*1 May, 1905.] Welsh jury pleadings, and the case to the on the submitted
plaintiff exculpatory testimony for the defense was as to the publication was answer, denying that the up in the matter set its own being evidence, court, all the This malicious. charged jury publication was libelous motion, upon plaintiff, person tending reflect shame object In the of ridicule. people as an up to hold him agree “We with in this it is said: opinion appeal on the court libel point. publication If the be on this ... the court below implies that it malicious. privileged, ous and not law was may wholly be over presumption not a mere This is legal conclusion, it is a which cannot be proof, come cannot be But the absence actual malice rebutted. whilst may plead and action, the defendant shown as bar to ‘any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount prove ” Fitch, 41 Cal. damages.’ And, as is said Wilson in some conclusively presumed to be 363, “All libels are De Young, 66 Cal. (See, also, Fitch v. degree, malicious.” circumstances, in sustain- below, under the erred The court judgment complaint. the demurrer to amended ing plaintiff must therefore reversed and against entered remanded, directions to overrule the demurrer. the cause with It is so ordered. Angellotti,
Shaw, J., J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied. May Department One. 3323. F. No.
[S. Appellant, CROSS, Respondent. R. H. WELSH, O. JOHN op por Law—Obligation Redemp- Contracts—Time Constitutional op Property—Change op Statute.-—The time Real tion from sale upon execution real governed by in an action contract must be rendered the contract when made in force subsequent change statute, ex- thereupon; rendered levy redemption, before and sale under exeeu- tending the time [146-Cal; \v. from such judgment, apply to a upon, such cannot tion obligation of impair the give it that effect would be to since sale, the contract. *2 Rights.—The Id.—Remedy Affecting far remedy, in so Substantial .“obligation in term rights, is included as it affects substantial consti- meaning state and federal contracts,” within the impairing forbidding passage tutions, ¡ of contracts. Company Redemption of Tuolumne Id.—Cases Overruled.—The cases apd Martin, 428, are to Sedgwick, 38 Cal. 517, v. 15 Cal. Moore v. court, in by later decisions of practically be deemed overruled redemption. for change as to the time to a of statute reference Distinguished.—The Burr, 415, v. U. S. case of Hooker 194. Id.—Case change in the statute applicable distinguished, and held redemp upon illowed to a percentage interest to the redemption, change as to the time tion, to a therein and not security judgment creditor. impairs the Superior judgment of the Court from a APPEAL Judge. Seawell, County Francisco. J. M. of San City and are stated the qpinion. facts Appellant. Wittenmyer, A. Bull, P. and L. Franklin mortgages in Barnitz v. applicable to declared The rule remedy to the Beverly, 118, apply 163 U. S. does remedy may belongs to the general judgment. Whatever being according state, no contract will altered to.the .of Co., 134 thereby (Hill Merchants’ Mut. Ins. impaired. v. S. Louisiana, R. R. v. 157 U. S. 527; New Orleans etc. Co. U. 693; Sneed, 135 v. Bryan Virginia, U. S. Tennessee 224; v. 4; Executions, Moore, 25 Ind. Freeman on 69; 96 U. S. Webb v. 315; Gilmore, 72 Ill. 294, secs. Martin v.
