[¶ 1] Llоyd Wells, Ellen Wells, Zbignew J. Kurlanski, Dee Kurlanski, Joseph Kil-bride, Kathleen Kilbride, Roswell Y. Fur-man and Jennifer Furman (hereinafter Wells) appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) affirming the Fаlmouth Zoning Board of Appeals’ approval of the Portland Yacht Club’s conditional use request for the construction of a building for boat storage and use by the junior sailing program. Wеlls contends that the Board erred in approving the conditional use request because a sufficiently similar request had been rejected within one year; the junior sailing program is an impermissible conditional use; the grant enlarged a nonconforming use; the request was not supported by substantial evidence; and the grant violated shoreland zoning. We affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2] The Club property is located in a residential district at the end of Old Powerhouse Road, and the Club operates the junior sailing program to teach children of both members and nonmembers to sail. On April 29, 1998, the Board denied the Club’s request for conditional use approval “to construct a new building to house the junior program and store small boats at Old Powerhouse Rd.” On March 1, 1999, the Club filed a conditional use request for the “construction of a building as part of the existing Portland Yacht Club, that measures 30' x 40' to store small boats nine months a year and use as classrooms during the summer for the Junior Sailing *373 Program.” The Club’s conditional use request was discussed at a Board meeting, and the public participated through oral and written comments. On March 30, 1999, the Board approvеd the Club’s conditional use request with conditions. 1
[¶ 3] Wells filed an appeal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B in the Superior Court. The court upheld the Board’s conditional use approval, finding that: the ordinance banning resubmission of a conditional use request within one year was not violated; 2 the Club’s use is a permitted conditional use; and the remaining arguments could not be sustained on the record. This appeal followed.
II. STANDING
[¶ 4] The Club contends that Wells does not have standing. To appeal a decision of the Board, “a party must (1) have appeared before the board of appeals; and (2) be able to demonstrate a particularized injury as a result of the board’s action.”
Sproul v. Town of Boothbay Harbor,
III. TIMING REQUIREMENT
[¶ 5] Wells contends that the approval of the conditional use request violates section 8.8(i), which рrohibits the Board from considering a second appeal of a similar nature within one year from the date of the denial of the first appeal. Falmouth, Me., Falmouth Zoning ORdinance § 8.8(l). “Generally, a party in an administrative proceeding must raise any objections it has before the agency for the issue to be preserved for appeal.”
Berry v. Bd. of Trustees, Me. State Ret. Sys.,
[¶ 6] Wells contends that the issue wаs raised to the Board through letters and comments that generally state that the concerns raised by Wells at the hearing for the Club’s first conditional use request continue to exist. These lettеrs and comments were not sufficient to alert the Board and the Club to the existence of the issue that the Club’s conditional use request violated the timing requirement; therefore, the issue cannot be raised here.
*374 IV. CONDITIONAL USE
[¶ 7] Wells contends that the Board erred in allowing an impermissible conditional use in a residential district because, while the Club is a “private club,” a permitted conditional use, the junior sailing program is not. A “private club” is defined in the ordinance as: “A group of people organized for a common purpose to pursue common goals, intеrests or activities, such as social or recreational, and usually characterized by certain membership qualifications, payment of fees or dues, and a constitution and bylаws.” Falmouth, Me., Falmouth Zoning Ordinance § 2.116. “[A]ny use not specifically allowed as either a permitted use or a conditional use is specifically prohibited.” Id. § 1.5.
[¶ 8] “Whether a proposed use falls within the terms of a zoning ordinance is a question of law.”
Underwood v. City of Presque Isle,
[¶ 9] The language of the ordinance is not so narrow that it excludes a private club from operating a program that charges tuition and allows the public to participate.
See
Falmouth, Me., Falmouth Zoning Ordinance § 2.116. The definition of “privаte club” does not include any limitation regarding public access or participation; instead, the definition characterizes a “private club” as a “group of people.”
See id.
The ordinance also states that a “private club” is “usually characterized by certain membership qualifications, payment of fees or dues.”
Id.
This language does not limit the use of a “private club” to those who pay fees or dues, and it does not prevent a private club from charging other fees, such as tuition.
See id.
Furthermore, the junior sailing program teachеs boating skills to children, an integral part of the predominant goal of the Club, which is to promote and facilitate boating.
See Underwood,
V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[¶ 10] Wells contends that the Club failed to satisfy the requirements of section 8.3(c), (d), (e) and (h).
3
“The appli
*375
cant is responsible for demonstrаting to the board that each of the statutory prerequisites is satisfied.”
Forester v. City of Westbrook,
[¶ 11] The record reflects that the Board questioned the Club about the requirements in section 8.3, and the minutes of the meeting state that a Board member “reviewed the conditional use standards[,] finding that the applicant satisfied those standards if conditions were placed on an approval.” We find that the communications in the meeting between the Board, the Club, and the appellants and the conditions the Board placed on approval support the Board’s implicit finding that the Club satisfied the requirements for receiving conditional use approval.
See id.; see also Forester,
VI. SHORELAND ZONING
[¶ 12] Wells also contends that by granting the conditional use request, the Board violated various shoreland zoning provi.sions. We find that Wells failed to preserve this issuе for appeal.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
.The conditions specified in the approval are:
1. No landscaping within [a specified no-nappealing abutter’s] property right of way.
2. The number of students in the sailing program shall be limited to 60 per session.
3.Activities at the proposed building are to cease by 8:00 PM.
. The Superior Court also determined that this issue was arguably waived “by the plaintiffs below, but given the record here the court does not neеd to rely upon waiver-”
. The Club was denied the initial conditional use request for failure "to satisfy section 8.3 c, d & e.” Section 8.3 states in pertinent part:
Conditional uses may be granted by the Board of Appeals after considering the characteristics and location of the proposed use and of other properties in the surrounding neighborhood, provided that the petitioner shall submit to the Board statements in writing, which may be accompanied by diagrams or photographs which shall become part of the record of the such petitions, demonstrating that the proposed use:
c. will not have a significant detrimental effect on the use and peaceful enjoyment of abutting property as a result of noise, vibrations, fumes, odor, dust, light or glare;
d. will not have a significаnt adverse effect on adjacent or nearby property values;
*375 e. will not result in significant hazards to pedestrian or vehicular traffic or significant traffic congestion;
h. will be served adequately by, but will not overburden, existing public services and facilities, including fire protection services, sanitary sewers, roads, water and storm drainage systems.
Falmouth, Me., Falmouth Zoning Ordinance § 8.3.