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Wells v. Stone City Bank
691 N.E.2d 1246
Ind. Ct. App.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 been admitted in other Indiana of test had supreme

cases. Our court found a sufficient reliability of the test re-

foundation for the Here, McGrew,

sults. as in the trial court type

noted that the results of this of test e.g., have been admitted other eases. See (Ind. State,

Houston v. State,

1990); Bellamy v. 259 Ind.

N.E.2d 401 We find no abuse of trial

court’s discretion. brief, reply In his Burkett directs us to State, 1112 (Ind.Ct.App.

Carter v.

1997), granted, wherein this court provide that the State failed to a suffi

found reliability urinaly

cient foundation equipment. supreme

sis test our granted petition the State’s to transfer Carter, ‍​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‍therefore, decisiоn does precedent. Ind.Appellate

not constitute Rule

11(B); State, Peterson v. (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

1292-98

Affirmed.

RUCKER, J., concurs.

GARRARD, J., concurs in result. WELLS, Appellant-Plaintiff,

James H.

The STONE CITY BANK and Paul M.

Patton, Individually Repre Capacity, Appellees-Defen sentative

dants.

No. 47A05-9608-CV-324. Appeals

Court of Indiana.

Feb. *2 Strodtman, E. E. Lawrence

Lawrence Associates, Cumberland, for Strodtman & appellant. Hoeller, Cox,

Mary Dina M. Lewis & Wells’ claims the Bank were barred J. Indianapolis, appellee. Wagner, two-year limitations injury claims.1 Its motion was

OPINION granted, subsequent motion to and Wells’ correct error was denied. BARTEAU, Judge. *3 appeals the court’s trial James H. STANDARD OF REVIEW pleadings in grant judgment of a on the favor judgment Wells contends the on the City Bank Paul ‍​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‍Patton of The Stone and M. ings in favor of the Bank was error because (the Bank). issues, Wells raises four complaint was one for breach of contract

we consolidate and restate as: governed by and and those actions are allegation that a bank 1. Whether an of limitations.2 wrongfully dishonored checks written on judgment pleadings pursuant A on the to account states a claim an account-holder’s 12(C) proper only Indiana Trial Rule when of the bank’s contractual obli- breach genuine there are no issues of material fact account-holder, gation toward the when the pleadings and when facts shown the alleges damages the account-holder in the clearly moving party judgment. entitle the opportunities form of lost business and Wagle Henry, reputation resulting alleged Ct.App.1997). A judgment breach? motion for on the pleadings granted only should be when it is 2. Whether a bank’s non-moving clear from the cheеks on an ac- drawn account-holder’s upon presentment any way count will be honored cannot in succeed under the can a claim of constructive fraud facts and therein. Noblesville wrongfully after some checks are dishon- Redevelopment Comm’n v. Noblesville As ored? Partnership, socs. Ltd. (Ind.1996). grant In reviewing the of a T.R.

