their](cid:13) automobiles." Pls.’ Compl. at 19-20 (App. 54a-55a).(cid:13) Furthermore, the text of the UTPCPL allowing plaintiffs to(cid:13) recover "actual damages" for violations of the statute in no(cid:13) way precludes recovery for the purchase price of the(cid:13) vehicles. We also point out that appellants misconstrue(cid:13) three of the four cases cited by the district court, for these(cid:13) decisions plainly calculated the amount in controversy(cid:13) under the UTPCPL by using the purchase price of the(cid:13) vehicle, not the repair costs, as the baseline for damages.(cid:13) Finally, the only cases appellants present in support of(cid:13) their position are based on statutes from other states and(cid:13) easily are distinguished on critical facts. Overall, we are(cid:13) satisfied that the district court correctly held that the(cid:13) $75,000 threshold was exceeded for each of the appellants’(cid:13) claims. Therefore, we will affirm the district court’s order(cid:13) denying appellants’ motion for remand.(cid:13) B. Economic Loss Doctrine(cid:13) Appellants contend that the district court erred in(cid:13) applying the economic loss doctrine to their fraudulent(cid:13) concealment and UTPCPL claims because (1) the doctrine(cid:13) applies only to transactions between commercial entities,(cid:13) not to transactions involving individual consumers, and (2)(cid:13) 14(cid:13) the doctrine does not bar actions for intentional fraud. The(cid:13) Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not addressed either(cid:13) question, and inasmuch as Pennsylvania substantive law is(cid:13) controlling here, we must predict how the court would rule(cid:13) by "giving ‘proper regard’ to the relevant rulings of other(cid:13) courts of the state." Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914(cid:13) F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 1990). "In the absence of guidance(cid:13) from the state’s highest court, we are to consider decisions(cid:13) of the state’s intermediate appellate courts for assistance in(cid:13) predicting how the state’s highest court would rule." Gares(cid:13) v. Willingboro Twp., 90 F.3d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1996). See(cid:13) also U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80(cid:13) F.3d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The rulings of intermediate(cid:13) appellate courts must be accorded significant weight and(cid:13) should not be disregarded absent persuasive indication that(cid:13) the highest court would rule otherwise.").(cid:13) The economic loss doctrine "prohibits plaintiffs from(cid:13) recovering in tort economic losses to which their(cid:13) entitlement flows only from a contract." Duquesne Light Co.(cid:13) v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 618 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1995). The Supreme Court adopted the doctrine in an(cid:13) admiralty products liability case, holding that"a(cid:13) manufacturer in a commercial context has no duty under(cid:13) either negligence or strict-liability theory to prevent a(cid:13) product from injuring itself." East River S.S. Corp. v.(cid:13) Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871, 106 S.Ct.(cid:13) 2295, 2302 (1986). Though it recognized the need for(cid:13) products liability law to protect consumers from dangerous(cid:13) products, the Court expressed concern that if products(cid:13) liability remedies "were to progress too far, contract law(cid:13) would drown in a sea of tort." Id. at 866, 106 S.Ct. at 2300.(cid:13) Drawing a distinction between tort and contract law, the(cid:13) Court observed that the need for a remedy in tort is(cid:13) reduced when the only injury is to the product itself and(cid:13) "the product has not met the customer’s expectations, or,(cid:13) in other words, that the customer has received ‘insufficient(cid:13) product value.’ " Id. at 872, 106 S.Ct. at 2302. The Court(cid:13) explained that in such a situation express and implied(cid:13) warranties under contract law are best suited to(cid:13) compensate for a loss in product value. Not only would(cid:13) allowing an action to lie in tort impose substantial costs on(cid:13) 15(cid:13) society, but relying on contract law permits parties to(cid:13) negotiate the terms of the manufacturer’s liability. See id.(cid:13) at 872-73, 106 S.Ct. at 2302-03. In exchange for allowing(cid:13) the manufacturer to restrict its liability, the purchaser can(cid:13) bargain for a lower price. Id. at 873, 106 S.Ct. at 2303.(cid:13) Accordingly, the Court saw "no reason to intrude into the(cid:13) parties’ allocation of the risk." Id.(cid:13) Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not(cid:13) ruled on the viability of the economic loss doctrine, an en(cid:13) banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the(cid:13) doctrine largely as set forth in East River. In REM Coal Co.(cid:13) v. Clark Equipment Co., 563 A.2d 128, 134 (Pa. Super. Ct.(cid:13) 1989), the court held that "negligence and strict liability(cid:13) theories do not apply in an action between commercial(cid:13) enterprises involving a product that malfunctions where the(cid:13) only resulting damage is to the product itself." Following(cid:13) the Supreme Court’s reasoning in East River, the court(cid:13) stated that "contract theories such as breach of warranty(cid:13) are specifically aimed at and perfectly suited to providing(cid:13) complete redress in cases involving . . . economic losses."(cid:13) Id. at 129. The court further explained that"such losses are(cid:13) based upon and flow from the purchaser’s loss of the(cid:13) benefit of his bargain and his disappointed expectations as(cid:13) to the product he purchased. Thus, the harm sought to be(cid:13) redressed is precisely that which a warranty action does(cid:13) redress." Id. The court concluded that limiting a plaintiff to(cid:13) contract remedies was necessary because "[t]o impose tort(cid:13) liability in addition would certainly erode the important(cid:13) distinctions between tort and contractual theories,(cid:13) including their differing objectives." Id. at 411.(cid:13) 1. Commercial Entities(cid:13) Appellants contend that the district court’s dismissal of(cid:13) their claims under the economic loss doctrine was improper(cid:13) because the doctrine applies only to transactions between(cid:13) commercial enterprises. Ford maintains that the district(cid:13) court’s holding not only was correct, but was consistent(cid:13) with Pennsylvania state court decisions recognizing that the(cid:13) economic loss doctrine extends to transactions involving(cid:13) individual consumers.