167 Wis. 345 | Wis. | 1918
The question in the case is whether the Power Company must'make compensation for the injury to lands which are made permanently unfit for agricultural purposes by the backing up of water by its dam as well as for lands which are actually overflowed.
This depends on the legislation under which the Power Company is acting, and an examination of that legislation clearly shows, we think, that the question must be affirmatively answered.
The Power Company obtains its authority to maintain the dam by virtue of a grant of power made to certain persons (of whom the company is the assignee) by ch. 189, Laws 1907. This act evidently contemplates- that the licensees shall make compensation for injuries to lands not flowed as well, as for lands actually flowed.
By sec. 2 of the act it is declared that “In case it shall be necessary to take, flow or injure” any lands or property for
Turning to tbe statutes last named we find that they have to do with log-driving corporations, which are authorized to improve streams with flooding dams, booms, etc., and are given powers of condemnation for that purpose. Tbe most significant of tbe sections referred to is sec. 1 lile, in which it is provided that such corporations may acquire title to necessary lands or easements by purchase or lease or by eminent domain, “and in case it shall be necessary to take, flow or injure lands and property in tbe construction of tbe works . . . such lands and property or easements therein may be acquired” in tbe manner prescribed by tbe statutes with reference to condemnation by railroads.
In our judgment tbe word “injure” in this statute as well as in tbe statute licensing tbe construction of tbe dam was intentionally inserted and was not intended to be construed in its technical legal sense, i. e. an actionable' wrong, but rather in tbe popular and usual sense, namely, an act resulting in damage. If tbe word were to be construed in its strict technical sense tbe insertion of it in tbe statute would accomplish little, if anything; construed in tbe usual sense, however, it becomes a reasonable and just provision requiring tbe licensees to make compensation for all damage inflicted by their enterprise.
If authority be necessary to support this reasoning it may be found in U. S. v. Alexander, 148 U. S. 186, 13 Sup. Ct. 529, and tbe cases therein collated.
By the Court. — Order afSrmed.