We reverse and rеmand. 12(C) motion, accept we as true the well- pleaded plead FACTS material facts in the ings, and our review is confined to informa 19,1991, February Bank On the lent Wells pleadings. tion included the $15,000.00. opened a business cheek- ing day, account the same and the loan mon- BREACH OF CONTRACT ey deposited was be the 20, 1991, February account. Between and The trial cоurt determined that Wells’ 4, 1991, March Wells wrote three checks on “substantively action was one $9,534.20. totaling the The' Bank injuries alleges damages in that he for a loss honor did not the cheeks. and business loss Thus, of business income.” R. at 104.3 the later, years About three Wells sued the reasoned, subject the claim was to a dishonor, alleging wrongful Bank two-year limitation, beсause some those faith, contract, good breach of damages typically more arise from the com sought and fraud. He 17.5 million dollars in However, damages mission of a tort. punitive damages, lost income as well as costs, alleges premised attorney on a breach of fees. The Bank moved judgment pleadings, asserting theory for a arise out of his provides apparently 1. Code Indiana section 34-1-2-2 3.The trial court concluded "injuries person actions for or character gravamen compensa- [and] Wells’ suit to obtain personal property” must be com- tion for and credibili- years menced two after cause ac- within thus, ty; essentially it is a tort action. tion hаs accrued. .we note that Wells also claimed in the opportunity successfully form of con- provides Indiana Code section 34-1-2-1 clude a business .transaction in which he was actions "on ing” and contracts not accounts in writ- engaged, resulting and the lost income there- and "for relief frauds" be from. years commenced within six after cause of action has accrued. relationship with the Bank. For determined that the suit We should have reason, governed his action is brought we believe been in contract: period of an oral by the limitations for breach plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect liquidation ground clause on the that it application no has to a tort action. How- of two of limi Where either statutes ever, plaintiff no claim makes that a claim, any may apply to a doubt tations duty was owed to it of that outside created applying should be resolved favor contract, and no breach of Northern Indiana Pub. longer limitation. alleged other than a failure to render Co., v. Fattore Const. Serv. Co. Although contracted for service. an action (Ind.Ct.App.1985), overruled on oth brought in tort sometimes be Miller, Inc. v. grounds, er Berns Const. negligent (Ind.1987). duty, breach of a contractual still And see *4 the nature of § owed and the conse- 51 Limitation Actions 63 Am.Jur.2d of (1970); quences § 54 Actions 39 of its breach must be C.J.S. Limitation determined of by reference to the contract which creatеd duty. that legal wrong A’tort is commit “[a] Markets, 58, quoting Id. at Better Food Inc. upon person property independent ted or Co., 179, v. American Dist. Tel. 40 Cal.2d 253 Dictionary contract.” Black’s Law 1489 (1953) 10, (citations omitted). P.2d 15-16 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis supplied). But the Similarly, appear allege Wells does not to relationship depositor between a and a bank any duty that wаs to him owed outside Teeling is contractual in nature. v. Indiana duty arising Bank, (Ind.Ct. that out of his contractual rela- 855, National 436 N.E.2d 858 Bank, tionship appears particu A in with the and he to App.1982). lar, deposit is a contract of no breach of that other than the funds between depositor a and a institution. Kros perform financial Bank’s failure to the eоntracted-for Kroslack, lack v. 1025 n. 1 completely service. His action should not be (Ind.1987). ground essentially it barred on the that a tort claim. damages The source of the Wells wrongful dishonoring claims is the Bank’s It be that some or all checks; notify to its failure Wells damages not in seeks are recoverable Wells timely being manner cheeks were exаmple, this breach of contract action. For dishonored; wrongful and its acceleration of damages reputation we have held loss of a note Wells executed with the bank. None libel, slander, in available actions for of that can be conduct characterized as inde- process, prosecution, abuse of pendent relationship of the contractual which third contract interference. Greives v. arose when Wells and defendants entered Greenwood, (Ind.Ct.App. 338 banking relationship. 1990). remedy is available reason Generally, there is no contractual relation in those actions is loss of is a ship between a tortfeasor and a victim. But. So, wrongs. foreseeable result of those Id. here, parties’ relationship trial, might at a court determine that dam inseparable wrongs alleges. suffered, any ages for loss of example, wrongful For no creditor bank can repu are not recoverable because the loss of ly accelerate a note unless it has a contractu tation was not a foreseeable result of the In al with the debtor. Orkin of its with Wells. Bank’s breach Walters, Exterminating Inc. v. 466 possibility particular But that a (Ind.Ct.App.1984),'we N.E.2d decided ‘ particu injury is not a foreseeable result of court it the trial erred when allowed Walters completely not lar breach contract should to sue Orkin tort for which arose proving litigant foreclose a from the breach negligence treating from Walters’ Orkin’s recovering those which he can brought a tort action instead home. Walters consequence a foreseeable (cid:127)show be of an action on the contract because the supreme court noted in Law breach. As our exculpatory an clause lim contract contained Pokraka, yers N.E.2d iting liability only. Corp. Title Ins. Orkin’s retreatment (Ind.1992), “recovery knowledge ignorance on of with or reckless of its theories 4) falsity; complaining party of an oral contract would fraud or that the relied personal injury 5) always involve either or dam- representation; repre So, decided, applica- age property.” it an proximately complaining sentation caused the two-year period Strunk, limitation tion party’s injury. Rice v. property to Pokraka’s (Ind.1996). 1280, 1289 claim, of an arose from fraud or breach representations Any might have contract, improper. would be Even oral opened made when his account to the harm Pokraka suffered could be though the effect that the Bank would honor checks that personal property, as characterized be drawn on account in the would two-year applying noted representations “past future were period tantamount limitations “would be fact”; rather, existing representa- were judicially rеpealing these statutes regarding repre- tions future conduct. Such limitations” for fraud and breach of an oral sentations cannot a fraud action. See, e.g., Indianapolis Anderson v. Indiana Applying two-year period limitations Pool, AAMCO Dealers Adver. Title, be, Lawyers it here would as was (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied judicially repealing the tantamount tо (misrepresentations concerning future bene- of limitations actions for breach of an oral advertising agreement fits an under could *5 that contract. The trial court’s decision has action). not a fraud effect, day in and it denies Wells his court for However, representation a re claim, just his breach of contract because сan, garding future conduct situa some alleg- consequential some of the he tions, See, give rise to a constructive fraud. might appropriately sought more in a es be e.g., Farrington Allsop, tort action. (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (summary judgment 109 approach We believe the better is to allow on statute of limitations debtor based was go of contract сlaim to Wells’ breach forward improper promises when debtor broke to re and to allow the trial court to determine the loan). pay allegations a While do not Wells’ relationship nature of Wells’ with fraud, they a state cause of action for actual Bank, to decide whether the Bank do a constructive fraud. The any breaсhed of the duties which from arose seeking statute of limitations for actions re relationship, and to whether the decide constructive, applies lief frauds as alleges a Wells were foreseeable re- actual, well as frauds. Ballard v. Drake’s reason, sult of the Bank’s breach. For that Estate, 143, 152, Ind.App. we reverse dismissal Wells’ contraсt reason, judgment For that a on count, and remand. pleadings improp on the fraud count was er, and we remand to the trial court for its