(cid:13) Appellants first argue that the district court’s holding is(cid:13) inconsistent with the seminal opinions on the economic(cid:13) 16(cid:13) loss doctrine because these decisions specifically speak of(cid:13) transactions between commercial entities. See East River,(cid:13) 476 U.S. at 871, 106 S.Ct. at 2302 ("manufacturer in a(cid:13) commercial relationship"); Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 620(cid:13) ("sophisticated business entities"); REM Coal, 563 A.2d at(cid:13) 134 ("commercial enterprises"); Indus. Unif. Rental Co., Inc.(cid:13) v. Int’l Harvester Co., 463 A.2d 1085, 1093 (Pa. Super. Ct.(cid:13) 1983) ("commercial enterprises"). Appellants’ argument is(cid:13) unavailing, however, for although the courts in these cases(cid:13) limited their discussions to the circumstances presented(cid:13) therein -- namely to transactions that happened to arise(cid:13) between two businesses -- these opinions do not indicate(cid:13) that the doctrine should not be applied to transactions(cid:13) involving noncommercial entities. Moreover, appellants do(cid:13) not offer authority specifically holding that the economic(cid:13) loss doctrine should not apply to transactions between(cid:13) manufacturers and noncommercial consumers.(cid:13) In light of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s silence(cid:13) on the issue, the district court relied on the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Superior Court’s decision in Jones v. General Motors Corp.,(cid:13) 631 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), to predict how the(cid:13) Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would resolve the matter.(cid:13) As in this case, the plaintiffs in Jones were individual(cid:13) consumers suing an automobile manufacturer for defective(cid:13) components in their vehicle, which in Jones caused a fire(cid:13) that destroyed their truck. See id. at 665. The superior(cid:13) court applied the economic loss doctrine to the plaintiffs’(cid:13) strict liability claim, holding that "we find that the rationale(cid:13) behind REM Coal is equally applicable to disputes involving(cid:13) claims brought by individuals." Id. at 666. The court(cid:13) explained that "[r]egardless of whether a consumer is a(cid:13) commercial entity or an individual, a manufacturer’s(cid:13) warranty as to the quality of its product is a bargained for(cid:13) condition of sale, the effect of which must not be(cid:13) undermined." Id.(cid:13) Appellants urge us to disregard Jones because "it was a(cid:13) panel decision that cannot, by law, overrule the(cid:13) ‘commercial entity’ requirement of REM Coal , an en banc(cid:13) decision." Br. of Appellants at 22 (citing Larthey v. Bland,(cid:13) 532 A.2d 456, 459 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)). The superior(cid:13) court’s decision in Jones, however, did not"overrule" REM(cid:13) 17(cid:13) Coal in any manner: as explained above, the REM Coal(cid:13) court addressed the legal issue in the context of the facts(cid:13) of that particular case and never explicitly stated that the(cid:13) doctrine should not be applied to disputes between(cid:13) manufacturers and noncommercial parties. Even more(cid:13) importantly, appellants misinterpret REM Coal as including(cid:13) a "commercial entity" requirement, for the court specifically(cid:13) reserved on whether the doctrine applies only to(cid:13) commercial enterprises. See REM Coal, 563 A.2d at 134 n.4(cid:13) ("Since the case sub judice involves a dispute between(cid:13) commercial enterprises, as did East River and Aloe Coal, we(cid:13) need not and do not decide any questions regarding(cid:13) disputes between non-commercial parties.").(cid:13) Appellants’ position that we should ignore Jones is at(cid:13) odds with our responsibility to give "significant weight" to(cid:13) state appellate court decisions that may provide insight into(cid:13) how the state supreme court would settle the issue. U.S.(cid:13) Underwriters, 80 F.3d at 93. Moreover, as Ford points out,(cid:13) Jones is not the only Pennsylvania decision applying the(cid:13) economic loss doctrine to commercial and noncommercial(cid:13) purchasers alike. See, e.g., Fasig v. Security-Conn. Life Ins.(cid:13) Co., 41 Pa. D. & C. 4th 494, 502-03 (Ct. Com. Pl. of Wayne(cid:13) County 1999); Buck v. Ford Motor Co., No. AR 97-6895,(cid:13) Pittsburgh Legal J., March 1999, at 83 (Ct. Com. Pl. of(cid:13) Allegheny County, Pa. Oct. 14, 1998). Therefore, even if(cid:13) courts rarely have cited Jones since it was issued eight(cid:13) years ago, the decision is still more predictive of how the(cid:13) Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would rule than the lack of(cid:13) cases presented by appellants in support of their position.(cid:13) Accordingly, as it was required to do, the district court(cid:13) correctly gave "proper regard" to Jones in predicting that(cid:13) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold that the(cid:13) economic loss doctrine extends to individual consumers.(cid:13) Appellants also criticize Jones as being"inconsistent with(cid:13) the purpose and rationale of the doctrine." Br. of Appellants(cid:13) at 22-23. They argue that East River and REM Coal applied(cid:13) the doctrine to contractual relationships between(cid:13) commercial entities because the sophisticated business(cid:13) enterprises in those cases not only understood the risks(cid:13) involved in negotiating the terms of the manufacturer’s(cid:13) liability, but also possessed comparable bargaining power(cid:13) 18(cid:13) that enabled them to enter into fair, arms-length(cid:13) agreements. See id. at 17-18. Appellants insist that the(cid:13) underlying conditions present in East River and REM Coal(cid:13) do not exist in transactions between ordinary consumers(cid:13) and large corporations. See id. at 18. They explain that in(cid:13) commercial relationships between consumers and car(cid:13) manufacturers, the consumers lack bargaining power and(cid:13) are effectively powerless in negotiating the terms of a car’s(cid:13) warranty. See id. Thus, to the extent that appellants were(cid:13) unable to enter into "informed, arms-length negotiations"(cid:13) with Ford over the terms of their warranties, appellants(cid:13) contend that the district court should not have applied the(cid:13) economic loss doctrine to their fraud and statutory claims.