151 Pa. 607 | Pa. | 1892
Opinion by
Eight of the eighteen assignments of error relate to the notice of the fire and the proofs of loss. As to the notice, Cluff testified that Ray, the adjuster, was sent to the place under instructions from himself or the company, and it is undisputed that Ray was there a week after the fire. This was conclusive evidence of notice to the company.
As to the proofs of loss, although they are conceded to be informal they come plainly within the rule laid down in Gould v. Insurance Co., 184 Pa. 570, 588, and the circumstances under which they were delivered, put upon defendants the duty of notifying the plaintiff of their objections, if the want of form was to be relied upon. The failure to give such notice was evidence for the jury of a waiver. But it is said that the proofs of loss were not sent to the company as required by the policy but left at the office of the local agent, Barbour; and Trask v. Ins. Co., 29 Pa. 198, and Edwards v. Ins. Co., 75 Pa. 378, are relied upon to show that such delivery is not sufficient. In both these cases the policy required the notice to be given “ forthwith ” and to the company, and it was held that unexcused delays of eleven and eighteen days respectively, were unreasonable and should be so pronounced as matter of law. And in Edwards v. Ins. Co. it was said that the local agent had no authority to receive the notice and was not bound to communicate it to the company. But since these decisions, the act of June 27, 1883, § 1, P. L. 165, has practically given a legislative definition of reasonable time by fixing the period of ten days for notice of the fire and twenty for the proofs of loss, and has settled the question of the agent’s authority by enacting that the notice and proofs may be delivered to the company at its general office or to the agent who countersigned the policy. There was evidence to justify submitting these matters to the jury in the way it was done, and the assignments of error relating thereto must be dismissed.
The substantial defence was upon the admitted fact that the insurance was on the full value of the fee in the land, while the plaintiff’s interest was only a life estate. Unexplained this was a solid defence on the merits, and the burden of explanation was on the plaintiff. It was testified by Neeley that he wrote the application for insurance for the plaintiff at her re
The question of the measure of damages is not free from difficulty, owing to the meagreness of its presentation by both parties. Undoubtedly the general rule that the insured cannot recover more than his actual loss, or the value of his interest, would, without more, limit the recovery of a life tenant as of a lessee, to the value of his unexpired term. See Wood on Fire Ins. 481. But it is equally true that a carrier, or custodian, or agent may insure in his own name, and recover the entire loss, standing as a trustee for all the amount recovered in excess of his interest: Wood on Fire Ins. 617, 632, 1121 and cases cited. In Miltenberger v. Beacom, 9 Pa. 198, it was said, “ the contract of assurance, like other contracts, may be effected by the agency of a third person, without the authority of the person to be benefited, if he subsequently recognize it. It is true that to enable the beneficiary to sue upon it directly he must be expressly named.” In the present case Neeley testified that there was some talk with plaintiff as to the name in which the insurance should be taken, she saying that some one thought it had better be in the name of the executor or administrator but she thought as she had control of it it had better
There remain to be considered only the seventh and eighth assignments, in regard to the denial of liability for specified reasons, as a waiver of other defences. The only ground upon which such a result can rest is estoppel. No party is required to name all his reasons at once, or any reason at all, and the assignment of one reason for refusal to pay' cannot be a waiver of any other existing reason, unless the other is one which could have been remedied or obviated, and the adversary was so far misled or lulled into security by the silence as to such reason that to enforce it now would be unfair or unjust: Ins. Co. v. Brown, 128 Pa. 386. The whole doctrine depends on estoppel, and the essential feature of it is loss or injury to the other party by the act of the party to be estopped. In this respect there is nothing peculiar about actions upon insurance policies. They stand on the same footing as other litigation. But it has been held that preliminary proofs of loss, though essential are in their nature formal, and “ a condition precedent not to the undertaking of the insurer, but to the right of action of the insured: ” Strong, J., in Ins. Co. v. Stauffer, 33 Pa.
The cases cited by appellee do not sustain the proposition in its breadth as put. In Ins. Co. v. Dougherty, 102 Pa. 568, Ins. Co. v. Erb, 112 Pa. 149, and Ins. Co. v. Enseminger, 12 W. N. 9, there was a positive refusal to pay at all, on grounds that the proofs of loss would not have cured, and it was held that the latter were therefore waived; and in Pipe Lines v. Ins. Co., 145 Pa. 346, a like positive refusal to pay was held evidence of a waiver of the period of sixty days allowed by the policy for adjustment and payment of the loss. All of these cases rest upon the substantial element of estoppel, that the defendant having led the plaintiff to suppose that a compliance with the preliminary formalities would be unavailing, could not thereafter set up the want of such preliminaries. Of the soundness of that principle there can be no question.
But it is not fair to the learned court, or to the case, to take
Judgment affirmed.