FRAUD ques of the consideration constructive fraud complaint alleg- count of second tion. accepted es that when the Bank his certified check, opened checking a commercial account by op Constructive fraud arises him, cheeks, and issued counter it was eration law when there is a course of fraudulently misrepresenting a material which, law, by conduct if sanctioned would is, fact —that the Bank would honor advantage, secure an unconscionable irre presented checks drawn on that account and speсtive of the actual intent defraud. payment. Cogdell, Mullen v. Ct.App.1994). The elements of constructive may An action for actual fraud not 1) duty existing by fraud are: a virtue of the representations alleg be based on the 2) fraud, relationship parties; repre between the es. To sustain an action for actual a 1) sentations or omissions made in violation of party prove five elements: that there 3) duty; by reliance the com misrepresentation past a thereon was material 2) 4) fact; representation plaining party; complaining to the existing that the 3) 5) false; thereof; proximate party was made as a result and deposited into his and advantage the funds gaining of an expense complaining charged deposit at the into his be his decision to funds party. Id. alleges damage account. Wells income, reliance, in form of from his in the law In constructive opportunity, lost business and relationship par fers fraud reputation. Finally, alleges which ‍​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‍surround ties and the circumstances actions, through gained its an ad- necessary that there It not to show them. expense by creating a sham vantage at Wells’ Farrington, intent was actual defraud. generated transaction which interest income of a fidu N.E.2d at 109. The existence for the Bank but no benefit to Wells. ciary relationship not the basis for a example, in fraud. For claim of constructive say We cannot it.is clear from the Mullen, we noted that a constructive fraud any way that Wells could not relationship be also arise where the succeed under the facts and seller, buyer parties is that of tween the reason, judgment therein. For that a on the buyer-seller one because pleadings in Bank on favor party may possess knowledge possessed fraud count was error. posi may thereby enjoy a the other and superiority tion of over the other. The rela CONCLUSION a tionship is therefore one which invokes improperly granted The trial court duty dealing. good faith and fair judgment for a Bank’s motion relation We decline hold that the ings alleges because flow ship checking a bank a acсount between from the Bank’s breach of its con- always necessarily fiduciary holder is one. Wells, tract because the relation- with relationship in we do believe the ship and the Bank invoked a between Wells good dealing faith and fair vokes serve as the toward Wells which could buyer- at the same extent as does a least action for constructive fraud. basis for an *6 inherently in relationship. seller A bank is The trial court’s decision reversed and superior checking position to its account proceedings. for further cause is remanded holders, who, in their busi order to conduct ness, protect depend on the bank to SHARPNACK, C.J., concurs. account holder’s funds and to honor cheсks RUCKER, J., opinion. dissents with account when on the account holder’s properly presented payment. The RUCKER, Judge, dissenting. relationship, like the bank and account holder majority I concur in the result the reaches relationship, buyer and seller is sufficient to Otherwise, respect I on the issue of fraud. fraud, support an inference of and Wells’ finely fully Nо matter how the line dissent. allege thus the first element of drawn, day at the count one of end fraud. constructive negligence. In complaint Wells’ sounds alleging of a In addition to the existence determining applicability of the statutes gives rise to a limitation, we look to the substance of the part of the Bank which could an action than the form which cause of rather action for constructive Wells also Klineman, Wolf, pleaded. Rose & it was satisfy the re- made which would 1206, v. Am. Lab. 656 N.E.2d P.C. North maining of constructive fraud. The elements denied¡ (Ind.Ct.App.1995), In alleged representation that it would Bank’s Midwest, Inc. v. Modern Materi -sul-Mark subsequent cheeks and the honor Wells’ als, Inc., (Ind.Ct.App. 594 N.E.2d would be wrongful dishonor of Wells’ checks 1992), adopted part, 612 N.E.2d 550 in violation of omission 1993). of action The substance of the cause toward Wells. Wells’ Bank’s the nature inquiry is ascertained an represen- on the Bank’s ings reliance reference to alleged harm and tation that checks would be honored Wells’ recovery in the com the theories of advanced upоn presentment, in the form of Wells’ deci- Quinn, plaint. v. note that was the source Whitehouse sion to execute the af- Insul-Mark, Accordingly I and would crued. dissent (Ind.1985); 270, 274 on this issue. firm the trial court at 464. complaint for breach In this ease Wells’ suf “the Bank’s actions alleges that Mr. business and