(cid:13) Although car purchasers -- whether ordinary consumers(cid:13) or businesses -- may be unable to negotiate the specific(cid:13) details of their automobile warranties, or may be able to(cid:13) select among only limited options, purchasers certainly do(cid:13) not lack bargaining power. Purchasers have the freedom to(cid:13) chose a less expensive car with a limited warranty or a(cid:13) more expensive car with a longer-term warranty, and they(cid:13) often have the option of buying an extended warranty.(cid:13) Moreover, purchasers may select among cars of various(cid:13) manufacturers and consider the differences in warranties in(cid:13) making their choice. Indeed, manufacturers may and do(cid:13) advertise the advantage of their own warranties. And as the(cid:13) Supreme Court stated in East River, "[w]hile giving(cid:13) recognition to the manufacturer’s bargain, warranty law(cid:13) sufficiently protects the purchaser by allowing it to obtain(cid:13) the benefit of its bargain. The expectation damages(cid:13) available in warranty for purely economic loss give a(cid:13) plaintiff the full benefit of its bargain by compensating for(cid:13) foregone business opportunities." East River , 476 U.S. at(cid:13) 873, 106 S.Ct. at 2303 (internal citation omitted).(cid:13) Furthermore, appellants’ proposal to differentiate(cid:13) between ordinary consumers and commercial entities would(cid:13) prove to be difficult to apply in practice. First, as alluded to(cid:13) above, businesses purchasing automobiles -- or any mass-(cid:13) produced product, for that matter -- may have no greater(cid:13) ability to negotiate the specific terms of a warranty than(cid:13) ordinary consumers. Second, a plaintiff ’s sophistication(cid:13) cannot be assumed simply because it is a business or(cid:13) 19(cid:13) corporation as distinguished from an individual consumer.(cid:13) Finally, if courts seek to avoid such baseless assumptions(cid:13) by engaging in case-by-case, fact-intensive inquires to(cid:13) determine the plaintiff ’s level of sophistication, they will be(cid:13) drawn into the type of "difficult line-drawing process that(cid:13) can only yield inconsistent results." REM Coal, 563 A.2d at(cid:13) 132-33.(cid:13) At bottom, not only do Pennsylvania state court decisions(cid:13) indicate that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania likely(cid:13) would apply the economic loss doctrine to transactions(cid:13) involving ordinary consumers, but drawing a distinction(cid:13) between commercial and noncommercial plaintiffs would be(cid:13) entirely impracticable. Therefore, we conclude that the(cid:13) district court properly held that the doctrine applies to(cid:13) transactions between manufacturers and ordinary(cid:13) consumers.(cid:13) 2. Intentional Fraud Exception(cid:13) Appellants next challenge the district court’s order on the(cid:13) grounds that it improperly applied the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine to their fraudulent concealment and UTPCPL(cid:13) claims, as they contend that pertinent Pennsylvania state(cid:13) court decisions and federal district court opinions(cid:13) interpreting Pennsylvania law do not support its holding.(cid:13) Ford argues, however, that the district court, after(cid:13) reviewing persuasive case law from other jurisdictions,(cid:13) correctly predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania(cid:13) would resist creating an exception for intentional fraud(cid:13) actions.(cid:13) Before examining decisions from other jurisdictions(cid:13) addressing whether the economic loss doctrine bars claims(cid:13) of intentional fraud, the district court first found a split in(cid:13) authority among Pennsylvania federal district courts on the(cid:13) issue. Appellants maintain, however, that there is no such(cid:13) split arguing that the three decisions arising out of the(cid:13) Eastern District of Pennsylvania that the court cited in(cid:13) support of its finding are distinguishable. Appellants(cid:13) explain that Factory Market, Inc. v. Schumer International,(cid:13) Inc., 987 F. Supp. 387, 395, 397 (E.D. Pa. 1997), and Sun(cid:13) Co., Inc. v. Badger Design & Constructors, Inc., 939 F.(cid:13) Supp. 365, 370, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1996), involved negligent(cid:13) 20(cid:13) misrepresentation claims, not intentional fraud claims. In(cid:13) addition, they argue that the passage in Sneberger v. BTI(cid:13) Americas, Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-932, 1998 WL 826992, at *8(cid:13) (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1998), stating that fraud and negligent(cid:13) misrepresentation actions are barred by the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine was dicta supported by only one case, Eagle Traffic(cid:13) Control v. Addco, 882 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1995), which(cid:13) itself was a negligent misrepresentation case.(cid:13) Appellants contend that, inasmuch as there is not a split(cid:13) in authority among district courts interpreting Pennsylvania(cid:13) law, the district court erred in relying on authority from(cid:13) other jurisdictions in predicting how the Supreme Court of(cid:13) Pennsylvania would decide the issue. Appellants submit(cid:13) that the district court should have followed the holdings of(cid:13) the other federal district courts in Pennsylvania to have(cid:13) addressed the specific issue raised in this case-- namely,(cid:13) whether claims for intentional fraud, as distinguished from(cid:13) negligent misrepresentation, are barred by the economic(cid:13) loss doctrine. See Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v.(cid:13) Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 535 (W.D. Pa. 2000);(cid:13) KNK Med.-Dental Specialities, Ltd. V. Tamex Corp. , Nos. Civ.(cid:13) A. 99-3409, Civ. A. 99-5265, 2000 WL 1470665, at *5 (E.D.(cid:13) Pa. Sept. 28, 2000); Polymer Dynamics, Inc. v. Bayer Corp.,(cid:13) No. Civ. A. 99-4040, 2000 WL 1146622, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa.(cid:13) Aug. 14, 2000); Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp., No.(cid:13) Civ. A. 97-6331, 2000 WL 134708, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3,(cid:13) 2000); N. Am. Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Bldg. &(cid:13) Constr. Trades Council of Phila. & Vicinity, AFL-CIO , No. Civ.(cid:13) A. 99-2050, 2000 WL 230214, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 29,(cid:13) 2000); Sunquest Info. Sys., Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds,(cid:13) Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 644, 658 (W.D. Pa. 1999); Auger v.