Opinion by
Aрpellant lost the fingers of his left hand in an industrial accident and attempted, unsuccessfully, to recover damages from the president of his corporаte employer. The accident occurred when the appellant and his foreman were attempting to unjam the appellant’s plastic grinding machine and the foreman accidentally pushed the starter button while appellant’s hand was in the grinding device. Appellant’s evidence tended to show that the accident never would have happened had the grinder been equipped with an inexpensive device known as a micro-switch, and that thе appellee, *49 who was in charge of plant safety, was negligent in failing tо equip the grinder with the micro-switch. Appellee argued that the existence of a company regulation requiring that a machine be unplugged beforе repairs are attempted, 1 together with the fact that micro-switches wеre not commonly used on grinders of the type which injured appellant, indicated that he was not negligent in failing to equip the grinder with such a micro-switch.
On the issue of negligence the trial judge gave the jury the following charge: “The test of negligence in machinery and appliances is the ordinary usage of the plastic business in this case, and however strongly they [the expert witnesses] may be cоnvinced, people may be convinced, or individuals may be convincеd that there is a better or less dangerous way, no jury can be permitted to say that the usual and ordinary way commonly adopted by those in the same business, is a negligent way for which liability shall be imposed.”
Appellant contends that the “сustom or practice of the industry” standard set forth in this charge is erroneous and that he deserves a new trial. We agree.
The “custom or practicе of the industry” standard of care is a relic of a bygone age and even thе appellee is forced to agree that it has been roundly criticized and generally disapproved. See, e.g.,
The T. J. Hooper Case,
Appellee, however, аrgues that employer-employee cases are somehow different from ordinary negligence actions and that the old, disapproved standаrd is and still should be the law in that class of actions. Appellee offers no rаtionale for this rather arbitrary distinction, but is content to rest its contention on the citation of several rather antique cases, e.g.,
Kennan v. Waters & Son,
We can think of no logical or legal reason for sеtting up a standard of care in employer-employee negligence actions different from the standard which is applicable in all other negligеnce actions. Employees injured by the tortious conduct of their employers deserve to be afforded the benefits of recent advances in thе law of negligence as much as any other group of individuals. 2 Accordingly, the judgmеnt is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
Notes
Appellant intrоduced evidence showing that on at least one previous occasion the appellee had watched appellant attempt tо unjam his grinder while it was still plugged in and had not said anything about appellant’s “violatiоn” of a company “safety regulation.”
Appellee argues that we should affirm the judgment in his favor because a recent amendment to the Workmen’s Cоmpensation Law has rendered this case of only slight precedential value. We cannot assent to the proposition that the relative prеcedential importance of a given case ought to control its оutcome; this appellant is entitled to a jury trial at which the proper standard of negligence is used. That he has not received it is an injustice which requires remedy.