Roger Respondent. Johnson, for change operate retroactively cannot upon the statute (Barnitz prior judgments. Beverly, v. 163 118; U. S. Sav Diego Barrett, Haynes ings 417; Bank v. 126 Cal. San v. 400; Roy, Tredway, 344; 133 Malone v. 134 Cal. Cal. Mc 2 Hayward, (U. S.) 608; Cracken v. How. Louisiana State of City Orleans, 203; v. New S. Planters’ Bank v. 102 U. S.) Sharp, (U. 311; 6 Co., How. Brine v. Fire Ins. Hartford 122 627; 284; 96 U. v. Lewis, Scobey S. Seibert U. S. v. Gib- 623 611; 572; Blair Mills, 17 Wash. son, 17 Ind. Swinburne v. 2 1 Francisco, 4 People v. (Ky.) 46; 4 San Williams, v. Litt. Decker, 563; Ark. Rue v. McClure, 28 127, 141; Oliver v. v. 455; 8 Blackf. Stewart McLean, Stepp, v. 575; Harrison Emerson, Greene Burton v. Vermilyea, 57; 8 Blackf. 151; Lafferty, Martin, 37 Ga. Smoot (Iowa) 396; Aycock v. Denio, 132.) Quackenbush Banks, 384; Gilm. complaint COOPER, A demurrer sustained to C. plain judgment defendant, entered for June, judgment appealed. tiff has A was recovered against plaintiff upon promissory note made levied on the a writ of execution issued and regu complaint, lands described in the which were larly time the October, sold thereunder 1900. At , promissory time the note was and at the executed *3 rendered, judgment allowed, under section debtor was in Procedure, 702 of the of six months after sale Code Civil which to redeem real estate a sale thereof under execu entry judgment, February, 1897, tion. In after the of but. levy sale, so before the of the section of the code was amended judgment as to debtor in allow twelve which months redeem. October, 1900,
In of defendant became the execution, at the sheriff’s sale under a writ of judgment, issued expiration and after the of six months, the sheriff executed a him. After the execu- deed expiration deed, year, plain- tion of the and before the of the by paying tiff offered to redeem purchase amount of the price by and interest thereon as the statute, fixed now seeks this action to be allowed to redeem paying the judgment according amount of the interest to the statute February, question of 1897. The for determination is whether judgment governed by debtor’s to redeem is the law in when contract was made and the ob- effect or the law now in Does statute, force. tained February, in 1897, apply amended made, upon to contracts judgments obtained, which been had at the time it was so plaintiff amended? If it then does, had the redeem; 3 1 79 Am. Dec. and note. Am. Dec. and note. Rep. 61 Am. St. 932. v. below the court not, if it does then the correct. I constitution provided
It is section of article “impair any pass law States that no state shall United I article obligation contracts,” in section ing legisla of the constitution of the state of California con obligation of pass impairing the ture shall no “law ’’ ambigu is not language constitutions tracts. The of the two of a impairs Any ous nor doubtful. law which solely at prohibited. contract is The restriction not aimed contracts, or a cer expressly destroy laws annul degree obligation, but, applies to all laws impair tain their obligation of con any degree impair substantial impairs question tracts. The as to whether or always easy obligation of is not solution. a contract applica quoted, its varied provision of the constitutions j learning subject discussion tions, has been the of more perhaps than the courts of the states and the United States It is settled that all the laws provision. other constitutional existing at time a contract is made which affect of a state rights parties to into and become enter it, obligatory upon all courts which assume part and are as remedy they if give a contracts as were referred such (Von incorporated in the terms of the contract. to or Hoff City Quincy, 550; Co., 4 Wall. Brine v. Insurance man v. remedy, rights, where affects substantial 96 U. S. “obligation contract,” in the term is included o impair s as to remedy materially cannot be altered obligations. (Green Biddle, 75; 8 Wheat. Edwards *4 In the latter Kearzey, S. case it is said: “The U. everything obliga includes within its obligation of a contract nothing Among important these elements tory scope. more . This is means of enforcement the breath its vital than the it, contract, such, as in the Without view of the existence. be, imperfect falls into the class of those to and law, ceases depend they termed, for their obligations, are ful upon they conscience of upon the will and those whom fillment rest.” n against plaintiff it judgment was obtained became
When estate, gave law of the land all his upon real lien thereon, issue right execution under to have creditor any real estate sell levy upon to execution said re- unless absolute to become the title at sale plaintiff, afterwards law as months. The within six demption be made pas- its judgments obtained before amended, applicable if to away deprive the creditor right, sage, take would at the end absolute right become to sell a title which would estate equitable an plaintiff in the months, six and vest so con- right property sell as to another six months. The right possession vey the immediate absolute title and it on condition right than the to sell more valuable that the It is evident future time. vest at some title shall can ac- longer time for before be to the would quire a title the less valuable given redeem, there years If which to purchaser. were ten if one hundred would, apprehend, purchasers, few we be with- years given, the to sell land would be were legisla- to the creditor. If out value and of assistance right to redeem from execution sales after ture can extend the months, period for a of six has been obtained months, years. many extend it for twelve could only degree. In the obli- difference be one one case would gation degree impaired would be a less than says it shall im- the other. But the constitution not be paired all. think the safer rule is to that the at We hold applicable amendment is not to an execution sale made passage, trying before its instead of rendered distinguish by discussing degree the case in which the impaired. legislature If change contract was desires period from execution sales from time time, policy it is change better hold that such shall not be retroactive, applicable judgments shall ren- dered after such amendment. The law as read into the con- govern tract at the time it made should in its enforcement. question aspects in various has been before supreme court of the States several times. United Biddle,
In Wheat. Greene where the constitution of Kentucky provided private rights that all and interests to should remain secure and certain lands valid existing passed by laws, legislature was held that of Ken occupant tucky relieving of lands damages for requiring wrongful detention and owner to pay the occu- Cal.—40 CXLVI. *5 v. there unconstitutional.