(cid:13) Stouffer Corp., No. 93-2529, 1993 WL 364622, at *5 (E.D.(cid:13) Pa. Aug. 31, 1993); Palco Linings, Inc. v. Pavex, Inc., 755 F.(cid:13) Supp. 1269, 1271 (M.D. Pa. 1990).(cid:13) In the face of appellants’ string of district court decisions,(cid:13) Ford first notes that the district court opinions are not(cid:13) binding on this court, for we must give only Pennsylvania(cid:13) state court decisions "proper regard." Ford then goes on to(cid:13) argue that all of these cases are unavailing because they(cid:13) can be traced back to Palco Linings, 755 F. Supp. at 1271,(cid:13) which is not based on a Pennsylvania state court decision,(cid:13) 21(cid:13) but on the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Moorman(cid:13) Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill.(cid:13) 1982). See Peerless Wall, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 535; KNK Med.,(cid:13) 2000 WL 1470665, at *5; Polymer Dynamics, 2000 WL(cid:13) 1146622, at *7 n.5; Montgomery County, 2000 WL 134708,(cid:13) at *7; N. Am. Roofing, 2000 WL 230214, at *7; Sunquest, 40(cid:13) F. Supp. 2d at 658; Auger, 1993 WL 364622, at *5.(cid:13) Ford also points out that the district courts in KNK(cid:13) Medical, Polymer Dynamics, and Montgomery County -- like(cid:13) the district court in this case -- explicitly recognized that(cid:13) there was a split in authority on the issue. Moreover, as(cid:13) Ford asserts, the three decisions lend questionable support(cid:13) to appellants’ argument in favor of an intentional fraud(cid:13) exception. For instance, KNK Medical is unavailing because(cid:13) the court permitted the fraud claim only after concluding(cid:13) that it was "sufficiently distinct from [the] contract claims."(cid:13) KNK Med., 2000 WL 1470665, at *6. Polymer Dynamics is(cid:13) not controlling because the court explicitly declined to(cid:13) resolve the question after noting that the defendant did not(cid:13) raise the doctrine as a defense. See Polymer Dynamics,(cid:13) 2000 WL 1146622, at *7 n.5. Finally, Montgomery County is(cid:13) unreliable because the court emphatically stated that "the(cid:13) economic loss doctrine bars the County’s recovery for both(cid:13) negligent and intentional misrepresentation," but then(cid:13) inexplicably reversed course and permitted the plaintiff ’s(cid:13) intentional misrepresentation claim, perhaps out of an(cid:13) abundance of caution in light of the apparent split in(cid:13) authority. Montgomery County, 2000 WL 134708, at *7.(cid:13) We are satisfied from our review of the case law Ford and(cid:13) appellants cite that the law in Pennsylvania with respect to(cid:13) the application of the economic loss doctrine to intentional(cid:13) fraud actions remains unsettled, and the district court(cid:13) opinions interpreting Pennsylvania law on the point provide(cid:13) little guidance. As already noted, the Supreme Court of(cid:13) Pennsylvania and the other Pennsylvania appellate courts(cid:13) have not resolved the issue in a published opinion. The(cid:13) Pennsylvania federal district court cases appellants and(cid:13) Ford cite are of limited help, for not only is there an(cid:13) apparent split among them, but these opinions address the(cid:13) issue in a very conclusory fashion without providing any(cid:13) explanation why the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would(cid:13) 22(cid:13) rule in a particular way. Moreover, as Ford points out,(cid:13) these district court prognostications do not control our(cid:13) prediction of how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would(cid:13) settle the issue.(cid:13) Having determined that the federal and state decisions(cid:13) interpreting Pennsylvania law shed little light on the(cid:13) question at issue, we next look outside the jurisdiction for(cid:13) persuasive authority on the subject. See Hughes v. Long,(cid:13) 242 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2001) ("In predicting how a(cid:13) matter would be decided under state law we examine: (1)(cid:13) what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said in related(cid:13) areas; (2) the decisional law of the Pennsylvania(cid:13) intermediate courts; (3) federal appeals and district court(cid:13) cases interpreting state law; and (4) decisions from other(cid:13) jurisdictions that have discussed the issues we face here.").(cid:13) We start with the three opinions interpreting Florida,(cid:13) Wisconsin, and Minnesota law that the district court cited(cid:13) in its order. See Hoseline, Inc. v. U.S.A. Diversified Prods.,(cid:13) Inc., 40 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir. 1998); Cooper Power(cid:13) Sys., Inc. v. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Co., Inc., 123(cid:13) F.3d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 1997); Nelson Distrib., Inc. v.(cid:13) Stewart-Warner Indus. Balancers, a Div. of Stewart-Warner(cid:13) Corp., 808 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Minn. 1992). Appellants(cid:13) assert that these opinions are irrelevant, insisting that we(cid:13) should disregard them because they "bear no relation to(cid:13) this consumer fraud action." Br. of Appellants at 26 n.9.(cid:13) Aside from referring to the opinions as "out-of-court(cid:13) decisions," however, appellants fail to explain why the(cid:13) opinions are inapposite. Instead, they simply comment that(cid:13) the opinions underscore their argument that we already(cid:13) have rejected that the economic loss doctrine is limited to(cid:13) disputes between commercial enterprises. Notwithstanding(cid:13) appellants’ position, these opinions squarely support the(cid:13) district court’s holding, as they undeniably recognize that(cid:13) the economic loss doctrine bars tort recovery for intentional(cid:13) fraud claims. Nevertheless, we find that the opinions are(cid:13) short on explanation and therefore provide little insight into(cid:13) how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania might resolve the(cid:13) matter.(cid:13) Appellants urge us to adopt the position appellants(cid:13) advance because it represents the majority rule. In a(cid:13) 23(cid:13) footnote in their reply brief, they cite 23 cases from other(cid:13) federal and state jurisdictions recognizing some type of(cid:13) fraud exception to the economic loss doctrine. See Br. of(cid:13) Appellants at 10-12 n.6. After reviewing the opinions cited(cid:13) in both parties’ briefs and conducting our own independent(cid:13) research, we find most persuasive the well-developed(cid:13) federal and state case law interpreting Michigan and(cid:13) Wisconsin law regarding the economic loss doctrine. We(cid:13) particularly are influenced by an emerging trend in these(cid:13) and other jurisdictions "recogniz[ing] a limited exception to(cid:13) the economic loss doctrine for fraud claims, but only where(cid:13) the claims at issue arise independent[ly] of the underlying(cid:13) contract." Raytheon Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., Inc., 979 F.