42 N.E.2d 82 | Ill. | 1942
Lead Opinion
The Appellate Court affirmed a judgment of the city court of East St. Louis (
The facts necessary to a consideration of the motion are, that in 1936 plaintiff Paul W. Werner resided in De Witt county and was in the employ of the defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company as a brakeman. While so engaged in defendant's railroad yards in Pana, Christian county, he received injuries. He instituted this suit in the city court of East St. Louis against the defendant claiming there was liability under the Federal Employer's Liability act. Defendant maintained an office in East St. Louis and service was had upon it within the territorial limits of the city.
Defendant's motion to dismiss raises a question as to the territorial jurisdiction of the city court. It is contended *561 that under the constitution and statute, city courts have no jurisdiction over a case where the cause of action declared upon arose without the territorial limits of the city.
The constitution of 1818, section 1 of article 4, created the Supreme Court. Power to create inferior courts was vested in the General Assembly. The constitution of 1848, section 1 of article 5 provided "The judicial power of this State shall be and is hereby vested in one Supreme Court, in circuit courts, in county courts, and in justices of the peace: provided, that inferior local courts, of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the General Assembly in the cities of this State, but such courts shall have a uniform organization and jurisdiction in such cities." The provision of the 1848 constitution came before this court in People ex. rel. Beebe, v.Evans,
In People ex rel. Montgomery v. Barr,
In Covill v. Phy,
Section 1 of article VI of the constitution of 1870 provides that "The judicial powers, except as in this article is otherwise provided, shall be vested in one supreme court, *563 circuit courts, county courts, justices of the peace, police magistrates and such courts as may be created by law in and for cities and incorporated towns."
The first statute in reference to the creation of city courts, enacted after the adoption of the constitution of 1870, was an act approved March 26, 1874. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 345.) It provided that city courts should "have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts within the city in which the same may be in all civil cases, and in all criminal cases, except treason and murder." This section was amended in 1901 (Laws of Illinois, 1901, p. 136) and as amended provided that city courts should "have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts within the city in which the same may be, in all civil cases and in all criminal cases arising in said city," etc. The next amendment was in 1915. (Laws of Illinois, 1915, p. 350.) It declared that the city courts "shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court within the city in which the same may be in all civil cases, both law and chancery, and in all criminal cases arising in said city." It was amended in 1931 but the provision material here was not changed.
One of the first cases to reach this court after the adoption of the constitution of 1870, where the jurisdiction of a city court was in question was Joslyn v. Dickerson,
By reference to the cases decided since the adoption of the present constitution, it will be observed that this court has construed the present provision in reference to city courts in the same way that the provision of the prior constitution was construed in the Evans, Barr and Holmes cases, supra.
The phrase "arising in said city" was first incorporated into the statute by the amendment of 1901 and has been included in every subsequent amendment. Appellee argues that the phrase "arising in said city" refers only to the words immediately preceding it, that is, to criminal cases. The answer to such argument is that neither of the constitutional provisions nor the decisions of this court have made any such distinction between civil and criminal actions. The addition of the phrase to the statute was merely making the language of the statute accord with what this court had previously held to be the law.
The appellee contends that since his action is transitory and not local the city court had jurisdiction over the case. The issue raised is not one of venue but a question as to power and authority of a court to hear a particular case. The distinction which plaintiff seeks to make between a *565
local action and one that is transitory is not within the plain words of the constitution or the statute and cannot be read into them by construction. Appellee cites and relies upon such cases as Frank Simpson Fruit Co. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa FeRailway Co.
Further argument is made as to the meaning of the phrase "arising in said city" and the question is raised as to when and where did plaintiff's cause of action arise. The English case ofDurham v. Spence, L.R. 6 Ex. 46, is a leading case on this point. The court was considering what the legislature meant when it spoke of a cause of action arising in England. The court said it understood a cause of action to be that which brings into being the necessity for bringing the action. The cause, it went on to state, must have reference to time and place and therefore "the cause of action arises when that is not done which ought to have been done; or that is done which ought not to have been done. But the time when the cause of action arises determines also the place where it arises, for when that occurs which is the cause of action the place where it occurs is the place where the cause of action arises." This has been followed in this country by courts where a similar question arose. (Hibernia National Bank v.Lacombe,
The question is not as to whether a city court has jurisdiction to try a personal injury case brought under *566 the Federal Employer's Liability act, but whether such a court has jurisdiction to try a case where the acts from which the cause of action arises occurred outside the territorial limits of the city. As pointed out, the power of the court to hear such a cause is limited as to the place where the cause of action arose. If it arose without the city where the court is located, whether in the same county or another county or State, the city court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. The exercise of its power to act must be considered with reference to the place where the cause of action arose.
Reference is made to section 14 of the City Court act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 37, par. 346) which provides for change of venue from one city court to another, to a circuit court "or to any other court of competent jurisdiction." Action authorized by this section is on the assumption that the city court from which the change of venue is sought had jurisdiction to hear the case. It is not an attempt to prescribe jurisdiction, that being covered by section 1, previously considered.
The city court of East St. Louis being without jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judgment is void and of no effect. Jurisdiction could not be conferred by the consent of the parties and was not waived by defendant's appearance and participation in the trial. It is a question that may be raised at any time, even on appeal. Town of Audubon v. Hand,
For the reasons assigned, the judgments of the Appellate Court and the city court are reversed.
Judgments reversed.
Upon denial of petition for rehearing, June 9, 1942, the following additional opinion was filed:
Addendum
To his petition for rehearing appellee has attached a motion in the form of an alternative to a denial *567 of the petition for rehearing, in which he asks the cause be remanded to the city court so that application might be made to that court under the act of 1891, as amended in 1935, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 146, par. 36,) for a change of venue to a court of competent jurisdiction. The record does not disclose that such an application was presented to or passed upon by the trial court. Under the facts appearing in this record the motion comes too late and is denied.