delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе questions presented by the record now before us arise on a demurrer to a bill in equity which was filed by the appellant against the appellees, in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The demurrer was sustained and the bill was dismissed and from the decree so passed the pending аppeal was taken. The facts, which it is necessary to state, are all set forth-in the *43 bill and are, of course, not disputed. It appears that by a deed dated March 25th, 1881, duly executed and recorded, one Moses Hindes Powder conveyed all his property to himself as trustee, in trust to, for and upon the following uses, trusts and purposes, namely: “In trust so that the said Moses Hindes Powder, trustee herein named, shall and will receive take and collect all the rents, issues, income profits and interest of said property hereby conveyed, аnd from all investments or changes of investments of the same, made or to be made, as hereinafter provided for, and apply the same to the support and maintenance of the said Moses Hindes Powder, and his wife and children, during the lives of the said Moses Hindes Powder аnd his wife and after the death of both of them, the principal of said estate and all increase thereof to become the absolute property of their children share and share alike, the children of any deceased child to take only their parеnt’s share, that is, that share thereof to which, if living, the parent would be entitled.” In the year 1S83, the Safe Deposit and Trust Company was substituted as trustee in the place of Moses Powder, and in October, 1894, the latter died.
In March, 1899, Algeria V. Powder,'the widow of the settlor, conveyed all her interest under the deed of trust to one Sarah A. Danskin.and in May following the latter transferred the same interest to Beryl D. Powder and Margaret D. White, the only children of the settlor. During the years 1899 and 1900 the plaintiff, Charles G. Wentzel, who is the appellant here, furnished the widow and two daughters, whо all lived together, with groceries and provisions, and for the sums due therefor he took the promissory notes of the two daughters and their mother. After parting with her interest in the trust property by the deed above alluded to Mrs. Powder applied for the benefit of the bankrupt lаw and was discharged from the payment of her debts. The appellant brought suit upon some of the promissory notes. Mrs. Powder pleaded her discharge and Beryl D. Powder, one of the daughters, pleaded infancy, but judgment was obtained against Mrs. White, the other daughter.
*44 The pеnding bill was then filed, first, to have the trust declared at an end and to subject the property covered by the deed to the payment of the judgment; or, as alternative relief, to have Mrs. White’s share of the income impounded and applied in satisfaction of the judgment. The appellees resist t-he granting of the relief sought, first, because the trust has not terminated; and, secondly, because the trust created by the deed of 1881 is a spendthrift trust, and the income is therefore beyond the reach of the creditors of the cestui que trustent. We will consider these twо propositions in their inverse'order.
Is the trust created by the deed a spendthrift trust? The terms of the deed must furnish an answer to this inquiry. It will be observed that there are no words used in the deed to indicate an intention on the part of the settlor to make the income inalienable, unlеss the direction to the trustee to “apply the same to the
suppoit and maintenance
of the said Moses Hindes Powder, and his wife and children during the lives of the said Moses Hindes Powder and his wife” can be interpreted as being sufficient to accomplish that result. Clearly, as respects the settlor himself nеither the words above quoted nor any others could have protected the income from attachment and condemnation at the suit of his creditors.
Warner et al.
v.
Rice,
Before proceeding to analyze the language used in the instruments with which this Court dealt in the cases heretofore decided, it will not be amiss to state, in the words of the Suprеme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the general principle applicable to the pending and similar inquiries. In
Slattery
v.
Wilson,
*46
In the deed now under consideration there are no terms to denote an intention or purpose to impose a restraint on the alienation of the income other than the words we have pointed out; namely that thе trustee should apply the income to the “support and maintenance” of the
cestui que trustent,
during the' lives of the settlor and his wife. Starting with the case of
Smith
v.
Towers,
the words which were there held to create a spendthrift trust were these: The testator devised certain real estate to а trustee in trust to collect the rents and profits, and to pay the same to his son, Robert,
“into his own hands and not into another, whether claiming by his authority or otherwise','
and upon his death to convey the real estate to the children of the
cestui que trust.
The difference between the phraseology of that will and the deed before us is obvious at a glance and we need not pause to comment on it. In
Md. Grange Agency
v.
Lee,
The case at bar is in no respect analogous to those where а spendthrift trust has been sustained. There is no provision in the deed attempting to place a restraint on the alienation of the income and there is no prohibition against that income being seized by creditors of the beneficiaries. In point of fact one of the cestui que trustent has actually conveyed away her interest in the income to the others. The two daughters are consequently the only beneficiaries entitled to the income. The declaration that the trustee is to apply the income for their maintenance and support is simply the declaration of a general trust for their benefit. And the record shows that the parties have uniformly acted upon that theory. The trustee has never expended the income for the support and maintenance of the beneficiaries. The trusteе has merely paid over to one of the beneficiaries at stated periods the income as it accrued and the party thus receiving it expended it. The *48 debt which the appellant seeks to recover was contracted by the beneficiaries for fоod, and therefore for articles used in their support and maintenance; and if the interest to accrue on the trust fund is applied to the payment of that debt it will be applied to the support and maintenance of the cestui que trust. Here the whole income is given to the beneficiaries for their support. The thing given is not a mere right to a support out of a fund; in which event the amount bestowed would be indefinite, and would be in its nature inalienable and beyond the reach of creditors; but the thing given is the whole income without any arbitrary discretion being lodged in the trustee as to its application. Where trustees have an arbitrary power of applying such part of an income as they see fit to the support of a cestui que trust, and for no other purpose, it was held that nothing passed to the assignees of the beneficiary. i Perry on Trusts, sec. 386B, citing Twopenny v. Pey ton, 10 Sim. 487; Re Sanderson's Trust, 3 K. & J. 497; Lord v. Bun, 2 Y. & C. 98; Holmes v. Penny, 3 K. & J. 90. In the samе section the author continues, “but if the power is not arbitrary, but is imperative on the trustees to pay over the income for the support of the cestui que trust and another person or persons, the assignees are entitled to take a part upon the insolvency of one, or the whole in the event of the death of the others,” citing Rippon v. Norton, 2 Beav. 63; Wallace v. Anderson, 16 Beav. 533; Percy v. Roberts, 1 Myl. & K. 4.
The case at bar does not fall within the principles applied in any of the decisions heretofore rendered by this Court in sustaining a spendthrift trust, and to bring it within the former rulings on this subject the doctrine imposing a restraint оn the alienation of an equitable life estate would have to be expanded and stretched much farther than it has hitherto been carried. As the deed gives the zvhole income for the support and maintenance of the beneficiaries, the whole belongs to them, аnd the statement of the purpose for which it has been given cannot be deemed an expression of an intention .that it shall not be alienable.
Secondly. We do not consider that the trust has terminated. *49 There is a contingent limitation over to the children of the daughters who may come into being during the life of the widow of the sеttlor, should either of the daughters die leaving issue during the life of the widow.
The conclusion we have reached is that the share of Mrs. White in the income is liable for the payment of the, judgment recovered against her. As this view differs from the one reached by the Circuit Court the decree dismissing the bill will be reversed and the cause will be remanded.
Decree reversed with costs above and bel.ow and cause remanded.