pant improvements was by remedy qualified said: “If afforded be and restrained indeed kind, may of the owner any conditions of impaired acknowledged, it and rendered subsist, and be of such restric insecure, according the nature and extent to Hay S.) after ward, (U. In tions.” McCracken v. How. legislature plaintiff of the had recovered a prop passed state of Illinois an act that sale of providing erty bring made under execution unless it should should not be appraised by as householders. two thirds of value certain its obligation contract. In impair The was held to of the act ‘‘ obligation it is of a consists opinion that said: depends binding party on the it. This force who makes made; are neces upon the laws in existence when it is these them sarily contracts, part and form a referred to all perform by one to them the obligation the measure of as right acquired by the There can be and the other. party, either, to ascertain the extent of other standard according indicate, that the terms of the contract than legal meaning; consummated their where becomes to settled duty right, compels one party defines the the law thing fight for, gives contracted the other a perform the there in force. performance by remedies to enforce duty, im to diminish the or to subsequent If law affect any necessarily right, bears on pair the party injury to the other. contract, in favor of one operation in its amounts to a or law, which denial Hence pro rights though accruing contract, obstruction remedy, directly obnoxious to the fessing to on the act plain constitution. . . . prohibition bring damages thereof, breach suit tiff was judgment, prosecute out to take execution obtain pursu satisfied, till the against the defendant existing giving Illinois. These these laws of laws ant binding as perfectly defendant, rights were they had as if been set forth in its the contract part much a relating judg very of the law in the words stipulations Any subsequent denies, law which . . . and executions. ments by superadding a right, condition impairs obstructs, or any sum less than the sale for be no value shall there on, appraisement ascertained levied *6 Welsh v. the any public sale, a affects other mode of valuation than as obligation case, the contract, as much the one other, only by sale the defendant’s it can a be enforced is denial of a prevention such sale the property, binding right. agreement more . . No or contract can create . obligations law, the by the which law than those fastened power which express the contracts; creates and attaches to mortgagor agent as his mortgagee a on to sell is confers delegates to the potent not more that which the law than marshal levied convey property to sell and an execution.” as law stated the above is decisive this. The case
amendment diminished it creditor, created a greater object give estate in the debtor. Its was debtor greater rights before, given than he had and he cannot be rights that he did not have when the was obtained, rights being without such taken from the creditor.
In Sharp, (U. S.) 601, Planters’ Bank v. 6 How. court legislature held that an act of the Mississippi of the state of prohibiting any transferring, bank from or indorsement otherwise, any note, receivable, bill debt, or other evidences of impaired obligation of contracts as to the note and bill receivable held the bank passage at the date of the act. The court “What said: law existed on this when point actually the note was transferred not inquiry, but what existed it obligations when was made and its as ato contract fixed.” were
In Kearzey, v. Edwards U. S. on error from the supreme Carolina, court of North appeared that when the obligations debts were contracted, the, exemption laws of exempt the state allowed as property ap- as freeholders pointed purpose might for the deem necessary for the comfort support family, and of the debtor’s fifty exceed dollars fifty in value, and acres of land not to exceed five hundred provided dollars value. The constitution of 1868 ex- empting five personal dollars’ worth hundred a not to exceed one thousand homestead dollars in value. held impair constitution could not of a contract existed at the time adoption. of its In was no that case there at the time the adoption constitution, the contracts existed. The rule is thus (cid:127)628 Cboss. subsisting in state opinion: jremedy ‘‘The
stated performed is to be is made and contract when where state obligation, subsequent law part of impair substantially remedy so affects that constitu- by the forbidden lessen value therefore void." tion, and is obtained Lewis, relator had