(cid:13) Supp. 858, 870 (E.D. Wis. 1997).(cid:13) The leading case is Huron Tool & Engineering Co. v.(cid:13) Precision Consulting Services, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 545(cid:13) (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), in which a Michigan state appellate(cid:13) court recognized an exception for fraud-in-the-inducement(cid:13) claims, but only if the fraud is "extraneous to the contract,"(cid:13) not "interwoven with the breach of contract." The court(cid:13) acknowledged that "[f]raud in the inducement presents a(cid:13) special situation where parties to a contract negotiate freely(cid:13) --which normally would constitute grounds for invoking the(cid:13) economic loss doctrine--but where in fact the ability of one(cid:13) party to negotiate fair terms and make an informed decision(cid:13) is undermined by the other party’s fraudulent behavior." Id.(cid:13) The court limited the exception for fraud-in-the-inducement(cid:13) claims, however, stating that "where the only(cid:13) misrepresentation by the dishonest party concerns the(cid:13) quality or character of the goods sold, the other party is(cid:13) still free to negotiate warranty and other terms to account(cid:13) for possible defects in the goods." Id. Accordingly, the court(cid:13) held that the "plaintiff may pursue a claim for fraud in the(cid:13) inducement extraneous to the alleged breach of contract."(cid:13) Id. at 546.(cid:13) Huron’s impact extends beyond Michigan. The Court of(cid:13) Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on Huron when it(cid:13) determined that there was no basis for treating an(cid:13) intentional misrepresentation claim differently from a(cid:13) negligent misrepresentation claim under Wisconsin law. See(cid:13) Cooper Power, 123 F.3d at 682. Explaining that the plaintiff(cid:13) 24(cid:13) was free to extract an express warranty from the(cid:13) manufacturer to remedy any misrepresentation, whether(cid:13) intentional or innocent, the court reasoned that intentional(cid:13) "[m]isrepresentations . . . that ultimately concern the(cid:13) quality of the products sold[ ] are properly remedied(cid:13) through claims for breach of warranty." Id. The Huron(cid:13) limitation also influenced the Court of Appeals for the(cid:13) Eighth Circuit when it concluded that "[a] fraud claim(cid:13) independent of the contract is actionable, but it must be(cid:13) based upon a misrepresentation that was outside of or(cid:13) collateral to the contract, such as many claims of(cid:13) fraudulent misrepresentation." AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool(cid:13) Corp., 137 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 1998). Finally, the(cid:13) Florida Supreme Court explicitly embraced Huron ’s(cid:13) distinction "between fraud extraneous to the contract and(cid:13) fraud interwoven with the breach of contract" when it held(cid:13) that "[w]here a contract exists, a tort action will lie for(cid:13) either intentional or negligent acts considered to be(cid:13) independent from acts that breached the contract." HTP,(cid:13) Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238,(cid:13) 1239-40 (Fla. 1996).(cid:13) This approach is not without its critics, however, as at(cid:13) least one district court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin(cid:13) has challenged the Huron limitation on several grounds.(cid:13) See Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d(cid:13) 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (Budgetel I); Budgetel Inns, Inc. v.(cid:13) Micros Sys., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Wis. 1999)(cid:13) (Budgetel II). That court presented three reasons to support(cid:13) its prediction that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would(cid:13) reject Huron and conclude that fraud-in-the-inducement(cid:13) claims as a rule are not barred by the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine. First, it surmised that the practical effect of the(cid:13) Huron limitation would be the complete elimination of the(cid:13) fraud-in-the-inducement exception because fraudulent(cid:13) inducement cases always involve misrepresentations(cid:13) concerning the quality or characteristics of the subject(cid:13) matter of the underlying contract. See Budgetel I, 8 F.(cid:13) Supp. at 1146. See also Black’s Law Dictionary at 661 (6th(cid:13) ed. 1990) (defining "fraud in the inducement" as(cid:13) "[m]isrepresentation as to the terms, quality or other(cid:13) aspects of a contractual relation . . . that leads a person to(cid:13) agree to enter into the transaction with a false impression(cid:13) 25(cid:13) or understanding of the risks, duties or obligations she has(cid:13) undertaken"). Second, the court stated that fraudulent(cid:13) inducement claims are, in reality, always independent of(cid:13) the contract insofar as the fraudulent inducement must(cid:13) occur before the formation of the contract. See Budgetel I,(cid:13) 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. Third, the court found that the(cid:13) Huron limitation conflicted with the underlying policies of(cid:13) the economic loss doctrine inasmuch as intentional(cid:13) misrepresentations impede parties from freely allocating(cid:13) economic risk between them. See id. at 1148.(cid:13) Only eight months after the court decided Budgetel II,(cid:13) another district court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin(cid:13) upheld the Huron limitation and, in so doing, responded to(cid:13) each of the criticisms of Huron in the Budgetel opinions.(cid:13) See Rich Prod. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937,(cid:13) 977-80 (E.D. Wis. 1999). First, the court rejected the notion(cid:13) that the limitation rendered the fraud-in-the-inducement(cid:13) exception a nullity, maintaining that "[i]t is not difficult to(cid:13) conceive of several scenarios giving rise to claims for fraud(cid:13) in the inducement that survive a challenge under Huron."