ficiently damaged credibility [such] operate capacity to continue to

that his destroyed.” R. at 8. business] [Wells’ and Shannette Freddie EDWARDS Bank alleges that “the complaint further Kirkwood, Appellants- of its decision to notify Mr. Wells failed to Plaintiffs, timely manner checks dishonor said v. to a disin communicating instead its decision Insync Upline, Dale SISLER impugning Mr. terested ‍​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‍third further Inc., Appellees-Defendants. reputation.” R. personal and business comрlaint that as a result at 7. The asserts No. 45A03-9701-CV-3. actions, in suffered the Bank’s Appeals Indiana. Court of plus million come in the amount $17.5 of Wells’ interest. The substance Feb. compen claim is to obtain of contract sustained

sation credibility. reputation and

and business damages as a result properly credibility are recov

reputation and than in an in a tort action rather

erable See, e.g.,

action for breach of Greenwood,

Greives repu (damages for

(Ind.Ct.App.1990) loss libel, in actions for

tation are available

slander, process, prosecu abuse interferenсe; party contract

tion and third remedy intentional torts afford this

these foreseeable); Indiana the result is

because Indus., v. Terre Haute Michigan Elec. Co.

&

Inc., (Ind.Ct.App.1987), *7 (Ind.1988) (in denied, authority ex action “[n]o profits future are proposition

ists industry”); for loss of face

recoverable Bernardi, Claise

Ct.App.1980) (damages injury to credit ordinarily recoverable in libel, slander, pros

tort actions

ecution, process rather than and abuse of action).

breach of contract alleged harm

In this case the nature of the business Wells’s credibility, ‍​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‍sub- and thus the cause of action is for

stance of his

injuries. personal injury must be A claim for years within two after its accru-

commenced § not initiate

al. I.C. 34-1-2-2. Wells did until three against action Bank ac-

years his claim after

Case Details

Case Name: Wells v. Stone City Bank
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Feb 16, 1998
Citation: 691 N.E.2d 1246
Docket Number: 47A05-9608-CV-324
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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