In S. U. Seibert county at a time judgment against ordinary money levied gave right to have a tax law him the when state repealed. it. he collect Before could enforce *7 to mandamus granted him a circuit court United States judg levy, supreme court affirmed the the and the compel right have tax levied was a holding that the the ment, to by repeal. right away that could not be taken vested 118, the Beverly, v. 163 S. In the late case of Barnitz U. fully is that a statute which principle discussed, and it held is upon foreclosure property of authorized the sold ex right redemption previously mortgage, of a where of the redemption beyond period isted, or which extends the of constitutionally apply sale allowed, cannot to a formerly time mortgage passage. its The court a executed before many impossible to resist citing after cases said: "It seems change merely the that a in the is not the conclusion remedy for another, substitution of one is a substantial impairment rights mortgagee expressed of the of the the ’’ quoted by in his contract. This is Freeman work Execu (3d III, 315), says: ed., vol. and the "It tions sec. author that the decisions of the national courts have been true involving application the of the law debts secured cases to not, however, do mortgage. We that the fact understand obligation gives any the debt was secured additional or that merely inviolability. specific property selects out of which coerced, notwithstanding might any subsequent payment mortgagor. or encumbrances the Where transfers the debt right the creditor still has the to exe sell under unsecured subject of the debtor cution, property sale, and stat extending right the creating operates ute to redeem obligation of the contract impair same if extent as ’’ by specific property. secured the debt were This court has Barnitz v. Beverly, the ease of U. followed S. in the Savings Bank Diego San v. Barrett, late cases of. Cal. of v. Haynes 417; Roy, Tredway, 400; Malone v. Cal. 344. subject fully
In the Haynes Tredway, above ease of may be discussed, and the court “In another form said: pur- agreement mortgagor said that the was that subject to chaser at the sale property should have title to the right possession mortgagor for six thereafter necessary case, months. That the contract giving result of give the amended statute effect here is mortgagor right possession upon twelve months face patent after the sale. It is thus extending mort- possession statute gagor period impair- is a substantial twelve months obligation ment limiting pos- of a session to six months.”
Upon principle parties what could it be said that where a specific create upon lien real estate extension period impairs obligation contract, they but that where general create a lien such real estate impair it does not of the contract? If a debtor single is the of a land, owner lot or tract lien of the by judgment creditor is, cases, thereon in most as valuable if him as he lien by mortgage. had a thereon And the later *8 decisions of this in court are with earlier In accord its ones. of People Francisco, opinion case v. 4 San Cal. 127, the states that had deeper the case attracted more attention and any interest than that had ever come Pour before court. counsel on each side argument, were heard in and was held opinion in an able that a apply law as to did not judgments existing at passed. the date the law The was “By change court said: of the law the of absolute away sale is taken and a provision substituted which delays hinders him recovering and in his money, but renders hope many him insecure in of it, might in instances totally destroy rights by nullifying them. It said that is remedy left, legislature delay a substantial if the can payment exemption they limitation or for six laws months years. could do it for six apprehensions Hence the cautious sages of the law tell who us such a construction pregnant would with mischief and The liable to abuse. highest among jurists authorities American and the most Cal.
630
in
expounders
concur
of the federal constitution
learned
part
suspension
remedies
rule that
statute of
less
is more or
made
existing
thereof
when the
was
is said that
It
of the contract.
impairing the
remedy is
only apply
cases where
authorities
to those
says
language
is not
of the constitution—it
denied. Such
Mitchell, 5
impaired.”
v.
The
was followed
Seale
case
apparently departed
early
These two
were
Cal. 402.
cases
517,
15
Redemption
Sedgwick,
from in
Cal.
Tuolumne
Co. v.
Martin,
Moore v.