(cid:13) See id. at 979. The court explained:(cid:13) For example, a company might falsely misrepresent its(cid:13) financial condition, or the level of its insurance(cid:13) coverage, in order to induce another company to enter(cid:13) into a contract. Such considerations, while they may(cid:13) be relevant when considering who[m] to do business(cid:13) with, do not concern the underlying subject matter of(cid:13) the contract or a party’s performance thereunder.(cid:13) Another example is representations regarding(cid:13) organizational form and status. A company may(cid:13) represent itself as a non-profit, charitable organization(cid:13) in order to induce another company to do business on(cid:13) terms more favorable than would otherwise be the(cid:13) case. Or someone doing business as a corporation may(cid:13) represent themselves as a sole proprietorship or(cid:13) partnership, inducing another party to do business(cid:13) thinking they have recourse against personal assets(cid:13) should a dispute develop. Such representations have(cid:13) nothing to do with the subject matter of the underlying(cid:13) contracts or the offending party’s performance(cid:13) thereunder, yet they may inflict damages upon the(cid:13) 26(cid:13) party that relies on them when deciding whether or not(cid:13) to do business. The Huron limitation may set the bar(cid:13) high, but it is not the death knell of fraud in the(cid:13) inducement claims between contracting parties.(cid:13) Id.(cid:13) Second, the Rich Products court stated that if fraudulent(cid:13) inducement claims are exempted from the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine because, as Budgetel asserted, they always arise(cid:13) independently of a contract, then the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine would be rendered a nullity, and tort law would(cid:13) swallow contract law. The court explained that if"all claims(cid:13) for fraud in the inducement are extraneous or independent(cid:13) of the contract because they occur ‘prior to the formation of(cid:13) the contract itself,’ . . . every breach of warranty claim(cid:13) would be turned into a tort by a simple affidavit stating, in(cid:13) effect, that the warranty was spoken before it was written."(cid:13) Id. (internal citation omitted). The court also warned that(cid:13) "written disclaimers of warranties could be voided after the(cid:13) fact by the same affidavit, so long as the oral(cid:13) representations preceded the contract," thus causing chaos(cid:13) and uncertainty in commercial transactions. Id. (cid:13) Third, the Rich Products court rejected the Budgetel(cid:13) court’s concerns that the Huron limitation conflicts with the(cid:13) underlying purpose of the economic loss doctrine by(cid:13) allowing intentional misrepresentations to hamper the(cid:13) bargaining process and prevent the free allocation of(cid:13) economic risk by the parties. It explicated that"[w]arranties(cid:13) of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are(cid:13) common hedges against the carelessness or outright(cid:13) dishonesty of a party’s representations regarding the(cid:13) subject matter of a contract." Id. at 980.(cid:13) The district court in this case seems to have followed the(cid:13) Huron line of cases when it found "more persuasive the(cid:13) reasoning of courts that do bar fraud claims that are(cid:13) intertwined with contract claims and the resulting loss has(cid:13) been economic." Werwinski, 2000 WL 1201576, at *5(cid:13) (emphasis added). Indeed, because appellants’ fraudulent(cid:13) concealment claims relate to "the quality or character of the(cid:13) goods sold," the claims clearly are "intertwined" with, and(cid:13) not "extraneous" to, their breach of warranty claims. Huron,(cid:13) 27(cid:13) 532 N.W.2d at 545. Appellants’ fraud claims are(cid:13) "undergirded by factual allegations identical to those(cid:13) supporting their breach of contract counts." Pub. Serv.(cid:13) Enter. Group, Inc. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 722 F. Supp. 184, 201(cid:13) (D.N.J. 1989). Moreover, the alleged fraudulent(cid:13) concealment "did not cause harm to the plaintiffs distinct(cid:13) from those caused by the breach of contract; and the mere(cid:13) fact that disclosure of certain facts to plaintiffs may have(cid:13) allowed them to take corrective action does not change the(cid:13) result." Id.(cid:13) In addition to exploring persuasive authority from other(cid:13) jurisdictions, we also examine the justifications presented(cid:13) by the parties in support of their competing positions. Ford(cid:13) argues that appellants have failed to articulate any(cid:13) rationale for carving out an exception for intentional fraud(cid:13) actions when the alleged misrepresentation relates to the(cid:13) quality or properties of the subject matter of the underlying(cid:13) contract. See Br. of Appellee at 28. In particular, Ford(cid:13) submits that neither appellants nor any of the opinions(cid:13) they cite provide any justification for treating intentional(cid:13) fraud actions differently from negligent misrepresentation(cid:13) actions, which both parties agree the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine bars under Pennsylvania state case law. Ford(cid:13) explains that from the perspective of a buyer, "intentional(cid:13) (fraudulent) and innocent (negligent) misrepresentations(cid:13) have the same effect," and a buyer can insure against both(cid:13) types of harms through express warranties and statutory(cid:13) warranties. Id. at 30. As Ford opines, "just as the(cid:13) purchaser can protect itself in the contractual language(cid:13) against the other party’s innocent, though wrong(cid:13) representations, so too can it protect itself -- by means of(cid:13) warranty -- against the other party’s intentionally wrong(cid:13) representations about a product’s performance or(cid:13) durability." Id. (internal citations and internal quotation(cid:13) marks omitted).(cid:13) The essence of appellants’ rationale for an intentional(cid:13) fraud exception is that applying the economic loss doctrine(cid:13) to such claims would not serve the doctrine’s purpose of(cid:13) preventing tort law from reallocating risks between parties(cid:13) who fairly have negotiated an arms-length contract. First,(cid:13) appellants maintain that a transaction has not been(cid:13) 28(cid:13) negotiated fairly -- and therefore does not allocate risk(cid:13) fairly -- if one party has made intentional false(cid:13) misrepresentations to the other. Second, appellants explain(cid:13) that "a party making an intentional misrepresentation is in(cid:13) a better position to assess the true risks associated with a(cid:13) contract and therefore should bear the risk of liability for a(cid:13) fraud claim." Amico v. Radius Communications, Inc., No.(cid:13) 1793, slip op. at 7 (C.P. Phila. Jan. 9, 2001) (attached as(cid:13) Exhibit B to Reply Brief of Appellants). Finally, appellants(cid:13) submit that parties to a contract should not have to(cid:13) anticipate possible intentional misrepresentations by the(cid:13) other party when negotiating the allocation of risk between(cid:13) the parties:(cid:13) Although it makes sense to allow parties to allocate the(cid:13) risk of mistakes or accidents that lead to economic(cid:13) losses, it does not make sense to extend the [economic(cid:13) loss] doctrine to intentional acts taken by one party to(cid:13) subvert the purposes of the contract. Although(cid:13) theoretically parties could include contractual(cid:13) provisions discussing the allocation of responsibility(cid:13) when one party intentionally lies or misleads the other,(cid:13) it would not be conducive to amicable commercial(cid:13) relations to require parties to include such clauses in(cid:13) contracts. Expressing such a basic lack of trust in the(cid:13) other party would be likely to sour a deal from the(cid:13) start.(cid:13) A party to a contract cannot rationally calculate the(cid:13) possibility that the other party will deliberately(cid:13) misrepresent terms critical to that contract. Public(cid:13) policy is better served by leaving the possibility of an(cid:13) intentional tort suit hanging over the head of a party(cid:13) considering outright fraud . . . .(cid:13) First Republic Bank v. Brand, No. 147, slip op. at 13 (C.P.(cid:13) Phila. Dec. 19, 2000) (quoting Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v.(cid:13) Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (W.D. Wis. 1997))(cid:13) (attached as Exhibit C to Reply Brief of Appellants).(cid:13) Both parties provide plausible explanations for their(cid:13) respective positions. On the one hand, appellants’ policy(cid:13) justifications for creating an intentional fraud exception are(cid:13) somewhat persuasive, as it makes sense to provide parties(cid:13) 29(cid:13) who have been victims of another party’s intentionally(cid:13) fraudulent behavior special protections under tort law in(cid:13) order to deter such behavior. On the other hand, appellants(cid:13) are unable to explain why contract remedies are inadequate(cid:13) to provide redress when the alleged misrepresentation(cid:13) relates to the quality or characteristics of the goods sold. As(cid:13) Ford points out, the mental state of the wrongdoer is(cid:13) irrelevant from the buyer’s perspective: a plaintiff suffers(cid:13) the same harm -- i.e., economic losses-- regardless of(cid:13) whether the misrepresentation is innocent, negligent, or(cid:13) intentional. Moreover, express warranties and state(cid:13) warranty statutes can provide for compensation to be(cid:13) awarded for these economic losses, regardless of whether(cid:13) the misrepresentation is innocent, negligent, or intentional.(cid:13) Thus, the need to provide a plaintiff additional tort(cid:13) remedies is diminished greatly when (1) the plaintiff can be(cid:13) made whole under contract law, and (2) allowing additional(cid:13) tort remedies will impose additional costs on society. As we(cid:13) have stated previously, "when loss of the benefit of a(cid:13) bargain is the plaintiff ’s sole loss, . . . the undesirable(cid:13) consequences of affording a tort remedy in addition to a(cid:13) contract-based recovery [are] sufficient to outweigh the(cid:13) limited interest of the plaintiff in having relief beyond that(cid:13) provided by warranty claims." Duquesne Light , 66 F.3d at(cid:13) 618-19 (internal quotations omitted).(cid:13) Furthermore, the district court based its prediction as to(cid:13) how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would resolve the(cid:13) issue on sound deductive reasoning. The district court(cid:13) applied the economic loss doctrine to the fraudulent(cid:13) concealment claims after recognizing the willingness of(cid:13) Pennsylvania courts to restrict intentional tort claims that(cid:13) overlap with contract claims. In particular, the district(cid:13) court cited the "gist of the action" doctrine 8 as evidence of(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 8. As Phico Insurance Co. v. Presbyterian Medical Services Corp., 663(cid:13) A.2d 753, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), articulated, the "gist of the action"(cid:13) doctrine bars plaintiffs from bringing a tort claim that merely replicates(cid:13) a claim for breach of an underlying contract. Appellants spend several(cid:13) pages of their opening brief challenging the district court’s conclusion(cid:13) with respect to the "gist of the action" doctrine. Appellants misinterpret(cid:13) the district court’s opinion, however, as relying on the "gist of the action"(cid:13) doctrine as an alternate basis for dismissing appellants’ fraud claims. As(cid:13) Ford correctly points out, the district "court merely cited that rule by(cid:13) analogy as an indication of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s likely(cid:13) leanings if presented with this issue in the context of the analogous(cid:13) economic loss doctrine." Br. of Appellee at 28-29 n.11.(cid:13) 30(cid:13) the Pennsylvania courts’ penchant for dismissing fraud(cid:13) claims that simply restate breach of contract claims. In the(cid:13) absence of any pertinent Pennsylvania case law on the(cid:13) subject, the district court aptly predicted that the Supreme(cid:13) Court of Pennsylvania would apply the economic loss(cid:13) doctrine to intentional fraud cases by drawing an analogy(cid:13) from Pennsylvania’s acceptance of the "gist of the action"(cid:13) doctrine. Such a conclusion is congruent with our past(cid:13) recognition that Pennsylvania state courts have exhibited a(cid:13) "lack of hospitality to tort liability for purely economic loss."(cid:13) Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110, 119 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1987). See also Pub. Serv. Enter. Group, Inc., 722 F.(cid:13) Supp. at 193 (recognizing "that Pennsylvania law is hostile(cid:13) to the recovery of economic losses in tort").