Oregon rehearing v. after the decision Barnitz Rep. case, in 54 Am. St. in note to the reported referring Beverly, to Barnitz said: “The decisions v. respecting constitutionality of statutes the state courts purporting give to debtors a time redeem within which to sales, previous from execution or foreclosure where previous redemption existed, or the case of the existence might right extending the time within which it be exer very evenly constitutionality cised, were divided. Thus Martin, affirmed in 428; Moore v. of such statutes Cal. 466; Barnitz, Beverly Gilliam, 55 Kan. v. v. State 18 Mont. People Francisco, 154; and denied San Wat 417; Campbell, Kan. Wilder Glenn, Idaho, 695; kins v. *9 in denial made in decisions California and but the Kansas by subsequent decisions in made the were overruled same however, appears, that the earlier in states. now decisions 808, Am. St. Rep. Rep. 932. 61 Am.St. note. 490, Am. 49 Am. and note. Rep. St. 257. Dec. 2 79 both states After the decision in were correct.” Barnitz v. rehearing granted supreme was court of Beverly a Montana a rendered accordance therewith. (18 109.) Mont. extending
We therefore conclude that the statute the time judgments apply existing for does not at the passage time of its and that the should be affirmed. Gray, C., concurred. given foregoing opinion judg-
For in the the reasons is ment affirmed. appealed from
Shaw, Dyke, J., J., Angellotti, Van J. (cid:127) petition rehearing On for Bank the ren- court Bank following opinion 1905:— dered the June petition rehearing appellant SHAW, In a cites J. supreme court of the recent decision the United States Burr, con in Hooker U. S. and insists that it is trary opinion in the to the views stated of Commissioner not Cooper The case cited herein. was briefs counsel submitted, nor case was referred to which the opinion in I opinion. Upon an examination of the that case decisive am that it not case at bar. satisfied against purchaser validity, as a at a fore- It involved after the sale, of a law enacted execution of closure the mort- foreclosure, reducing the decree of gage before rate money paid by to be purchase redemp- on the of interest previously month, allowed, per two cent tioner 1895, p. (Stats. opinion The per month. one cent (Stats. of this state 1897, p. 41), to another also refers redemption from six to increasing allowed twelve the time in question; but as redemp- law here is the months, which made within six in fact months, involved tion there in issue. The suit not law was validity of pur- to him a sheriff to execute deed compel purchaser payment notwithstanding sale, suant to per cent a month. decision at one interest money with against purchaser. valid the law was that the effect is, decision ground mortgage, cannot invoke the con- party *10 "Welsh v. Ceoss. re protection stitutional it, afforded to his contract that right garding the to redeem made under the a contract says: “Upon law in force at the time of the sale. The court hav principle, independent purchaser, we cannot see how an ing as mortgage, no connection with became excepting he purchaser sale, question can raise the at foreclosure legislation as validity in his own behalf in relation to the of to at the time redemption and of which existed rate interest independent pur he purchase. made his In our view the ... as it must, herein, chaser under the facts abide the law ’ ’ stood purchase. at the time of his language If broadly proposition is to taken as be sales, would, course, apply of all warrant, would to sheriff’s rights purchas affecting all far as the them, to laws so ers and as the relation thereunder are concerned only, purchaser defendant herein that of to the case is might rights depend on are measured be said that his language purchased. law force he when must, course, interpreted decision be with reference understood, not particular I do law there considered. So must question. applied think it can be to the law here so conceded, that it has been decided view fact paramount supreme court, which is the United States prescribes authority questions, on such that law which money must be purchase the amount of interest on the which sale is execution paid to redeem from foreclosure or land is meas purchaser rely, can law on which the rights particular. in that It does not follow ure of his period fixes the allowed the same is true of the which during may debtor redeem and after the sale within which the rights may possession land. The he remain regard to the land reach farther back parties rights depend on the of the creditor. The must necessarily land all the estate of the debtor in the must obtain subject empowered power to sell. A which the creditor was power sale does include the to transfer property to not power at all with purchaser all estate sold to the subject By respect to the to such transfer. the law estate in this part which became of his contract the creditor case debt, subject (cid:127)entitled, payment for the sale land, except entire estate debtor in the save and necessarily right possession This six months. pur all of this included the to transfer estate chaser carve purporting at subsequent law, the sale. The out of term this estate an additional and reserve to the debtor clearly of six vio months, years, which is an would estate *11 purchaser late the original contract. prop all obtains the respect the of with the creditor subject erty distinguished prin to sale. The case cannot be ciple Bugbee, from Kinzie, 311; Bronson v. 1 Howard v. How. 461; Beverly, 118, How. and which Barnitz v. U. S. allowing redemption declare or increasing period laws the as to pre-existing mortgages, invalid nor from McCracken Hayward, 707, v. 608, Gantley How. Ewing, and 3 How. holding requiring appraisement property laws prohibiting the sale thereof proportion for less than a certain appraised against previous contracts, value invalid Kearzey, Edwards v. Barry, 15 U. S. and Gunn v. Wall. establishing concerning rule provid the same laws ing a homestead or exemptions. additional In all such cases the creditor would obtain no benefit whatever from the con provision stitutional by his if favor he could not means legal process his transfer to the or property, therein, attempted estate to be withheld by subsequent law.