(cid:13) Finally, even if we were torn between two competing yet(cid:13) sensible interpretations of Pennsylvania law and did not(cid:13) find the district court’s deductive reasoning to be(cid:13) persuasive, we should opt for the interpretation that(cid:13) restricts liability, rather than expands it, until the Supreme(cid:13) Court of Pennsylvania decides differently. See City of(cid:13) Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 2002); Home Valu, Inc. v. Pep Boys, 213 F.3d 960, 965(cid:13) (7th Cir. 2000) ("Where, as in this case, we are faced with(cid:13) two equally plausible interpretations of state law, we(cid:13) generally choose the narrower interpretation which restricts(cid:13) liability, rather than a more expansive interpretation which(cid:13) creates substantially more liability." (internal quotation(cid:13) marks omitted)). The economic loss doctrine is designed to(cid:13) place a check on limitless liability for manufacturers and(cid:13) establish clear boundaries between tort and contract law.(cid:13) Carving out an exception for intentional fraud would(cid:13) eliminate that check on liability and blur the boundaries(cid:13) between the two areas of law, thus exposing manufacturers(cid:13) to substantially greater liability. In light of these realities,(cid:13) we select the path that limits liability by rejecting(cid:13) appellants’ request for an intentional fraud exception.(cid:13) Based on these reasons, we believe the district court(cid:13) correctly applied the economic loss doctrine to appellants’(cid:13) fraudulent concealment claims. Therefore, we will affirm the(cid:13) district court’s order with respect to appellants’ common(cid:13) law fraudulent concealment claims.(cid:13) 31(cid:13) 3. Statutory Fraud Claims(cid:13) Appellants next argue that the district court erred in(cid:13) applying the economic loss doctrine to their fraud claims(cid:13) under the UTPCPL. Ford responds that the district court(cid:13) was correct when it ruled that there "does not seem to be(cid:13) an[y] reason for treating a common law fraudulent(cid:13) concealment claim differently from a statutory claim under(cid:13) a consumer protection statute." Werwinski, 2000 WL(cid:13) 1201576, at *5 (citing Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. v. PPG(cid:13) Indus., Inc., 1998 WL 469913, at *5 (W.D. Wis. June 11,(cid:13) 1998)).(cid:13) Appellants attack the district court’s conclusion by(cid:13) attempting to distinguish the case on which the district(cid:13) court relied. Appellants explain that the plaintiff in Weather(cid:13) Shield was a business that would be barred from bringing(cid:13) a claim under the Pennsylvania UTPCPL, which only(cid:13) applies to products purchased for "personal, family or(cid:13) household purposes." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73,S 202-9.2(a).(cid:13) Appellants do not explain how this fact materially(cid:13) diminishes the persuasiveness of Weather Shield on the(cid:13) issue of whether statutory fraud claims should be treated(cid:13) the same way as common law fraud claims under the(cid:13) economic loss doctrine.(cid:13) Notwithstanding appellants’ attempt to distinguish the(cid:13) case, Weather Shield provides persuasive authority for(cid:13) applying the economic loss doctrine to statutory(cid:13) misrepresentation claims. As the district court in Weather(cid:13) Shield explicates, "exempting [statutory fraud] claims from(cid:13) the effects of the economic loss doctrine would virtually(cid:13) nullify the doctrine since [the statute] is broad enough to(cid:13) encompass nearly every misrepresentation claim in the(cid:13) commercial sales context, and claims arising from product(cid:13) failure can readily be recast as misrepresentation claims."(cid:13) Weather Shield, 1998 WL 469913, at *6. Ford also offers in(cid:13) support of its position Flagg Energy Development Corp. v.(cid:13) General Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 1075, 1088 (Conn. 1998),(cid:13) in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the(cid:13) economic loss rule barred plaintiffs’ claims under the(cid:13) Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act because the claims(cid:13) "depend[ed] upon the allegations of fact that are identical to(cid:13) those asserted in their [contract] claims."(cid:13) 32(cid:13) In light of the persuasive authority treating common law(cid:13) and statutory fraud claims similarly under the economic(cid:13) loss doctrine, and appellants’ inability to proffer contrary(cid:13) authority, we do not believe that the district court erred in(cid:13) applying the doctrine to appellants’ UTPCPL claims.(cid:13) Inasmuch as the same policy justifications for applying the(cid:13) doctrine to appellants’ common law intentional fraud claims(cid:13) support the doctrine’s application to appellants’ UTPCPL(cid:13) claims, we will affirm the district court’s order with respect(cid:13) to these statutory claims.9(cid:13) IV. CONCLUSION(cid:13) For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders(cid:13) entered by the district court on April 11, 2000, and(cid:13) December 12, 2000.(cid:13) 9. In a footnote at the end of its decision, the district court concluded(cid:13) that the Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations barred the Coffeys’(cid:13) and Daria Zaharchuk’s common law fraud claims. See Werwinski, 2000(cid:13) WL 1201576, at *6 n.5. The court decided that appellants’ claims arose(cid:13) when they began experiencing problems with their transmissions,(cid:13) explaining that "a fraud claim arises when the plaintiff knew or should(cid:13) have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence of the injury(cid:13) stemming from the alleged fraud." Id. Accordingly, the court determined(cid:13) that the fraud claims of any plaintiffs who experienced transmission(cid:13) problems before January 21, 1998 (two years before the filing of the(cid:13) complaint) were time barred.(cid:13) Appellants contend that the district court’s ruling was erroneous(cid:13) because the discovery rule tolled the limitations period until they learned(cid:13) that a latent defect was causing their transmission problems. Appellants(cid:13) insist that when their cars failed, they did not know and had no reason(cid:13) to suspect that the transmission contained latent defects or that Ford(cid:13) knew about the defects and fraudulently concealed them from Ford(cid:13) automobile owners. Consequently, they argue that the statute of(cid:13) limitations did not begin to run on their fraudulent concealment claims(cid:13) until they discovered Ford’s fraudulent behavior. Having determined that(cid:13) the economic loss doctrine bars the fraudulent concealment claims, we(cid:13) need not resolve this matter.(cid:13) 33(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 34