BEATTY, C. J. The case of Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, upon petitioner confidently which so relies is not author ity this case because of the broad and vital distinction extending between law the time of redemption from execu reducing a law tion sales and the rate of by interest paid to be redemptioner. The former diminishes the estate can necessarily impairs security. be sold If independ an purchaser cannot hold the ent entire subject estate to the mortgage or lien the lienholder cannot sell the purchase man No will pay whole estate. for what he hold, purchase and what no one will cannot has salable possible method only securing value. the full rights uphold is to lienholder title of his vendee to all that his or empowered he is law to sell. a But merely reduces rate interest paid by be impairing so far from redemptioner, security of a mort- gagee judgment creditor, opposite has There are effect. two at execution man desires classes bidders sales. One keep funds, property for use or for idle ás investment and, may compelled if assumed, be will offer fair value competition to do man so of other bidders. Another bidding object has keep no desire to his property; profit by redemp- at is to paid the sale interest to on a competition tion. The is of two of bidders these classes advantageous course alike the execution creditor and to nearly debtor, and a law which induces either class to bid more would, far fair value 'than he otherwise so actually impairing security, it. I enhances think is demonstrable—assuming, current is, as the fact rate of interest on per is less than twelve cent— secured loans twenty- that a law which reduces thei rate from per tendency necessary four induce to twelve cent has a bidding higher one who with view to bid than otherwise would. For he cannot afford in case he *12 unprofitable to pay redemption a sum which will amaize junior lienholder, simple the execution or a and a illus- debtor nearly he the tration will show that can afford to more bid property redemption fair value when the rate is twelve per the per twenty-four Suppose cent than when it is cent. fairly offered for sale to be worth twelve hundred solely fifty man with dollars; bidding who is a view redemption twenty-four per cent, a if the rate is af- cannot, dollars, for pay ford one thousand the end more than at year redemption ($1,240) practically of a be the cost of would if property. Whereas, of the rate was equal to the value pay hundred per twelve cent he could better afford to eleven th¡e year of of at the end the cost dollars, for eighteen of only leaving ten dollars $1,232, be would instead course, likely redemption. Of it is not that profit as the made, would or could often be so a calculation nice reducing of a tendency what real law' illustration shows advantage rate is. redounds to the speculative but the and hurts one parties to the contract complain, position in a bidder, who not lines of decision this court two This view reconciles A law extend- supreme court the United States. in the to liens ing redemption is unconstitutional as time of Egan. Paving San Francisco Co. security accruing impairs before enactment because it reducing right. creditor has a A which the vested law upon a redemption interest rate is not unconstitutional because security impair in- it does not of the creditor or affect juriously the interest of the debtor.
Rehearing denied. May
[S. F. 3158. Department One. 2, 1905.] No. SAN FRANCISCO PAVING COMPANY, Respondent, v.
ANNIE al., Appellants. EGAN et Improvement—Validity Street of Besolution Intention—De- scription Work—Exceptions—Other Streets.—A resolution improve of intention to a street is not invalid because it a orders street that had been once paved macadamized be with bituminous where there no claim that rock, the block improved to be has accepted city as a completed fully been constructed street; excepts portion nor because that of work of the same class, already done, expense at owners, and affects minority frontage; excepts nor because portion required kept law to order company railroad having tracks thereon; nor because includes work of various kinds on it. other streets. Engineer.—The require does not a certificate Id.—Certificate city engineer the circumstances case; of this engineer shows had certificate examined the work intention, resolution of described and had found the same “practically grade,” official line and and which showed the area length pavement, curb constructed, and that recorded, objectionable. certificate was *13 Assessment—Pleading—Findings — Objections Id.—Foreclosure Bid and Contract Untenable.—In action to foreclose a assessment, making where the of a valid bid and street a valid con- found, alleged specification there is no tract were of insuf- ficiency findings evidence sustain in these respects, upon appeal. are not available objections thereto Warrant—Signatures.—The return warrant, Id.—Beturn contractor, person behalf signed on who had made compliance demand, is a oath, verified with the law. superintendent signed need not be streets. The return clearly ,for payment if it shows demand is sufficient premises assessed, publicly made accordance with section Street Act.